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One of the central purposes of the international law of the sea is to define various 
maritime zones, their extent and limits. One of these zones is the continental shelf. 
The continental shelf in modern international law has two aspects: The continental 
shelf within 200 nautical miles from the shore of coastal States and the continental 
shelf beyond that limit.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that 
information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles shall be 
submitted by the coastal State to a scientific and technical commission, namely the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Commission is responsible 
for making recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment 
of the outer limits of their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles. If the limits 
of the shelf established by a coastal State are on the basis of the recommendations, 
they are final and binding. 
 The establishment of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles has two 
main features: The establishment of the boundary line between the continental shelf 
and the international seabed area and the establishment of the boundary between the 
continental shelf of adjacent or opposite coastal States. Many questions concerning 
the relationship between these procedures have been left unanswered as well as the 
relationship between the Commission and international courts and tribunals. 
This thesis analyses the role of coastal States, the Commission and 
international courts and tribunals in the establishment of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles and the interplay between them. It explores how the various 
sources of international law have contributed to the establishment of the current legal 
framework.  
The thesis explores the differences between the delineation and delimitation 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. It demonstrates that the role of the 
Commission is to curtail extravagant claims to the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles and protect the territorial scope of the international seabed area. It also 
shows that the role of international courts and tribunals in this field is essentially the 
same as their role in other types of disputes. It explains that the establishment of the 
boundary line between the continental shelf and the international seabed area and the 
establishment of the boundary between the continental shelf of adjacent or opposite 
coastal States is a separate process. Furthermore, it clarifies that the three-stage 
boundary delimitation method is applicable beyond 200 nautical miles. It also 
displays that no special rule of customary international law has evolved that is solely 
applicable to delimitations regarding the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
The thesis addresses the interaction of the various mechanisms within the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles. Its main conclusion is that despite the possibility for 
tension to arise the relationship between the institutions is clear and precise and they 
together form a coherent system where each separate institution plays its own part in 
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1.1. The Topic 
This thesis addresses disputes concerning the establishment of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles.
1
 The reason why there is global interest in this issue lies 
in the fact that it is often necessary for coastal States to settle these disputes before 
deciding the outer limit of the shelf and before exploring and exploiting important 
natural resources from the seabed beyond 200 nm. It is, for instance, very unlikely 
that oil and gas companies are willing to make an investment in disputed areas. The 
economic, financial and political incentives to solve such disputes are consequently 
often high. Another factor is that territorial rights and natural resources have 
throughout history been a flammable combination which has negatively impacted 
peace and stability in the international society.  
One of the central purposes of the international law of the sea is to define 
various maritime zones, their extent and limits. According to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea
2
 the continental shelf extends at least to a distance 
of 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.
3
 If a coastal State fulfils complex geoscientific criteria laid out in the 
Convention it can make a claim to the continental shelf beyond the 200 nm limit.
4
  
UNCLOS provides that information on the limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm from the baselines shall be submitted by the coastal State to a 
scientific and technical commission, named the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf.
5
 The Commission is responsible for making recommendations to 
coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their 
                                                          
1
 1 nautical mile (nm) equals 1,852 metres.  
2
 Adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 396 (UNCLOS or 
the Convention). Some authors use the abbreviation LOSC or LOS Convention. 
3
 Article 76(1) of UNCLOS. The provisions on baselines are found in articles 5-14 of UNCLOS 
4
 For the reason of simplification, the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is often referred to as the outer 
continental shelf in this thesis while the continental shelf within 200 nm is sometimes referred to as 
the inner continental shelf. These terms are nowhere to be found in UNCLOS and are not theoretically 
correct since ‘there is in law only a single “continental shelf” rather than an inner continental shelf and 
a separate extended or outer continental shelf’. In the Matter of an Arbitration between Barbados and 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (Barbados v. Republic of Trinidad & Tobago) (Arbitration 
Tribunal) (2006) 45 ILM 800, 835, para. 213 (Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case); See also Dispute 
Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar) (Judgement)  2012 
˂http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1-C16_Judgment_14_02_2012. 
pdf˃ accessed 16 July 2012 [108, para. 362] (Bay of Bengal Case). 
5




continental shelves beyond 200 nm. If the limits of the shelf established by a coastal 
State are on the basis of the recommendations, they are final and binding.
6
 This 
process is quite different from the one provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf
7
 and from the establishment of other maritime zones under 
international law which can be established without the involvement of an 
international entity. 
The establishment of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm has two main 
features: The establishment of the boundary line between the continental shelf and 
the international sea bed area
8
 (the delineation of the continental shelf) and the 
establishment of the boundary between the continental shelf of adjacent or opposite 
coastal States (the delimitation of the continental shelf).
9
 These two features are 
procedural in nature. The delineation process is a complex legal-scientific/technical 
procedure where the CLCS plays a pivotal role in curtailing the territorial 
temptations of broad margin States. Its task is to protect the Area beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction that has been designated as the common heritage of mankind.  
The delimitation process is different from the CLCS procedure. The actions 
of the CLCS are without prejudice to matters relating to the delimitation of 
boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.
10
 According to 
UNCLOS it is for neighbouring States to delimit the maritime boundaries of their 
continental shelves.
11
 The delimitation is supposed to be effected by agreement and, 
                                                          
6
 Article 76(8) of UNCLOS. 
7
 Adopted on 29 April 1958; entered into force 10 June 1964; 499 UNTS 311 (1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention). The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention is one of four conventions adopted in Geneva in 
1958 which are the predecessors to UNCLOS. 
8
 The international seabed area is usually referred to as the Area. Article 1(1) of UNCLOS defines the 
Area as ‘the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. 
The definition is a negative one ‘for in order to know the exact extent of the Area, one needs to know 
up to where exactly coastal states have extended their national jurisdiction at sea’. Erik Franckx, ‘The 
International Seabed Authority and the Common Heritage of Mankind: The need for States to 
Establish the Outer Limits of their Continental Shelf’ (2010) 25 IJMCL 543, 552. Article 140 of 
UNCLOS provides that ‘[a]ctivities in the Area shall ... be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole’. 
9
 These two terms should not be confused with the term demarcation which is important in land 
boundary delimitations. The demarcation of a land boundary ‘amounts to laying it down, as mutually 
defined, by means of boundary pillars, monuments and buoys, and permanent erections of other kinds, 
along the topographical conformations of the territories to be separated by it’. A. Cukwurah, The 
Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester University Press 1967) 28. 
Demarcation is of limited practical value in outer continental shelf delimitations since the importance 
of visually showing the boundary line on the seabed itself is very limited. 
10
 Article 9 of Annex II to UNCLOS. 
11




if not possible, within a reasonable time resort shall be made to procedures provided 
for in the dispute settlement part of UNCLOS.
12
 The Convention provides that this 
process shall be guided by international law as defined in article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute). The most important outcome of this 
guidance is that it designates a law-making role for international courts and tribunals. 
The purpose of the delimitation is to achieve an equitable solution,
13
 not to fulfil 
specific scientific and technical criteria as in the CLCS procedure. From the work of 
Aristotle to modern times equity has been associated with procedure. Equity viewed 
in these terms aims ‘to devise remedies giving fuller effect to the norms of positive 
law’.
14
   
The relationship between the delineation process of the outer continental 
shelf and the dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS has been controversial 
because States failed to address the issue when negotiating the Convention. The 
outcome of the same negotiations was that international courts and tribunals were 
mandated to decide what is the law in maritime boundary delimitations. 
Consequently, international courts and tribunals have been given a central role in 
deciding what is the procedural and substantive law in this field. So far only one 
delimitation case regarding the outer continental shelf has been decided by an 
international tribunal, namely the Bay of Bengal Case which was decided by the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
15
 More such cases are, however, to 
come.
16
 It is hoped that this thesis will be of some help to future litigation, 
negotiations and academic discussions. 
1.2. The Approach  
This thesis is about the relationship between the delineation and delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf, the relationship between the inner and outer continental shelf 
                                                          
12
 Part XV of the Convention contains the provisions on dispute settlement. 
13
 Ibid. This is also the purpose of delimitations involving the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). See 
article 74(1) of UNCLOS.  
14
 Phaedon Kozyris, ‘Lifting the Veils of Equity in Maritime Entitlements: Equidistance with 
proportionality around the islands’ (1997-8) 26 Denv. J. Int’l & Pol’y 319, 326. 
15
 Hereinafter ITLOS or the Tribunal. 
16
 In April-May this year a dispute that involves considerations regarding the delimitation of the outer 
continental shelf was heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court). See Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Pending)  





and the relationship between the CLCS and international courts and tribunals. The 
thesis is also about the role of science and scientific experts in international law and 
who is responsible for applying and interpreting the law in an area which involves 
complicated scientific and technical considerations. An attempt is made to answer 
the six following questions: 
 
•What are the similarities and differences between delineation and 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf? 
 
•What is the role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 
delineation and delimitation disputes? 
  
•What is the role of international courts and tribunals in disputes regarding 
the establishment of the outer continental shelf? 
 
•Are there any special factors concerning the outer continental shelf that limit 
the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals? 
 
•Are the principles of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm 
the same as those for within 200 nm? 
 
•Has a rule of customary international law emerged that is especially 
applicable in outer continental shelf delimitations? 
 
1.3. Outline of the Study 
This thesis will address some of the larger questions concerning the establishment of 
the outer continental shelf. Chapter two explains various important concepts for the 
subject of the thesis and discusses the main aspects of delineation and delimitation of 
the outer continental shelf. It focuses to a large extent on the historical development 
that led to the current legal framework concerning the continental shelf, who are 





 Chapter three focuses on the legal nature of the CLCS, its recommendations 
and how the Commission differs from international dispute settlement bodies. It asks 
the question of what the CLCS really is. It deals also with questions regarding the 
interpretation of article 76(8) of UNCLOS. In addition, an attempt is made to explain 
how the Commission deals with submissions in the event of a dispute between States 
with opposite or adjacent coasts or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime 
disputes. 
Chapter four focuses on the settlement of disputes by international courts and 
tribunals in the context of the outer continental shelf. Jurisdictional and procedural 
matters are the focal point. It examines the dispute settlement mechanism of 
UNCLOS, the law-making role of international courts and tribunals and questions 
concerning the optional exception clause, standing and whether States are obliged to 
await recommendations from the CLCS before they seek to delimit their outer 
continental shelf. The chapter also addresses the evaluation of scientific and 
technical evidence in cases concerning the outer continental shelf and the 
consequences of a judgement for the CLCS.  
Chapter five aims to shed light on the methods that have been used and could 
be used in boundary delimitations involving the outer continental shelf. An attempt is 
made to answer the question of whether the principles of maritime delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf are the same as those for the delimitation of the inner 
continental shelf. It asks whether the equidistance/relevant circumstances method is 
applicable in delimitation cases before international courts and tribunals concerning 
the outer continental shelf and analyses boundary agreements involving the outer 
continental shelf with the aim of identifying trends and differences in the State 
practice. Finally, the conclusions of the thesis are found in chapter six.  
 Overall, this thesis analyses the role of coastal States, the CLCS and 
international courts and tribunals in the establishment of the outer continental shelf 
and how the legal framework can be further coherently developed in accordance with 





2. The Establishment of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the establishment of the outer continental shelf. The purpose 
of it is twofold: To define important concepts for the purposes of the thesis and to 
explain the main aspects of the delineation and delimitation of the outer continental 
shelf. Consequently, this chapter is divided into two main parts. The former part 
discusses the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf. It gives a brief 
historical overview of the concept and introduces the natural prolongation concept. 
For the sake of convenience the natural prolongation discussion will not separate 
delineation and delimitation considerations. Finally, the main provisions of 
UNCLOS regarding the establishment of the continental shelf are explained and a 
short overview is given about coastal States rights and duties in the continental shelf.  
The later part of this chapter is dedicated to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between neighbouring States. The main purpose of this part is to introduce the 
main underlying ideas and principles of maritime boundary delimitation. Moreover, 
the part explains the views of the two main schools of maritime boundary 
delimitation. Finally, it gives a brief historical overview of continental shelf 
delimitation. Although this chapter is divided into two main parts, for structural 
reasons, it must be borne in mind that the issues relating to delineation and 




2.2. What is the Continental Shelf? 
The term continental shelf does not have the same meaning in international law as in 
science. The scientific meaning of the continental shelf refers to the platform on 
which the land lies. In a more detailed way it can generally be described as 
following: 
Physically, the sea bed adjacent to a typical coast is usually considered to consist of three separate 
sections ... First, the section that slopes down gradually from the low-water mark to the depth, 
averaging about 130 metres, at which the angle of declination increases markedly: this is the 
                                                          
17
 See Coalter Lathrop, ‘Continental Shelf Delimitation Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Approaches 
Taken by Coastal States before the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’ in David 
Colson & Robert Smith (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries vol. VI (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 




continental shelf proper. Second, the section bordering the shelf and having the steeper slope, 
going down to around 1,200 to 3,500 metres: this is known as the continental slope. Third, there is 
in many locations an area beyond the slope where the sea bed falls away more gradually and is 
composed mainly of sediments washed down from the continents. This is called the continental 
rise, and typically descends to a depth of around 3,500 to 5,500 metres. Together these three 




Beyond the outer edge of the continental margin is the deep ocean floor which 
includes the oceanic features of the seafloor, such as ocean basins, abyssal plains, 
abyssal hills, mid-ocean ridges, fracture zones and seamounts. The main reason why 
there is a large interest in the establishment of the continental shelf is that in many 
places the continental margin is rich of natural resources suitable for exploitation, the 
most important being oil and gas. Other possible future energy sources, are also 
found there, ‘such as gas hydrate, a methane/water mixture frozen into the 
sediments’.
19
 It also ‘includes many types of sea-floor formations with metal and 
mineral resource potential, such as polymetallic nodules’ and biological resources 
used for medical and pharmaceutical purposes.
20
   
The continental shelf as it is described in UNCLOS is partially a legal fiction. 
The continental shelf in the meaning of UNCLOS extends throughout the natural 
prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a 
distance of 200 nm from the baselines where the outer edge does not extend up to 
that distance.
21
 The seabed itself has no role in the latter method, only distance. It 
must also be noted that the seabed within the territorial sea, which is of course part of 
the physical continental shelf, is not part of the legal continental shelf.  
2.3. The Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles  
2.3.1. The History of the Legal Continental Shelf 1945-82 
It is customary to view the statement made by United States President Harry Truman 
(the Truman Proclamation) on 28 September 1945
22
 as the beginning of the modern 
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continental shelf regime. It must though be noted that a small number of States had 
already regulated the exploitation of resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the 
territorial sea, as well as the physical seabed, long before the Truman Proclamation. 
For instance, pearl fisheries of Ceylon were regulated from 1811.
23
 Moreover, in 
1936 the United Kingdom proposed to Venezuela new legal criterion for the 
exploitation of what were initially called submarine areas.
24
 The proposal was at the 
time however, rejected by Venezuela; the latter believing that it contradicted the 
principle of the freedom of the high seas.
25
 Although, the idea of extended seabed 
jurisdiction had already been introduced before the Truman Proclamation it was the 
Proclamation itself that ‘came to be regarded as the starting point of the positive law 
on the subject’
26
 and began the development of the modern continental shelf concept. 
The Proclamation was mainly influenced by three factors. First, ‘the need to find new 
deposits of petroleum and natural gas and minerals, lying in the seabed and the ocean 
floor and its subsoil’.
27
 Second, ‘to guard against a threatened shortage resulting 
from the depletion of world stocks during the Second World War’.
28
 Third, ‘to avoid 
dependence on imported supplies of these strategic raw materials’.
29
  
The Proclamation stated that ‘the Government of the United States regards 
the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the 
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States, subject to its jurisdiction 
and control’.
30
 The preamble of the Proclamation justifies its context mainly with 
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reference to contiguity and reasonableness. The Proclamation was followed by 
similar claims from other States.
31
 
The speed of the development of the continental shelf as a legal regime was 
unusually fast. Five years after the Truman Proclamation, Lauterpacht stated that 
‘[s]eldom has an apparent major change in international law been accomplished by 
peaceful means more rapidly and amidst more general acquiescence and approval 
than in the case of the claims to submarine areas – the sea-bed and its subsoil – 
adjacent to the coast of littoral states’.
32
 Moreover, Lauterpacht provided: 
[A]ssuming that we are confronted here with the creation of new international law by custom, 
what matters is not so much the number of states participating in its creation and the length of the 
period within which that change takes place, as the relative importance, in any particular sphere, of 
states inaugurating the change. In a matter closely related to the principle of the freedom of the 
seas the conduct of the two principal maritime Powers – such as Great Britain and the United 
States – is of special importance. With regard to the continental shelf and submarine areas 
generally these two states inaugurated the development and their initiative was treated as 




Not everyone shared the same view. Amerasinghe, the first president of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
34
 pointed out that ‘[i]n 1945 the 
nations of the world were too enfeebled by six years of war or too pre-occupied with 
the pressing problem of repairing the havoc of war or too dependent on the United 
States to challenge the doctrine or reveal its flaws’.
35
 Oda argued that the fact that 
many unilateral declarations provoked no protest from other States perhaps only 
meant nothing more than that these ‘claims did not directly infringe upon the 
interests of other states at the time’.
36
 Although some scepticism arose about the 
continental shelf as an instant custom, it was soon transported into treaty law within 
one of the Geneva Conventions, prepared by the International Law Commission,
37
 
thirteen years after the Proclamation. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf defined the continental shelf as follows: 
For the purpose of these articles, the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to 
a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of 
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the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar 




The ICJ stated in the 1969 North Sea Case ‒ the first continental shelf delimitation 
case that went before an international court ‒ that the provision was one of the 
‘Articles being the ones which, it is clear, were ... regarded as reflecting, or as 
crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international law’ at 
the time they were negotiated.
39
 It also laid much emphasis on the continental shelf 
being the natural prolongation of the coastal State’s land mass although no mention 
is made of this concept in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Even if the 
Geneva Conventions definition was accepted and adopted into domestic legislation 
by various States it was not free from difficulty. The former method, that is the 200-
metre limit, which ‘was chosen partly as corresponding approximately to the normal 
outer limit of the shelf in the physical sense,’
40
 was not controversial. The alternative 
to the 200 metre depth criterion ‘which has come to be known as the exploitability 
criterion ... constitutes the indeterminate nature and the unsatisfactory feature of the 
definition’.
41
 There was an understanding that ‘[i]t was clear that new technology 
would push the limit farther and farther from the shore, and that “exploitability” – 
which could mean anything from the ability to drag up a basket of sedentary fish to 
the ability to establish a full–scale profit-making offshore oil complex – was itself an 
elusive criterion’.
42
 In the years after the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention was 
concluded ‘[i]t was feared that the consequence of continued adherence to the 
exploitability test in the face of rapidly developing technology, rendering ever deeper 
areas “exploitable”, would be the eventual extension of coastal State “continental 
shelf” claims so as to cover the entire ocean floor’.
43
 Another related factor was that 
developing countries were concerned that the resources of the oceans would only be 
‘exploited by a few powerful States that would in this way be able to control the 
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 whilst at the same time hoping ‘that a share of the resources 
would help them eliminate their poverty problems’.
45
 
A speech delivered by the Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo in 1967 before 
the United Nations General Assembly
46
 is viewed as the beginning of a remarkable 
evolution in international law. His speech introduced an idea about the common 
heritage of mankind in the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. He 
proposed that the international community should establish an area of the seabed and 
ocean floor from which to exploit resources from the ocean depths.
47
 Pardo’s ideas 
instantly became popular, especially among developing and recently independent 
States. Two years after his speech, UNGA declared:  
[T]he definition of the continental shelf contained in the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 
29 April 1958, does not define with sufficient precision the limits of the area over which a coastal 
state exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural 




The next year UNGA declared that ‘[t]he sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction ... as well as the resources of the 
area, are the common heritage of mankind’.
49
  
At the beginning of the 1970s there was a strong call for change in the law of 
the sea. This call was answered with the Third Conference that took place between 
1973 and 1982. The main dispute at the Third Conference, regarding the continental 
shelf, concerned its outer limits.
50
 Many States favoured the connection of the 200 
nm limits of the EEZ and the continental shelf whereas the majority of States do not 
have a physical continental shelf beyond that distance. However, a number of coastal 
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States with prospects for extended continental shelves, usually called the broad 
margin States (including maritime powers such as USA, USSR, Argentina and 
Australia), ‘were not happy with a plan that deprived them of large shallow-water 
shelf areas which they had always considered as their own’.
51
 Instead, the broad 
margin States preferred a definition which would extend the continental shelf beyond 
200 nm.
52
 By the tenth session of the Third Conference in 1980, the UNCLOS 
provisions on the continental shelf were in their final form. The final outcome was 
one of compromise, it being recognised that coastal States could extend their 
continental shelf jurisdiction beyond 200 nm subject to detailed conditions.  
The history of the continental shelf did not end in 1982 with the conclusion of 
UNCLOS. International courts and tribunals and the CLCS have developed the 
concept further, as will be explained below and in the following chapters.  
2.3.2. Natural Prolongation 
Coastal State’s entitlement to any maritime zone is based on its title over the land. In 
the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ observed in respect of the 
territorial sea that ‘[i]t is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the 
waters off its coasts’.
53
 In the case of the continental shelf the fundamental concept 
has been ‘the natural prolongation of the land domain’.
54
 The continental shelf is a 
legal concept in which ‘the principle is applied that the land dominates the sea’.
55
 It 
does so ‘through the projection of the coasts or the coastal fronts’.
56
 Phrased 
differently, ‘continental shelf rights are legally both an emanation from and an 
automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State’.
57
  
It must be emphasised that it is not the landmass itself which is the basis of 
entitlement to the continental shelf, it is the sovereignty over the landmass ‘and it is 
by means of the maritime front of this landmass, in other words by its coastal 
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opening, that this territorial sovereignty brings its continental shelf rights into 
effect’.
58
 It is ‘the coast of the territory of the State [which] is the decisive factor for 
title to submarine areas adjacent to it’.
59
 This means that States with larger 
landmasses are not more entitled to the continental shelf than States with less 
landmass since the key issue is the coastal opening and not what lies behind it.  
It was the ICJ in the North Sea Case ‘which gave currency to the expression 
“natural prolongation” as part of the vocabulary of the international law of the sea’.
60
 
When rejecting the primacy of proximity in continental shelf delimitations the Court 
provided: 
What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the coastal State in respect of 
its continental shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually 
part of the territory over which the coastal State already has dominion, ‒ in the sense that, 
although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension 
of it under the sea. From this it would follow that whenever a given submarine area does not 
constitute a natural ‒or the most natural‒ extension of the land territory of a coastal State, even 
though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory of any other State, it cannot be 
regarded as appertaining to that State; ‒ or at least it cannot be so regarded in the face of a 
competing claim by a State of whose land territory the submarine area concerned is to be regarded 




Furthermore, the Court stated that the natural prolongation concept was to be applied 
in maritime boundary delimitations since it was one of the underlying ideas for the 
development of the legal regime for the continental shelf.
62
 The concept of natural 
prolongation was explored in detail and elaborated in subsequent continental shelf 
cases. In the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Case the Court provided that UNCLOS (which was 
then in draft form) did not ‘affect the role of the concept of natural prolongation in 
this domain’
63
 and that natural prolongation ‘was and remains a concept to be 
examined within the context of customary law and State practise’.
64
 Moreover, the 
Court clarified that it was the natural prolongation as it is currently that matters, not 
its historical development:  
The function of the Court is to make use of geology only so far as required for the application of 
international law. It is of the view that what must be taken into account in the delimitation of shelf 
areas are the physical circumstances as they are today; that just as it is the geographical 
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configuration of the present-day coasts, so also it is the present-day sea-bed, which must be 




In the 1985 Libya/Malta Case, the ICJ, under the influence of UNCLOS, eliminated 
scientific considerations other than geometry from the establishment of the 
continental shelf within 200 nm. When accepting Malta’s view on the natural 
prolongation concept the Court concluded:  
[S]ince the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental shelf appertaining 
to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the geological characteristics of the 
corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any role of geological or 
geophysical factors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the States concerned or 
in proceedings to a delimitation as between their claims. This is especially clear where verification 
of the validity of title is concerned, since at least in so far as those areas are situated at a distance 
of under 200 miles from the coasts in question, title depends solely on the distance from the coasts 
of the claimant States of any areas of sea-bed claimed by the way of continental shelf, and the 




It must be emphasised that the Court did not reject geoscientific considerations in 
areas beyond 200 nm. The Court was only concerned with the inner continental shelf. 
One of the consequences of this judgement is that natural prolongation lost its force 
as a primary issue in the jurisprudence of maritime boundary delimitations within 
200 nm. It was not until 27 years after the ICJ’s judgement that an international 
tribunal had the opportunity to further develop the natural prolongation concept as 
will be discussed below.  
2.3.3. UNCLOS Provisions on the Establishment of the Continental Shelf 
2.3.3.1. Introduction 
‘[O]ne of the principal objects and purposes of article 76 [of UNCLOS] is to define 
the precise outer limits of the continental shelf’.
67
 The procedure it establishes ‘is 
intended to result in permanent limits between the continental shelf and the sea-bed 
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.
68
 
There are no precisely defined limits between the Area and a coastal State until a 
coastal State has established the outer limits of the continental shelf. In the event that 
the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm ‘article 76 contains a number of 
considerations to be taken into account in establishing the outer limit and requires the 
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coastal state to submit information to the’ CLCS.
69
 The article contains various terms 
of a geological and geomorphological nature.
70
 As will be discussed below, ITLOS 
held in the Bay of Bengal Case that the continental shelf is a geomorphological 
concept. 
It is important to notice from the beginning that ‘article 76 is concerned with 
entitlement to and the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf and 
not the delimitation of overlapping entitlements between neighboring States’.
71
 
Article 76(10) clearly states that ‘[t]he provisions of this article are without prejudice 
to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts’. This means that article 76 is about delineation of the continental 
shelf, not delimitation.  
The first paragraph of article 76 defines UNCLOS’s continental shelf 
concept. Other provisions of the article are first and foremost concerned with the 
establishment of the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This 
concerns both procedure and substance. These provisions are in fact among the most 
complex in UNCLOS.  
2.3.3.2. UNCLOS Definition of the Continental Shelf 
Article 76(1) is the introduction to UNCLOS’s concept of the continental shelf. It 
reads:  
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 




From the wording of the provision it is clear that States can establish the continental 
shelf through two different methods. The latter method is used when the outer 
margin of the continental shelf does not exceed the 200 nm line. In those instances it 
is a geometrical measurement which creates the entitlement to the continental shelf. 
This means that the legal continental shelf concept has departed ‘from the principle 
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that natural prolongation is the sole basis of the title’.
73
 It is ‘the distance from the 




Another important provision is Article 76(3). It provides that ‘[t]he continental 
margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, 
and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not 
include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof’.
75
 These 
four-component subdivisions of submarine morphology, i.e. the seabed and the 
subsoil of the shelf, the slope, the rise and the deep ocean floor, ‘are involved in 
defining the continental margin of any kind of coastal State land mass, in accordance 
with article 76, paragraph 3, of the Convention’.
76
  
As explained above, the natural prolongation concept has played an important 
role in the development of the continental shelf as a legal concept. ITLOS was the 
first tribunal to explain the meaning of the concept in cases beyond 200 nm: 
[T]he Tribunal is of the view that the reference to natural prolongation in article 76, paragraph 1, 
of the Convention, should be understood in light of the subsequent provisions of the article 
defining the continental shelf and the continental margin. Entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 
200 nm should thus be determined by reference to the outer edge of the continental margin, to be 
ascertained in accordance with article 76, paragraph 4. To interpret otherwise is warranted neither 




This means that the natural prolongation concept in UNCLOS does not constitute ‘a 
separate and independent criterion a coastal State must satisfy in order to be entitled 
to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm’.
78
 This also means, as Myanmar argued before 
the Tribunal, that ‘the controlling concept is not natural prolongation but the “outer 
edge of the continental margin”, which is precisely defined by … article 76, 
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 The focus of article 76(4) is on geomorphology, not geology. 
Consequently, article 76 must be interpreted from a geomorphological perspective. 
ITLOS supported its conclusion by noting that the wording ‘“the outer edge 
of the continental margin” is an essential element in determining the extent of the 
continental shelf’
80
; the precision of article 76(4);
81
 that the term ‘natural 
prolongation’ is not found in subsequent paragraphs of article 76;
82
 the 
interrelationship between para. 1 and 4
83
; and the practice of the CLCS.
84
 It seems 
that the law of the sea has lost one of its more controversial concepts.
85
  
Judge Gao strongly disagreed with the majority of the Tribunal on the 
interpretation of the natural prolongation concept. He is of the opinion that the 
interpretation of the majority is inaccurate and goes too far.
86
 In his view it is Article 
76(1) which is the controlling provision which ‘defines the continental shelf and 
provides two bases for entitlement: natural prolongation and distance’.
87
 Moreover, 
Gao noted that in reality the fundamental aspects of the definition of the continental 
shelf are found in paragraphs 1 and 3 and not paragraphs 1 and 4.
88
 Furthermore, Gao 
stated: ‘It is my firm view that natural prolongation retains its primacy over all other 
factors; and that legal title to the continental shelf is based … on geology and 
                                                          
79
 Ibid 125, para. 427. 
80
 Bay of Bengal Case (n 4) 126, para. 429. 
81
 Ibid 126-7, paras. 430-1 & 435. 
82
 Ibid 127, para. 432. In his Separate Opinion Judge Gao criticised this argument and pointed out that 
‘[b]y way of analogy, the concept of “common heritage of mankind” is enshrined in the Preamble of 
the Convention, but nowhere in the Convention is a clear and precise definition of the concept found. 
Yet, that does not prevent it from being one of the most important legal principles of the entire 
Convention as well as the basis for Part XI on the Area.’ Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. 
Myanmar) (Judgement) (Separate Opinion of Judge Gao) 2012 
 ˂http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/9-
C16.sep_op.Gao.withmaps.orig.E.pdf˃ accessed 16 July 2012 [35, para. 85] (Separate Opinion of 
Judge Gao).    
83
 Bay of Bengal Case (n 4) 127, para. 434. 
84
 Ibid 127-8, para. 436. The Tribunal referred to the ‘test of appurtenance’ which is applied by the 
CLCS on the basis of article 76(4) ‘to determine the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm’. Ibid; 
See Doc. CLCS/11 (13 May 1999) 12, para. 2.2.6 & 13, para 2.2.8 (the Guidelines or the Scientific 
and Technical Guidelines). 
85
 Arguably, this conclusion simplifies future maritime boundary litigations, in this field, since less 
amount of scientific and technical evidence needs to be validated.  
86
 Separate Opinion of Judge Gao (n 82) 36, para. 87 & 40, para. 98. 
87
 Ibid 36, para. 88. 
88




geomorphology, at least as far as the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is 
concerned.’
89
 It is unlikely that Judge Gao is alone in this opinion. 
2.3.3.3. Crustal Types 
The CLCS has taken the view that article 76 is neutral on the point of crustal types.
90
 
The Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the CLCS provide: 
Article 76 makes no systematic reference to the different types of the earth’s crust. Instead it only 
makes reference to the two terms: ‘the natural prolongation of … land territory’ and ‘the 
submerged prolongation of the land mass’ of coastal States as opposed to oceanic ridges of the 
deep ocean floor. The terms ‘land mass’ and ‘land territory’ are both neutral terms with regard to 




This view was confirmed in the Bay of Bengal Case when the question about the 
relevance of the origin of sediments arose for delimiting the continental shelf, as 
discussed in chapter five. The view is also confirmed in CLCS’s recommendation 
with regard to the UK’s submission in respect of Ascension Island. The 
recommendations provide that in general ‘[t]he principle of crustal neutrality applies: 
i.e. article 76 is neutral regarding the crustal nature of the land mass of a coastal 
State’.
92
 This interpretation does not make a distinction between land territory which 
is continental in origin and that which is oceanic in origin, as may be the case for 
islands. This means that ‘any kind of land mass (irrespective of crustal type, size etc.) 
of a coastal State has a continental margin that can be delineated in accordance with 
article 76, paragraph 4 of the Convention’.
93
 If it was a requirement that the crustal 
nature of the natural prolongation must be continental then the consequence would 
be that article 121(2) of UNCLOS, which permits islands to generate their own 
maritime zones, and article 48 of UNCLOS, which permits archipelagos to claim the 
continental shelf, would be rendered irrelevant.  
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2.3.3.4. The Foot of the Slope 
A critical issue for a coastal State that is seeking to establish the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm is to determine the location of the foot of the continental slope. 
Article 76(4)(b) of UNCLOS defines the foot of the slope in the following manner:  
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as 
the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
 
It must be noted ‘that this is a geomorphological definition, open to displacement by 
geological evidence of where the boundary between continental crust and oceanic 
crust lies’.
94
 When the foot of the slope is discussed it must be borne in mind that it is 
part of the ‘continental slope province of the continental margin in the sense of the 
Convention’.
95
 The Scientific and Technical Guidelines state:  
The Commission recognizes that the foot of the continental slope is an essential feature that serves 
as the basis for entitlement to the extended continental shelf and the delineation of its outer limits. 
According to paragraphs 4 (a) (i) and (ii) [of article 76], it is the reference baseline from which the 




Furthermore the Guidelines provide: 
The Commission interprets the determination of the foot of the continental slope by means of the 
point of maximum change in gradient at its base, as a provision with the character of a general 
rule. The fundamental requirements posed by this provision are: 
●The identification of the region defined as the base of the continental slope; and 





The Guidelines define the base of the continental slope ‘as a region where the lower 
part of the slope merges into the top of the continental rise, or into the top of the deep 
ocean floor where a continental rise does not exist’.
98
 In one of its recommendations 
the Commission states that:  
The determination of a [foot of the slope] requires the existence of both a continental slope and an 
identifiable base to that slope ... In turn, the existence of a continental slope requires the existence 
of a distinct morphological feature rising from the level of the continental rise or deep ocean floor 
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Although the foot of the slope is the key factor in the two methods used to determine 
the outer limits of the continental margin it can be rather difficult to locate it. One of 
the problems in locating the foot of the slope is that in some places there is more than 
merely a single change in the gradient at the base of the continental slope. In such 
instances the CLCS provides:  
[T]he Commission recognizes as a general rule the selection of the point of maximum change in 
the gradient as the method to identify the location of the foot of the continental slope. The 
selection of any other local change in the gradient at its base, i.e. any change other than the 
maximum, will be regarded by the Commission as an exception. The justification for the 







 geomorphological, geological and geophysical sources of evidence 
can be used to locate the foot of the slope.
102
 However, the CLCS prefers certain 
types of evidence. 
As a general rule, whenever the base of the continental slope can be clearly determined on the 
basis of morphological and bathymetric evidence, the Commission recommends the application of 
that evidence. Geological and geophysical data can also be submitted by coastal States to 
supplement proof that the base of the continental slope is found at that location ... The 
determination of the location of the point of maximum change in the gradient at the base of the 
continental slope will be conducted by means of the mathematical analyses of the two-dimensional 
profiles, three-dimensional bathymetric models and preferably both. Methods based on purely 




Even though the CLCS does not agree with the location of some of the foot of the 
slope points, in a coastal State’s submission, it is a possibility that the points 
accepted by the Commission are sufficient to establish the outer edge of the 
continental margin for that State.
104
 It is therefore not vital for a coastal State to 
prove the correctness of the location of all foot of the slope points it has selected. 
That however depends on the circumstances in each case. There is variation in the 
importance of different foot of the slope points. 
Article 76 is silent on how the location of the foot of the continental slope 
should be defined when evidence to the contrary to the general rule is invoked. The 
Virginia Commentary states that ‘[t]he phrase “in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary” implies that there may be special circumstances requiring the application of 
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alternative means for determining the foot of the continental slope’.
105
 It has been 
noted that ‘[a]s the article is concerned with the definition of the foot of the slope, it 
will concern evidence, which indicates that the foot is located at another point than 
the point of maximum change in gradient at the base of the continental slope’.
106
 The 
Convention does not mention any specific type of evidence that States must use in 
this context. Subsequently it seems as UNCLOS does not call for the use of any 
specific data. The Guidelines provide:  
The Commission interprets this provision as an opportunity for coastal States to use the best 
geological and geophysical evidence available to them to locate the foot of the continental slope at 
its base when the geomorphological evidence given by the maximum change in the gradient as a 




Moreover, ‘[t]he Commission interprets the determination of the foot of the 
continental slope when evidence to the contrary to the general rule is invoked as a 
provision with the character of an exception to the rule’.
108
 This interpretation about 
the primacy of the maximum change in gradient rule over the evidence to the 
contrary rule is confirmed in CLCS’s recommendations with regard to the 
submission made by Barbados which provided that ‘it did not agree with the 
methodology used in the Submission to determine the critical [foot of the slope] 
points, based on evidence to the contrary. The subcommission was of the view that 
these [foot of the slope] points could be determined on the basis of the general rule 
(maximum change in the gradient).’
109
 The International Law Association’s 
Committee on the Legal Issues of the Continental Shelf
110
 has a different 
understanding of this issue. It is of the opinion that ‘[t]he maximum change in 
gradient rule is applicable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. If the latter type 
of evidence on the location on the foot of the slope exists, the maximum change in 
gradient rule is not applicable’.
111
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As mentioned above, the CLCS views the foot of the slope as ‘an essential 
feature that serves as the basis for ... the delineation of its outer limits’.
112
 As will be 
discussed in chapter five, it is possible to argue that the foot of the continental slope 
can serve as the basis for the provisional equidistance line in continental shelf 
delimitations beyond 200 nm between adjacent and opposite States.  
2.3.3.5. The Outer Limits of the Continental Margin 
Since the continental rise can extend up to 900 nm some limits were deemed 
necessary to protect the territorial scope of the Area.
113
 Article 76(2) of UNCLOS 
provides that ‘[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the 
limits provided for in paragraphs 4 to 6’. The provision is only of relevance in case 
there is a natural prolongation beyond 200 nm. It must be noted that ‘[i]n some areas 
there may be a choice between different outer limit lines applying paragraphs 4 to 
6’.
114
 In these instances it is ‘[o]nly the coastal State [which] is competent to make 
such a choice when it makes a submission to the CLCS or when it establishes the 
outer limit of its continental shelf on the basis of the recommendations of the 
Commission’.
115
 Beyond the limits, provided in paras. 4-6, ‘[n]o State shall claim or 
exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, 
nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof’.
116
 
Moreover, ‘[n]o such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such 
appropriation shall be recognized’.
117
 It follows from article 76(2) that ‘[t]he absence 
of outer limits of the continental shelf established in accordance with article 76 does 
not give the coastal State the right to exercise rights over’ the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm.
118
 Moreover, ‘[t]he absence of a reference to paragraphs 7 to 9 of 
article 76 indicates that article 76(2) is also operative and binding on a coastal State 
before these provisions have been implemented by it’.
119
  
As explained above, the ‘outer edge of the continental margin’ is the 
controlling concept of article 76. The concept is defined in para. 4. The provision 
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‘introduces specific formulae to enable the coastal State to establish precisely the 
outer edge of the continental margin’.
 120
 Its application will make a State able ‘to 
identify the precise location of the outer edge of the continental margin’.
121
 Article 
76(4)(a) provides two methods of defining its outer edge, whilst it is difficult and 
expensive to obtain the data needed for the former method, the latter is satisfied by 
geometric measurements.
122
 Both methods have in common that the location of the 
outer edge of the continental margin is found through measurements from the foot of 
the slope. It is provided that: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the 
continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at 
each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from 
such point to the foot of the continental slope; or 
 
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 
60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope. 
 
Gardiner, a geologist in the Irish delegation at the Third Conference, developed the 
sediment thickness formula found in para. 4(a)(i). During the Conference it was 
referred to as the ‘Irish Formula’. The purpose of the formula ‘was to ensure that 
coastal State sovereign rights would extend to a major portion of the continental rise 
where significant hydrocarbon resources were expected to exist’.
123
 To explain the 
method the following example is often made:  
In effect, paragraph 4(a)(i) establishes a ratio of thickness of sedimentary rocks to distance from 
the foot of the continental slope at a minimum of 1 to 100 (0.01). For example, if the outer limit is 
to be established at 100 miles from the foot of the slope, the sedimentary rocks must [be] at least 1 
mile thick. The figure of one percent was chosen so that coastal States would retain under their 





[I]n certain cases sedimentary rocks will not be distributed evenly and there may be more than one 
point on a profile line that meets the 1 per cent criterion. The inclusion of the word ‘outermost’ in 
paragraph 4(a)(i) indicates that the coastal State is not obliged to select the point that meets the 1 
per cent criterion that is situated most landward, but may select another point that meets the 1 per 
cent criterion seaward of that most landward point.
125
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The Scientific and Technical Guidelines provide that ‘for each of the fixed points 
chosen the Commission expects documentation of the continuity between the 
sediments at those points and the sediments at the foot of the continental slope’.
126
 
The ILA Committee submits ‘that the requirement of continuity is met if a fixed 
point is located within the outer edge of the continental margin’.
127
 
The formula in para. 4(a)(ii), is named after Hollis Hedberg, an American 
geology professor and consequently often referred to as the ‘Hedberg formula’. 
Hedberg called the continental slope a ‘“prominent worldwide geomorphic feature” 
which would serve as the logical and equitable guide to the precise boundary 
between national and international jurisdiction’.
128
 He argued that his formula did 
‘not aim to secure areas of favourable petroleum prospects, manganese nodules, or 
other resources either to coastal state or international jurisdiction’.
129
 He pointed out 
that ‘[i]t simply tries to provide the most natural, logical, appropriate, and feasible 
boundary between the two’.
130
 Since it is difficult to determine the exact base of the 
continental slope, Hedberg proposed that a boundary zone should be established 
beyond the base of the continental slope.
131
 Hedberg ‘took 100 kilometres as the 
“minimum technically practical width of the boundary zone,” which translates 
roughly to 60 nautical miles’.
132
 Once the foot of the slope is established the 
additional task of drawing a line 60 nm therefrom should not prove problematic. It is 
important to notice that ‘the [foot of the slope] must be situated more than 140 M 
from the territorial sea baselines in order to establish an outer edge of continental 
margin beyond 200 M using the 60 M distance formula’.
133
  
Para. 7, which is applicable to both methods, provides that:  
The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that shelf extends 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
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measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, 




Serdy has pointed out that ‘[t]he consequence of this simplification may be that areas 
of oceanic crust or deep seabed fall within a coastal State’s (legal) continental shelf 
despite paragraph 3, or more rarely that areas of continental crust remain outside it – 
although the latter is more typically the result of the cut-offs of paragraph 5’.
135
 
CLCS has provided, controversially, how the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is to 
be connected with the 200 nm line. The CLCS’s recommendations regarding 
Australia’s submission provide that: 
[T]he Commission is of the view that the determination of the last segment of the outer limits of 
the continental shelf shall be established either by the intersection of the formula line, in 
accordance with article 76, paragraphs 4 and 7, and the 200 M limit from the baselines ... or it shall 
be determined by the line of shortest distance between the last fixed formula point and 200 M 





The question has been raised ‘whether a fixed point which meets the requirements of 
paragraph 4 can be linked to a point on the 200 nautical mile limit, which does not 
meet these requirements’.
137
 The ILA Committee states that  
[A]ll fixed points used to construct a line in accordance with article 76(7) in principle have to meet 
either one or the other of these requirements. The employment of a fixed point which is located on 
the 200 nautical mile limit but does not meet these requirements cannot be used as one of the fixed 





The Statement of Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to Be Used in 
Establishing the Outer Edge of the Continental Margin
139
 contains an exception to 
article 76(4) of UNCLOS which is not mentioned in the Convention. The exception 
was intended to address the unique geographic conditions of the ocean floor of Sri 
Lanka in the Bay of Bengal, where the formation of sedimentary rocks is such that 
the application of the Irish formula would result in an inequitably small legal shelf. 
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 See Annex II of the Final Act of UNCLOS which contains a statement of understanding which 
considers a specific case of geographical characteristics that was accepted by the Third Conference. It 
is linked to the provisions of the Convention through article 3(1)(a) of Annex II. Nandan & Rosenne 




According to the Virginia Commentary the Statement only applies to Sri Lanka and 
possibly the south-eastern coast of India.
140
 It must however be noted that not only 
India but also Kenya and Myanmar have referred to it in their submissions to the 
CLCS.
141




2.3.3.6. The Maximum Extent of the Continental Margin 
Article 76(5) introduces two constraints which limit the extent of the continental 
shelf.  
The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed, 
drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 
100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 
2,500 metres. 
 
The continental shelf beyond 200 nm is therefore limited by a certain distance from 
the baselines, i.e. 350 nm ‒ or a mixed criterion of distance and depth ‒ that is 
100 nm from the 2,500 m isobaths. If the 100 nm+2500 isobath limitation is used it is 
possible that the outer limits of the continental shelf extend beyond 350 nm. It must 
be emphasised that these lines do not create any rights. Their purpose is to limit the 
possible maximum area that can be claimed by a coastal State on the basis of article 
76(4) of UNCLOS. It falls to the coastal State to decide which line of limitation it 
uses. It can choose to use them both, whichever is further, with the aim of gaining a 
larger piece of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. It is important to note that ‘[f]or 
any continental margin, there will only be one line at 350 nautical miles from the 
baselines. However, there are areas of the seabed where a number of consecutive 
2,500 meter isobaths occur’.
143
 The Scientific and Technical Guidelines provide that 
‘[s]uch situations arise as a result of geological and tectonic processes shaping the 
present continental margins. They can create multiple repetitions of the 2,500 m 
isobaths, for example, by faulting, folding and thrusting along continental 
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 It has been argued that ‘[n]othing in the Convention precludes a State 
from using the 2500-meter isobath most advantageous to its interests’.
145
 The 
Guidelines provide, however, that ‘[u]nless there is evidence to the contrary, the 
Commission may recommend the use of the first 2,500 m isobaths from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured that conforms to the general 
configuration of the continental margin’.
146
 In this context it must be noted that:  
A number of publications support the interpretation that a 2500 meter isobath can only be 
employed by a State if it is situated in the natural prolongation of its land territory. This is 
confirmed by the drafting history of article 76, which indicates that proposals to include a 
reference to water depth in the article in general were justified by the argument that they reflected 




When considering Norway’s submission regarding the Arctic Ocean and the Barents 
Sea, the CLCS adopted the peculiar position that the 2500-metre isobath constraint 
line had to be landward of the foot of the continental slope,
148
 although there is 
nothing in UNCLOS that supports this interpretation.
149
  
To exclude the possibility of States making enormous claims to the outer 
continental shelf, article 76(6) provides the following:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of the 
continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are 
natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs. 
 
Para. 6 does not define what is meant by the term ‘submarine ridges’; nor does any 
other provision of UNCLOS. This is one of the most controversial issues regarding 
the establishment of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
150
 What is at least clear is 
that a distinction must be made between submarine ridges and oceanic ridges on the 
deep ocean floor. According to article 76(3), oceanic ridges are not part of the 
continental shelf. A distinction must also be made between submarine ridges and 
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submarine elevations, since submarine elevations that are natural components of the 
continental margin do not fall under the 350 nm limitation as submarine ridges. 
Moreover, it must be noted that the list of submarine elevations in para. 6 is 
‘illustrative and not exhaustive’.
151
 The distinction between submarine ridges and 
elevations is particularly important for some coastal States who can claim a 
continental shelf area beyond the 350 nm limit with the 100 nm+2500 isobath line in 
the event that a seabed feature is defined as a submarine elevation rather than a 
submarine ridge. Some critical issues regarding the CLCS’s interpretation of the 
provisions relevant to ridges will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.3.4. Coastal States’ Rights and Duties in the Continental Shelf 
It was famously stated by the ICJ in the North Sea Case: 
 
[T]he rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of 
its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an 
inherent right. In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any 
special legal acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States have done this) 
but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not depend on its being exercised. 
To echo the language of the Geneva Convention, it is ‘exclusive’ in the sense that if the coastal 
State does not choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it, that is its own 




Article 77 of UNCLOS deals with the rights of the coastal State over the continental 
shelf. The article’s substance is the same as article 2 of the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention. According to para. 1 ‘[t]he coastal State exercises over the continental 
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources’. It is important to note that the paragraph mentions sovereign rights and 
not sovereignty. This means that coastal States have limited sovereignty in the 
continental shelf, that is to say, the continental shelf is not a zone of sovereignty.
153
 It 
is a zone where States enjoy sovereign rights. Article 77(2) echoes the North Sea 
Case and provides that ‘[t]he rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the 
sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its 
natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent 
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of the coastal State’. Article 77(4) defines the natural resources, which part VI of 
UNCLOS ‒ the part regarding the Continental Shelf ‒ refers to as consisting of:  
[T]he mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living 
organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, 
either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical 




Consequently, the sovereign rights of the coastal States only apply to natural 
resources. Contrary to land territory, article 77(3) provides that ‘[t]he rights of the 
coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or 
notional, or on any express proclamation’. These rights ‘over the continental shelf do 




A few other provisions of UNCLOS are also of relevance in this context. 
Article 80 provides a coastal state with the right to erect and regulate artificial 
islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf. Article 246 contains 
rules regarding the right to regulate research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, 
by the coastal state.
156
 Moreover, article 79 contains a rather imprecise right to 
regulate the laying of submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf.  
The substance of article 82 of UNCLOS was new in international law. It must 
be seen in connection with article 76. The definition and limits of the continental 
shelf were negotiated together with the requirement to share the revenues of the 
continental shelf. It is very unlikely that article 76 would have been concluded if 
article 82 was not part of the package deal. Article 82(1) provides that ‘[t]he coastal 
State shall make payments or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of 
the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’. The 
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provision clearly provides a contrario that living resources are excluded from the 
payment scheme. Article 82(2) defines the payment duty further:   
The payments and contributions shall be made annually with respect to all production at a site after 
the first five years of production at that site. For the sixth year, the rate of payment or contribution 
shall be 1 per cent of the value or volume of production at the site. The rate shall increase by 
1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter. 
Production does not include resources used in connection with exploitation. 
 
According to article 82(4) ‘[t]he payments or contributions shall be made through the 
Authority,
157
 which shall distribute them to States Parties to this Convention, on the 
basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of 
developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked among them’. 
Para. 3 protects the interests of developing States in this context and provides that if 
such a State ‘is a net importer of a mineral resource produced from its continental 
shelf [it] is exempt from making such payments or contributions in respect of that 
mineral resource’. The process described in article 82 has not yet been activated. 
2.4. The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Adjacent or 
Opposite Coastal States 
2.4.1. Amputation of Entitlement 
Delimitation is in essence a simple act. It can be defined as consisting of ‘drawing a 
demarcation line, a boundary, between two neighbouring States when the 
geographical situation does not allow both the parties concerned to enjoy their title to 
its full extent’.
158
 What complicates this act is that many statesmen view territory as 
power and loss of power as weakness. Because ‘[t]he drawing of frontiers both on 
land and at sea must always entail restrictions on the extensions of a country’s 
territorial expanse’
159
 it is, in the words of Weil, ‘a painful process since, by its very 
definition, it implies an amputation of the area which each of the States involved 
could hope to appropriate if it faced the oceans on its own’.
160
 Borders, land or 
maritime, are after all ‘not merely lines on the ground, or ways of delimiting spheres 
of public jurisdiction, but serve also to delimit the existence of a political order by 
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means of its separation from others’.
161
 Even though boundary issues have triggered 
serious disputes and even great wars throughout previous centuries Oxman has 
importantly noted that ‘maritime boundary issues do not normally seem to engage 
the same level of political attention as many disputes over land territory’.
162
 The 
reason for this is that ‘resultant agreements are often viewed as economic or 
technical. Indeed, it can be argued that few maritime boundary agreements are 
regarded as overwhelmingly political’.
163
 However, in some instances, especially 
when natural resources are involved, boundary delimitations have caused severe 
turbulence in the relationships between States.   
A clear difference must be made between land boundaries and continental 
shelf boundaries for the reason that ‘the process by which a court determines the line 
of a land boundary between two States can be clearly distinguished from the process 
by which it identifies the principles and rules applicable to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf’.
164
 Factors such as occupation, the effective exercise of State 
sovereignty, acts of sovereignty ‘help to determine which title is the better and hence 
legally the only one in the context of land delimitation’.
165
 These factors play no part 
in continental shelf delimitations, however, since as was clearly stated in the North 
Sea Case, the right to the continental shelf does not depend on it being exercised.
166
  
There are nevertheless similarities between land and maritime boundaries. 
For example the ICJ drew an analogy between land and maritime boundaries in the 
North Sea Case, noting that, as with land boundaries, maritime boundaries may 
remain undefined over quite long periods of time without this uncertainty affecting 
the rights of States concerned.
167
 Moreover, the Court stated in the Aegean Sea Case 
that ‘[w]hether it is a land frontier or a boundary line in the continental shelf that is in 
question, the process is essentially the same, and inevitably involves the same 
element of stability and permanence, and is subject to the rule excluding boundary 
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 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali) (Judgement) [1986] ICJ 
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agreements from fundamental change of circumstances’.
168
 The interrelationship 
between land and maritime boundaries is especially clear for adjacent coastal States. 
For such States ‘the intersection of the land boundary with the sea constitutes the 
starting point for the maritime boundary’.
169
 It should therefore not be surprising that 
‘[a]djacent states sometimes argue that a maritime boundary should be established by 
extending the land boundary in the same direction out to sea’.
170
 
 When the only maritime zone was the three nm territorial sea the need for 
maritime boundaries was limited and mainly relevant to States adjacent to one 
another. The expansion of maritime zones since 1945 has increased the need for 
maritime boundaries, not only between adjacent States but also between those 
opposite others.
171
 The current treaty regime on maritime boundary delimitation is 
found in UNCLOS. The provisions on the delimitation of the continental shelf and 
the EEZ are identical and were subject to the same arguments and developed in the 
same way at the last minutes of the Third Conference.
172
 They differ ‘only in respect 
of the designation of the maritime area to which they apply’.
173
 Articles 74(1) and 
83(1) of the Convention provide the basic principle for delimiting the EEZ and the 
continental shelf: 
The delimitation of the [EEZ/continental shelf] between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 




The Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case made the following 
statement regarding the provision: 
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This apparently simple and imprecise formula allows in fact for a broad consideration of the legal 
rules embodied in treaties and customary law as pertinent to the delimitation between the parties, 
and allows as well for the consideration of general principles of international law and the 
contributions that the decisions of international courts and tribunals and learned writers have made 




If negotiations on an agreement are not fruitful, paras. 2 and 3 of the same articles 
include procedures applicable where there is no agreement. Of these paragraphs, 
para. 2 is of greater importance. It provides that ‘[i]f no agreement can be reached 
within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures 
provided for in Part XV [the dispute resolution part of UNCLOS]’. It must however 
be emphasised, as will be discussed in chapter four, that States can, according to 
article 298(1)(a)(i) of the Convention, exclude themselves by declaration from 
settling maritime boundary disputes by compulsory third-party means.  
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) are the product of failure on the part of the Third 
Conference to reach any consensus on the method to be used in delimiting the EEZ 
and the continental shelf. Churchill and Lowe have noted:  
UNCLOS III had great difficulty in finding acceptable provisions concerning the delimitation of 
the continental shelf and the EEZ. Participants at the Conference divided into two broad camps, 
those who favoured equidistance (with an exception for special circumstances) as the primary 
principle of delimitation and those who wanted the emphasis placed on equitable principles, with 
no mention being made on equidistance. Negotiations on the matter were very protracted, and the 




Weil argued that the provisions are ‘so empty of meaning that they are almost non- 
provisions’.
177
 Others have adopted a more positive view. Philip Allott stated that 




It must be taken to be legislation by means of a symbolic formula. It is saying that the process of 
delimitation must be conducted in the light of the principles that have been evolved by 
international law and that, for this purpose, international law must be understood in a special 
extended sense to include not only fully formed international law but also the material found in 
formative sources of international law (such as prenormative state practice, judicial decisions, 
general principles of law). The vital point to understand about such symbolic formula is that it 
does not transform all there heterogeneous materials into international law by the legislative act of 
the Convention. It is not merely legislation by reference. The complete ragbag of such materials 
does not together constitute the ‘UNCLOS substantive rule’ on delimitation. What the Convention 
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does is to set the parameters of the delimitation process. Those parameters are finite in number and 
kind but not wholly specific. They are not wholly specific, but they are exclusive.
179
   
 
On this issue, the ICJ in the Libya/Malta Case stated that UNCLOS ‘sets a goal to be 
achieved, but is silent as to the method to be followed to achieve it. It restricts itself 
to setting a standard, and it is left to the States themselves, or to the courts, to endow 
this standard with specific content.’
180
 Malcolm D. Evans has pointed out that 
UNCLOS ‘devolves the development of rules and principles of delimitation to 
general international law, and so any comment on the future of delimitation is a 
matter that must be considered in the wider context of the law of the sea, rather than 
through the terms of the LOSC itself.’
181
 In his declaration in the Bay of Bengal 
Case, Wolfrum states that ‘it is the task, and even the responsibility of international 
courts and tribunals (when requested to settle disputes) to develop the methodology 
that is suitable for this purpose’.
182
 This responsibility is further discussed in chapter 
four and five. 
2.4.2. An Agreement on the Basis of International Law  
Article 74(1) and 83(1) create a flexible procedural framework for maritime 
boundary delimitations. It has been noted that ‘[t]he reference to delimitation by 
agreement clarifies that, even though the act of delineating the outer limits of the 
[EEZ/continental shelf] is usually performed unilaterally, when there are overlapping 
claims the States concerned must be prepared to enter into negotiations in the 
matter’.
183
 The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals envisages that it is 
a crystal clear rule of international law that a maritime boundary cannot be conducted 
unilaterally. They must be determined bi- or multilaterally. Anderson has pointed out 
that ‘[t]he principle of the non-use of force entails that boundaries may not be 
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imposed unilaterally, whether by force or by making national claims’.
184
 The ICJ, in 
the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Case, stated:   
[A]n attempt by a unilateral act to establish international maritime boundary lines regardless of the 
legal position of other States is contrary to recognized principles of international law, as laid down, 
inter alia, in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on the Law of the Sea, especially the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which 
provide that maritime boundaries should be determined by agreement between the Parties. This 




The Court provided in the 1984 Gulf of Maine Case that:  
No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected 
unilaterally by one of those States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an 
agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention of 




The ICJ detailed in the 1969 North Sea Case what was implied by the duty to 
negotiate and stated that one of the ideas which has ‘always underlain the 
development of the legal régime of the continental shelf’ is that   
the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an 
agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior 
condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of 
agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are 
meaningful, which will both be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without 




Moreover, the Court provided that the obligation to negotiate ‘constitutes a special 
application of a principle which underlies all international relations, and which is 
moreover recognized … as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes’
188
 in the Charter of the United Nations.
189
 It must be noted 
that the obligation to negotiate is ‘not only to enter into negotiations, but also to 
pursue them as far as possible, with a view to concluding agreements ... But an 
obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement’.
190
 In 
short, States have to negotiate in good faith without being obliged to conclude a 
maritime boundary agreement. 
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As aforementioned, the agreements States are supposed to conclude are to be 
on the basis of international law as referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
In the opinion of Charney this ‘reference to international law provides an ambiguous 
connection to the old language [of the Geneva Conventions] and customary 
international law’.
191
 The reference to article 38 means that the agreements 
mentioned in articles 74 and 83 can be based on whatever source of international law 
the negotiating parties want to use; there is no limit in this regard. The question can 
be asked as to whether any consequences follow from a boundary agreement not 
based on international law. Whilst it is clear that a boundary agreement cannot be 
based on geometry or religious texts alone, it remains uncertain what consequences 
follow from an agreement merely based on something other than international law. 
Neither UNCLOS nor the VCLT provide an answer in this regard. It could be argued 
that this was such a fundamental fault that the maritime boundary agreement could 
not be binding. That conclusion would not, however, benefit the stability and 
predictability of international relations. Since this issue has not proved problematic 
in practice, it will be left unanswered. 
2.4.3. Equitable Principles and Equidistance 
As aforementioned the participants of the Third Conference divided into two groups; 
of equidistance supporters (with an exception for special circumstances) and 
supporters of equitable principles. This was not division characterising the Third 
Conference only; indeed it has characterised the whole history of EEZ/continental 
shelf boundary delimitations. It can be said that the main difference between these 
methods is that the equidistance method is more predictable and easier to execute 
whilst the equitable principles method lays greater stress ‘on the unique and specific 
character of each factual situation’.
192
 
Equitable principles are problematic to define.
193
 That is probably because 
‘nobody has ever really known what an “equitable principle” of delimitation was or 
is’.
194
 Nevertheless, ‘[t]he concept of equitable principles implies a judgement on ... 
elements of fact and a particular view of the purpose of delimitation ... Equitable 
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principles exist on the level of value judgements. They are man-made.’
195
 Even 
though the concept has been criticised for lack of clarity a few basic facts regarding it 
seem clear. First of all, ‘[e]quity does not necessarily imply equality’.
196
 In other 
words:  
There can never be any question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does not require 
that a State without access to the sea should be allotted an area of continental shelf, any more than 
there could be a question of rendering the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to 




Second, equitable principles are not synonymous with equity in the abstract. In 
delimitation ‘it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract 
justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable 
principles’.
198
 Even though ‘the delimitation ... must be equitable, it cannot have as 
its object simply the awarding of an “equitable share” in the continental shelf to each 
Party’.
199
 The ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya Case stated that ‘[e]quity as a legal concept is 
a direct emanation of the idea of justice’ and it ‘is a general principle directly 
applicable as law’.
200
 The Court in the Libya/Malta Case provided that the 
application of equity as a legal concept ‘should display consistency and a degree of 
predictability; even though it looks with particularity to the peculiar circumstances of 
an instant case, it also looks beyond it to principles of more general application’.
201
 
Third, the ‘[a]pplication of equitable principles is to be distinguished from a decision 
ex aequo et bono’.
202
 Thirlway is of the opinion that ‘[e]quity is probably best 
regarded, in words applied by the International Court to the comparable principle of 
good faith, as one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of 
legal obligations, but “not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist”’.
203
 Philip Allott states convincingly:  
The concepts of ‘equitable principles’ and ‘equitable solutions’ are playing in this context a role 
analogous to that played by ‘reasonableness’ in English law. They are high-level power modifiers 
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whose referent is a subtle amalgam of an attitude or approach (fairness, common sense) and 




The ICJ has noted:  
[T]here is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the purpose of 
making sure that they apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of 





The application of equitable principles to the facts of each maritime delimitation case 
‘starts from relevant circumstances and, applying equitable principles, arrives 
immediately at an equitable line. The delimitation exercise rests on the autonomous 
concept of equity and looks only to the final outcome: the facts lead straight to the 
desired result.’
206
 It is the end result ‒ not the method ‒ that is the prime issue. 
The equidistance/relevant circumstances approach is quite different from the 
equitable principles approach. In essence it consists of two stages: An equidistance 
line and relevant circumstances. The equidistance line has been described as a line 
‘which leaves to each of the parties concerned all those portions of the continental 
shelf that are nearer to a point on its own coast than they are to any point on the coast 
of the other party’.
207
 Such line ‘may consist either of a “median” line
208
 between 
“opposite” States, or of a “lateral” line between “adjacent” States’.
209
 The first stage 
in the equidistance/relevant circumstances method is to draw a provisional 
equidistance line in the disputed area. Then, relevant circumstances specific to the 
case in question are examined to assess the equity of the result of the first stage. 
After this examination, the equidistance line is either confirmed or the line is 
adjusted to take account of any special circumstances.210 A third stage was recently 
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added to this method, which is the comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths and the 
ratio of the relevant maritime areas allocated to each Party.
211
 The third stage can be 
seen as a minor split from the considerations regarding relevant circumstances.  
As will be explained below, equitable principles conquered equidistance 
before the ICJ in 1969 and became part of UNCLOS, termed ‘equitable solution’. 
Equidistance is, however, the most commonly used method of continental shelf 
delimitations and is highly regarded by the ICJ. The Court stated in the Gulf of 
Maine Case that ‘there is no single method which intrinsically brings greater justice 
or is of greater practical usefulness’.
212
 It has also stated that ‘[t]he jurisprudence of 
the Court sets out the reasons why the equidistance method is widely used in the 
practice of maritime delimitation: it has a certain intrinsic value because of its 
scientific character and the relative ease with which it can be applied’.
213
 
2.4.4. The Development of Continental Shelf Delimitations 
The first delimitation of the seabed beyond the territorial sea occurred in a treaty 
between the United Kingdom (Trinidad and Tobago) and Venezuela regarding the 
submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria in 1942.
214
 Oil shortage and the strategic need 
for oil during the Second World War was the trigger for the treaty’s conclusion. The 
treaty divides the areas explorable for hydrocarbons in the Gulf and in an adjacent 
channel.
215
 It has been pointed out that ‘[t]he Paria Treaty could be considered as the 
logical outcome of two factors which, sooner or later, were bound to meet: the 
potential exploitation of offshore oil and the legal framework it required under 
international law’.
216
 Since it was the first delimitation of its kind, it ‘followed such 
delimitation methods that may be described as sui generis within a conventional 
delimitation’.
217
 For instance, geological and geomorphological considerations as 
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well as considerations based on equidistance seem not to have played any role. The 
delimitation has not served as a precedent for any subsequent maritime delimitation.  
It was the 1945 Truman Proclamation that introduced the criterion for modern 
continental shelf delimitations. The Proclamation provided that ‘[i]n cases where the 
continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent 
state, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned 
in accordance with equitable principles’.
218
 The ICJ has noted that ‘[t]hese two 
concepts, of delimitation by mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with 
equitable principles, have underlain all the subsequent history of the subject’.
219
 The 
principles of delimitation evolved during the 1950s. The ILC argued strongly for the 
equidistance method; its effort is seen in article 6(1)(2) of the 1958 Convention on 
the Continental Shelf which states that: 
In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance 
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State 
is measured. 
 
Leonard Legault and Blair Hankey have described why the equidistance/special 
circumstances formula became so popular: 
The emergence of equidistance-special circumstances in the early treaty law may be explained by 
the fact that this formula struck a balance of some sort between predictability and flexibility, 
objectivity and discretion. Moreover, the combined rule generally respected the principle of equal 
division of the area of converging or overlapping claims, in the absence of inequities resulting 
from the aberrant coastal features or major differences in coastal lengths. Finally, it took account 
of adjacency or proximity to the coast as the legal basis of title for the territorial sea and as an 
integral part of the basis of title for the continental shelf. Later, with the appearance of the 
economic zone doctrine, this factor of adjacency was dubbed the ‘distance principle’ and assumed 
even greater theoretical importance for delimitation purposes as it became the single common 




In the North Sea Case of 1969, the ICJ rejected the idea that the equidistance/special 
circumstances method constituted a rule of customary law
221
 concluding that there 
was ‘no other single method of delimitation the use of which is in all circumstances 
obligatory’.
222
 Moreover, the Court stated that ‘[i]nternational law of continental 
shelf delimitation does not involve any imperative rule and permits resort to various 
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principles or methods, as may be appropriate, or a combination of them, provided 
that, by the application of equitable principles, a reasonable result is arrived at’.
223
 It 
confirmed, however, that delimitation is not a matter ‘for the unfettered appreciation 
of the Parties’
224
 and that it:  
is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all 
the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party: all those 
parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and 





Later decisions and awards have iterated the status of the equidistance method as a 
non-principle. For instance, in the Tunisia/Libya Case the ICJ stated that 
‘equidistance is not ... a mandatory legal principle, or a method having some 
privileged status in relation to other methods’.
226
 Moreover, the tribunal provided in 
the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case that ‘the equidistance method is just one among 
many and there is no obligation to use it or give it priority’.
227
 According to the 




Since the North Sea Case was decided international courts and tribunals have 
had to put the continental shelf puzzle together and create a predictable regime. 
Ironically, ‘the Court’s later jurisprudence on Article 6 has departed from its earlier 
conclusion and now assimilates it to the customary rule of delimitation based on 
equitable principles’.
229
 In other words, the jurisprudence has moved in the direction 
of viewing the equidistance/special circumstances rule on the one hand, and 
delimitation according to equitable principles on the other, as incapable of being 
fully distinguishable. In consequence the margin for debate on what should be the 
primary method for delimitation has been tightened through decisions of 
international courts and tribunals in more recent cases.
230
 ITLOS has noted that 
‘[i]nternational courts and tribunals have developed a body of case law on maritime 
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delimitation which has reduced the elements of subjectivity and uncertainty in the 
determination of maritime boundaries and in the choice of methods employed to that 
end’.
231
 The ICJ in the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between 
Qatar and Bahrain noted 
[T]he equidistance/special circumstances rule, which is applicable in particular to the delimitation 
of the territorial sea, and the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule, as it has been 
developed since 1958 in case-law and State practice with regard to the delimitation of the 




Similarly the Court stated in the Land and Maritime Boundary Case between 
Cameroon and Nigeria that:  
The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the applicable criteria, principles and rules 
of delimitation are when a line covering several ones of coincident jurisdiction is to be determined. 
They are expressed in the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method. This 
method, which is very similar to the equidistance/special circumstances method applicable in 
delimitation of the territorial sea, involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering 





The tribunal reached a similar conclusion in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago 
Delimitation Case:  
The determination of the line of delimitation thus normally follows a two-step approach. First, a 
provisional line of equidistance is posited as a hypothesis and a practical starting point. While a 
convenient starting point, equidistance alone will in many circumstances not ensure an equitable 
result in the light of the peculiarities of each specific case. The second step accordingly requires 
the examination of this provisional line in the light of relevant circumstances, which are case 
specific, so as to determine whether it is necessary to adjust the provisional equidistance line in 




The ICJ’s most recent case on maritime boundary delimitation case ‒ the 2009 Black 
Sea Case ‒ is ‘built on the evolution of the jurisprudence on maritime 
delimitation’
235
 and adds the notion of proportionality as the third stage of the 
delimitation method. It provided:  
Finally, and at a third stage, the Court will verify that the line (a provisional equidistance line 
which may or may not have been adjusted by taking into account the relevant circumstances) 
does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked disproportion 
between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime 
area of each State by reference to the delimitation line …
236
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ITLOS, in the most recent judgement on maritime boundaries before any 
international court or tribunal, used the three stage approach. It described the method 
in the following manner:  
[T]he Tribunal will proceed in the following stages: at the first stage it will construct a provisional 
equidistance line, based on the geography of the Parties’ coasts and mathematical calculations. 
Once the provisional equidistance line has been drawn, it will proceed to the second stage of the 
process, which consists of determining whether there are any relevant circumstances requiring 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line; if so, it will make an adjustment that produces an 
equitable result. At the third and final stage in this process the Tribunal will check whether the 
line, as adjusted, results in any significant disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal 




To summarise what has been stated above, the maritime delimitation method 
developed by that international courts and tribunals is of equitable principles/relevant 
circumstances. It is a three-stage method which is flexible enough to fit the 
geographical circumstances in most cases.   
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
Although the continental shelf concept has been developed by the usage of the whole 
arsenal of international law it is clear that international courts and tribunals, with the 
ICJ in the front seat, are the most important actors in this development. It was the ICJ 
that introduced the natural prolongation concept in the North Sea Case. It was the 
ICJ, in the same case, which rejected the equidistance/special circumstances method 
of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention as a principle of customary international 
law and decided that delimitation must be in accordance with equitable principles. It 
was in the Libya/Malta Case that the ICJ gave scientific considerations, other than 
distance, the final blow in the establishment of the continental shelf within 200 nm. It 
was ITLOS that minimised the role of geology in the application and interpretation 
of article 76. Together, the ICJ and tribunals have created and developed maritime 
boundary delimitation jurisprudence. Even though UNCLOS is of high importance in 
continental shelf considerations, the central provisions of the Convention are mostly 
elaborative of the concepts created by courts and tribunals. 
The natural prolongation concept, as understood in light of the subsequent 
provisions of article 76, is the most important concept for the establishment of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm with regard to both delineation and delimitation. It 
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is the basis for entitlement to the continental shelf beyond the 200 nm limit. The foot 
of the slope concept can be said to be the second most important concept concerning 
the delineation of the continental shelf. It is the reference baseline for the methods 
established by UNCLOS to determine the exact location of coastal State’s natural 
prolongation. The most important concept for the delimitation of the continental 
shelf is that of equitable principles. These principles focus on the unique and specific 
character of each case. 
If a comparison is made between delineation and delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm, a few observations can be made. First, the act of 
delineation and delimitation consists of drawing a line that defines the jurisdiction of 
a coastal State. Second, both procedures have their roots in title. Third, the boundary 
line that is established by delineation is one between a coastal State and the Area, a 
sui generis international creature. The boundary line established by delimitation is, 
however, between two or more coastal States. Fourth, if a coastal State is going to 
delineate its continental shelf, it has to make a submission to the CLCS which must 
confirm the reasonableness of the submission, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter. If, however, a coastal State seeks to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 





3. The Role of the CLCS 
3.1. Introduction 
The CLCS is one of three institutions that were created with UNCLOS to implement 
its provisions. For the reason of ‘the complexity [of article 76], because [it] 
involve[s] questions of sophisticated technical judgement, and because of the new 
interest of all states in the resulting boundaries, it was agreed to set up an 




Its establishment was a necessary element of bridging the gap between the aspirations of those 
States which considered the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelves as part of 
their sovereignty and of those which wanted to limit a further seaward extension of national claims 




As will be explained in the following chapter, the Commission is a specialist body 
with a limited mandate to consider data and other material submitted by coastal 
States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits 
extend beyond 200 nm and make recommendations based on this material in 
accordance with article 76 and Annex II of UNCLOS. In other words, it will be 
argued that ‘the Commission is not a jurisdictional but a technological and scientific 
body, aimed at analysing the data supporting the coastal state’s submission’.
240
 It 
must be highlighted that an unusual string is attached to the recommendations of the 
Commission; they are final and binding if accepted by the submitting coastal State. 
There is thus something special about these recommendations. Another special 
aspect of the recommendations are that they ‘will result in a major redrawing of the 
world map of the ocean floor, thereby changing the face of the world – even if that 
face lies beneath the waters of the seas and oceans around the globe’.
241
  
The process that leads to the establishment of the outer continental shelf is 
quite different from the process of establishing the limits of the continental shelf in 
accordance with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, for no 
institutional elements were attached to the establishment of the continental shelf in 
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that Convention. For the same reason, this process is also different from other 
processes that lead to the establishment of maritime zones under international law. 
Moreover, this process does not involve equitable solution considerations as in the 
process that leads to the establishment of maritime boundaries between neighbouring 
States. In short, the process is different from its predecessor process in the 
establishment of the extent of the continental shelf, is not the same as the process that 
leads to the establishment of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, or EEZ, and is 
different from the maritime boundary delimitation process. 
This chapter seeks to define what is the role of the CLCS in the delineation 
and delimitation of the outer continental shelf. The focus will be on the legal nature 
of the Commission and its recommendations and how the Commission differs from 
international dispute settlement bodies. The chapter is divided into five parts. The 
first introduces the main legal instruments relevant to the Commission. The second 
asks what the CLCS in fact is. The third explains briefly how its recommendations 
are made. The fourth deals with four issues concerning the interpretation of article 
76(8) of UNCLOS. Finally, the question is considered as to how the CLCS should 
deal with a submission in the case of a dispute between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes. 
3.2. Legal Instruments 
The Commission is established by article 76(8) of UNCLOS, which defines its 
principal role. Annex II deals with the composition and function of the Commission, 
how it organises its work, the obligations of coastal States when making 
submissions, and the applicable procedure in the event of a disagreement between the 
Commission and a submitting coastal State. It includes a provision, similar to article 
76(10), that ‘[t]he actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to 
delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts’.
242
  
Also of importance are soft law instruments established by the Commission 
itself. The CLCS has created two such instruments; namely the Rules of Procedure of 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
243
 and the Scientific and 
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Technical Guidelines of the Commission. The Rules of Procedure are more detailed 
than is Annex II to UNCLOS. They include three annexes. The first addresses 
submissions in the event of a dispute between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes. It has been questioned 
whether some of its provisions are in conformity with UNCLOS, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter. The second annex establishes the rules of confidentiality 
concerning information and data submitted to the Commission. The third annex 
contains the modus operandi for the consideration by the Commission of a 
submission made thereto. 
Although there is nothing in UNCLOS that allows the Commission explicitly 
to establish procedural rules or scientific and technical guidelines, the creation of 
such instruments can possibly be justified on the basis that international institutions 
have the power to adopt rules for their internal functions.
244
 This is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘doctrine of implied powers’ established in the Advisory Opinion 
on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.
245
 
According to that doctrine, an organisation must, under international law, ‘be deemed 
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the [UN] Charter,
246
 
are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance 
of its duties’.
247
 The ILA Committee has pointed out that ‘[t]he Commission is 
competent to establish the rules applicable to its own internal procedures’ with which 
States must comply in their dealings with the CLCS.
248
 These ‘rules can only be 
objected against on the ground that the CLCS has overstepped the limits of its 
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competence or that these rules are invalid for other reasons’.
249
 The UN under-
secretary for legal affairs has noted that it should be underlined:  
[T]hat rules of procedure and other relevant documents adopted by the Commission should be in 
strict conformity with the pertinent provisions of the Convention … In the case of any conflict 
between the provisions of these documents, which are supplementary by their nature, and those of 




A complicating factor in the work of the Commission is that at the time of the 
negotiation of UNCLOS ‘the knowledge and information available on the seabed and 
ocean floor had been much less developed than today’.
251
 Consequently, the drafters 
of the Convention had not anticipated the technical complexities involved in the 
application of some of its provisions, in particular those of Part VI and Annex II to 
the Convention.
252
 To ameliorate some of the problems caused by the ambiguities of 
article 76 of UNCLOS, the CLCS adopted the Scientific and Technical Guidelines 
with the aim of assisting coastal states in fulfilling their obligation to submit data and 
other information to the Commission to be able to establish the outer limits of the 
continental shelf. The importance of the Guidelines is explained in the first chapter 
thereof:    
With these Guidelines, the Commission aims ... to clarify its interpretation of scientific, technical 
and legal terms contained in the Convention. Clarification is required in particular because the 
Convention makes use of scientific terms in a legal context which at times departs significantly 
from accepted scientific definitions and terminology. In other cases, clarification is required 
because various terms in the Convention might be left open to several possible and equally 
acceptable interpretations. It is also possible that it may not have been felt necessary at the time of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to determine the precise definition of 
various scientific and technical terms. In still other cases, the need for clarification arises as a 
result of the complexity of several provisions and the potential scientific and technical difficulties 





It has been argued that the Guidelines ‘come close to being an authoritative 
interpretation of the technical provisions found in Article 76’.
254
 Some go even 
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further and state that the Guidelines are ‘the first authoritative and detailed scientific 
and technical interpretation of article 76’.
255
 These views seem to be in line with the 
judgement in the Bay of Bengal Case which made references to the Guidelines when 
addressing the meaning of natural prolongation.
256
 
3.3. What is the CLCS? 
3.3.1. What is the Role of the CLCS? 
The CLCS has been given a specific function under article 76(8) of UNCLOS and 
article 3(1) of Annex II to the Convention. Article 76(8) of UNCLOS provides:  
Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of 
equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal 
States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The 
limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be 
final and binding. 
 
Article 3(1) of Annex II to UNCLOS provides that the functions of the Commission 
shall be: 
a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of 
the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make 
recommendations in accordance with Article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 
29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; 
b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during the 
preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a). 
 
The provisions above provide that the role of the CLCS is twofold; (1) to consider 
submissions
257
 from coastal States and subsequently to issue recommendations;
258
 
and (2) to provide scientific and technical advice.
259
 The former role is the primary 
one. It consists of an evaluative process which is scientific and technical in nature. It 
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constitutes an independent assessment of the data submitted by the coastal State. This 
role ‘implies a power to establish whether the scientific and technical data submitted 
by a coastal State prove that the conditions which allow the specific delineation of 
the outer limit of the continental shelf are met’.
260
 In this process the CLCS must 
answer the question of ‘whether ... the scientific and technical data submitted by the 
coastal State actually supports the conclusions which are drawn from them ... and ... 
[whether] these conclusions are in accordance with article 76’.
261
 The CLCS has 
indicated that it prefers bathymetrical, geodetical, geophysical (seismic, gravity and 
magnetic data) and geological evidence, both digital and non-digital, including maps 
and charts.
262
 This preference of the CLCS is not, however, binding upon States. 
UNCLOS does not prohibit States from using any kind of evidence. 
In this context it must be noted that a coastal State can submit ‘in the course 
of the examination by the Commission of its original information, new particulars of 
the limits of its continental shelf or substantial part thereof if in the view of the 
coastal State concerned it is justified by additional scientific and technical data 
obtained by it’.
263
 This is something which States have done in practice.
264
 The 
purpose of submitting ‘such additional material and information is to support, 
integrate and clarify the particulars of the limits of the continental shelf contained in 
the submission’.
265
 This is an important aspect of the dialogue that takes place 
between the coastal State and the CLCS in the delineation procedure. 
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Although article 3(1)(a) of UNCLOS clearly ‘provides a link between CLCS 
work and legal standards’,
266
 it is important to note that the above provisions, or 
other provisions in UNCLOS, do not ‘charge the Commission to consider and make 
recommendations on legal matters’.
267
 Nevertheless, ‘the consideration of a 
submission by the CLCS in general will not only be concerned with the evaluation of 
scientific and technical data, but may also require findings on the interpretation or 




Although the functions of the CLCS are concerned with the assessment of scientific and technical 
data, this assessment has to be carried out ‘in accordance with article 76 of the Convention’.
 
This 
wording indicates that the CLCS is bound to apply the substantive provisions of article 76 in 
considering the information that has been submitted by the coastal State. This requirement would 
raise few problems if the provisions of article 76 would not raise any questions concerning their 
interpretation or application. However, this clearly is not the case. The interpretation and practical 
application of various provisions of article 76 are controversial.
 
While one interpretation of a 
provision of article 76 may lead to the conclusion that specific data proves that the requirements of 





Even although the CLCS has not been given the competence to render an award 
binding on the parties concerned, ‘the Commission has to be presumed to be 
competent to deal with issues concerning the interpretation or application of article 
76 or other relevant articles of the Convention to the extent this is required to carry 
out the functions which are explicitly assigned to it’.
270
 The ILA Committee notes:  
This conclusion also follows from the fact that the Commission is charged with considering 
submissions in accordance with article 76 of the Convention. This function includes the question 
whether the information that has been submitted to the Commission proves that the conditions set 
out in article 76 are actually met by the coastal State for the specific outer limit lines it proposes. 
At times, this may require the interpretation of specific provisions of article 76.
 
The Commission 
will have to make its own assessment of whether the interpretation a coastal State has (implicitly) 
adopted in its submission actually is in accordance with article 76.
 
At the same time, the 
requirement to consider submissions and make recommendations in accordance with article 76
 




Although the CLCS must to some extent have the power to interpret article 76 and 
Annex II of UNCLOS, ‘since it cannot fulfil its role in clinical isolation from legal 
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 it must be noted that ‘the competence to interpret and apply article 
76 of the Convention rests in the first place with its States parties’.
273
 The CLCS ‘is 
only competent to deal with the interpretation of the provisions of article 76 and 
other provisions of the Convention to the extent this is necessary to carry out the 
functions which have been assigned to it under the Convention’.
274
 As a 
consequence, the ILA Committee argues that ‘this competence has to be interpreted 
restrictively’ and
 
‘does not replace the competence of the States parties (or courts or 
tribunals) to interpret the Convention’.
275
 Wolfrum notes that the role of the CLCS in 
this context is rather to direct the State to delineate the outer continental shelf in 
conformity with article 76 without infringing upon the sovereignty of the State.
276
 
The ILA Committee argues:  
It should be noted that the assessment of scientific and technical data, which is one of the functions 
of the CLCS, has to be distinguished from the consideration of scientific and technical terms in 
connection with the interpretation of provisions of article 76 of the Convention. A number of terms 
included in the Convention have been derived from the field of natural sciences. This fact does, 
however, not place their interpretation beyond the legal realm and does not give the CLCS a 
competence to interpret these provisions which is different from the competence which it has 
generally in this respect ... These limitations on the competence of the Commission indicate that 
the Commission should defer to a reasonable interpretation of article 76 provided by a coastal 
State making a submission. This state of affairs might possibly lead to the existence of 
contradictory interpretations of article 76. This makes it important to consider how other States 
parties to the Convention can indicate their views on these provisions and how possible disputes 




It must be asked what is meant by the ILA Committee stating that ‘the Commission 
should defer to a reasonable interpretation of article 76 provided by a coastal State 
making a submission’. If one considers that a fundamental role of the CLCS is to 
guard the Area against excessive claims by coastal States, then why should the CLCS 
defer to a coastal state at all? The CLCS must, given its role, have some powers of 
interpretation.  
It can be argued that the CLCS has interpreted UNCLOS incorrectly and that 
it has established rules not found in UNCLOS. As mentioned in chapter two, when 
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the CLCS considered Norway’s submission regarding the Arctic Ocean and the 
Barents Sea, the Commission adopted the position that the 2500-metre isobath 
constraint line had to be landward of the foot of the continental slope even although 
nothing in UNCLOS supports this interpretation. The CLCS has adopted other 
controversial positions, some of which are discussed later in this chapter. 
As mentioned, the Commission plays an important role with regard to the 
fundamental aim of article 76 of UNCLOS to guarantee that the Area, which 
UNCLOS recognises as the common heritage of mankind,
278
 is not improperly 
diminished by excessive unilateral delineations by coastal States.
279
 Interestingly, the 
Authority plays no part in the delineation process although it has a significant interest 
in the revenue sharing system established by article 82.
280
 It has been noted that in 
the delineation process ‘the Authority merely serves as a depositary of information 
submitted by coastal States giving the outer limit lines of the continental shelf’.
281
 
One of the main purposes for the creation of the CLCS was to safeguard the outer 
limits of the Area. This has been explained in the following way: 
Having reached agreement on the outer limit, coupled with revenue sharing, it was next realized 
that some mechanism was necessary to verify that the limit established by any particular coastal 
state was in accord with the rules set forth in Article 76. If this mechanism was not 
institutionalized in the treaty, then the potential for conflict between an individual coastal state and 
the Authority would be great, with resulting uncertainties and delays. It was also understood that 
this mechanism could not be institutionalized within the Seabed Authority itself, since the 
Authority was an interested party. Obviously, an independent body was the answer, one that had 




Franckx has, importantly, noted that:  
Coastal states will ... need to determine the outer edge of the continental margin extending beyond 
200 nm first, in accordance with Article 76 of the 1982 Convention, before mankind as a whole 
                                                          
278
 Article 136 of UNCLOS. 
279
 China has expressed the view that whilst State parties to UNCLOS exercise the right to submit 
information on the outer limits of the outer continental shelf they ‘shall also have the obligation to 
ensure respect for the extent of the International Seabed Area ... and not to affect the overall interests 
of the international community as a whole’. Note Verbale of the Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the United Nations (6 February 2009) Doc. CML/2/2009 (China’s reactions to 
Japan). The note was a reaction to the submission made by Japan to the CLCS. 
280
 Satya Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne (eds.) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; A 
Commentary vol. VI (Martinus Nijhoff 2002) 85.  
281
 Ibid. Article 134(3) of UNCLOS provides that ‘[t]he requirements concerning deposit of, and 
publicity to be given to, the charts or lists of geographical coordinates showing the limits referred to in 
article 1, paragraph 1(1), are set forth in Part VI’.  
282
 Thomas Clingan, ‘Dispute Settlement among Non-Parties to the LOS Convention with Respect to 
the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf’ in Thomas Clingan (ed.) The law of the sea – what lies 
ahead? (The Law of the Sea Institute William S. Richardson School of Law University of Hawaii 




will be able to know with any certainty what the spatial limits are within which the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind applies.
283
 
   
The CLCS received its first submission in December 2001 from the Russian 
Federation. In mid-July 2012, the CLCS had received 61 submissions and 45 
preliminary information submissions and had issued 18 recommendations. In the 
final 12 months before the 2009 deadline, the Commission received 40 submissions. 
There exists no definite number of submissions that the Commission will receive. 
Nevertheless, the Chairman of the CLCS has stated that ‘expected total number of 
submissions was as high as 65 almost double the number of submissions forecast at 
the time of the drafting of the Convention’.
284
 It is likely that this estimation is too 
cautious. The area claimed in the first 51 submissions is over 23 million square 
kilometres in size.
285
 Thereof is 10% included in two or more submissions; that is to 
say 10% of the claimed area is subject to overlapping claims.
286
 In a much quoted 
inventory from 1998, Prescott identifies 29 areas of continental shelf extending 
beyond 200 nm (absent Antarctica). Of these, 22 involve more than one State and 
only seven involve just one State.
287
 This clearly indicates that the delineation and 
delimitation processes are interlinked and the extent to which the CLCS will be faced 
with delimitation issues.  
As aforementioned, the role of the CLCS is not only to consider submissions 
and issue recommendations. It also has the role of providing ‘scientific and technical 
advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during the preparation of the data’ 
that is necessary for concluding a submission.
288
 The advice can be quite important 
for developing States, especially those that do not have broad access to experts.
289
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3.3.2. Who are the Members of the CLCS? 
The CLCS consists of 21 members who are experts in the fields of geology, 
geophysics or hydrography.
290
 It has been criticised that law is not one of the fields 
of expertise qualifying candidates for election to the CLCS, given the central role of 
the Commission in the application of the provisions of UNCLOS. Nelson has argued 
that even although the CLCS is not a court, ‘one of the cardinal functions of the 
Commission must necessarily be to interpret or apply the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS; an essentially legal task’.
291
 In defence of the composition of the 
Commission, it must be noted that it may, to the extent considered necessary and 
useful, consult specialists in any field relevant to its work.
292
 Specialists in 
international law can therefore be called upon to give advice at the request of the 
Commission. Of greater importance, the secretariat of the Commission is in the 
Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea of the United Nations Secretariat. 
Moreover, the Commission can seek advice from the Legal Counsel of the United 
Nations. It can also request the Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS to clarify or 
make recommendations on specific issues,
293
 as, indeed, it has done. The ILA 
Committee notes in this context that ‘[i]n the case of controversial issues, it may be 
difficult for the Meeting of States parties to assist the Commission in this respect’.
294
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The fact that the ‘CLCS only rarely seeks legal advice, and when it does so is reliant 
on a sole provider, the United Nations Secretariat’s Office of Legal Affairs’,
295
 
seriously damages this argument of defence. Oude Elferink has argued, from a 
different perspective:  
[T]his ‘perceived weakness’ of the CLCS, in the sense that it is a body that does not include legal 
expertise, may rather be considered its strength. This ‘weakness’ makes it possible to insulate the 
CLCS to a large extent from (the resolution of) legal disputes and have it focus on the tasks which 
have been entrusted to it under the Convention, which primarily involve the evaluation of 
scientific and technical data.
296
   
 
Rothwell has pointed out that ‘[i]t is clear that the Commission is not to be 
comprised of jurists or legal experts, which further reinforces the scientific nature of 
its work’.
297
 Similarly, Oxman notes that ‘the Commission is not a court, and legal 
expertise is not included among the express qualifications of its members’.
298
 
Zinchenko provided:  
The Commission is not a court of law, nor was it ever expected to become one. It was neither 
conceived as a watchdog, nor as a chamber for the easy and convenient approval of coastal States’ 
submissions. The role of this highly scientific organ, which is called upon to provide assistance in 
the very politicized realm of setting legal boundaries, is to help establish the true limit of the outer 
boundary of the continental shelf according to the terms of the United Nations Convention on the 




On this issue the ILA Committee stated: 
The question how the absence of legal expertise in the Commission has to be judged depends on: 
a) its functions under the Convention ... are in the first place concerned with the consideration of 
scientific and technical data; and b) to what extent the procedure involving the Commission might 
exclude the application of Part XV of the Convention to questions concerning the interpretation or 
application of article 76.
 
If article 76 were to be completely excluded from the procedures of Part 
XV, the absence of legal expertise in the Commission would seem to be problematic, as there then 
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The initial election of members to the Commission was supposed to be held within 
18 months from the date of the entry into force of UNCLOS, at the latest.
301
 
Although the time limit is clearly expressed in UNCLOS, the Commission did not 
meet until 16 June 1997, 13 months later than it was supposed to. In the third 
Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS it was agreed to postpone the election of 
members until March 1997.
302
 The main reason for the delay was the wish to reach 
universal participation in the Convention prior to the Commission elections.
303
 The 
delay of the elections permitted 31 other countries to become parties to the 
Convention prior to the first election of members to the Commission.
304
 
The election of members to the Commission shall be held at a meeting of 
States parties. A nominee requires two-thirds majority of the votes from the 
representatives present and voting
305
 where two-thirds of the State parties constitutes 
a quorum.
306
 Members are elected for a term of five years and are eligible for re-
election.
307
 The CLCS members are elected by State parties to UNCLOS from 
among their own nationals,
308
 with due regard to the need to ensure equitable 
geographical representation.
309
 At least three members shall be elected from each 
geographical region.
310
 The rationale underlying the requirement of equitable 
geographical representation in the Commission can be traced to the fear of 
industrialised coastal States that they could easily be outvoted by a majority of 
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 The ILA Committee notes that ‘[s]ome concern has been 
voiced in respect of the consistency and predictability of the work of the CLCS’.
312
 
The reason for this concern stems ‘among others from the fact that the procedure for 
election of the members of the CLCS can result in a significant turnover in 
membership and that there will be limited information on the reasoning of the CLCS 
in dealing with submissions’.
313
 
It is important to note that members of the CLCS serve in their personal 
capacities. The Commission does not consist of States, representatives of States or 
representatives of the United Nations. The members are intended to be elected due to 
their relevant expertise in specific fields of science and technology and must be 
politically and commercially neutral in the execution of their work for the CLCS. 
Members must not only be neutral in terms of politics and commerce, but must also 
‘strive for scientific objectivity in areas where there may be wide and legitimate 
divergences of opinion: as an arbiter between schools of competing scientific thought 
concerning the seabed and its underlying structures’ and be aware ‘that decisions 
taken on the basis of its recommendations are “final and binding”, with no provision 
for future revisions to reflect improved information and understanding’.
314
 
The manner in which members’ expenses are defrayed has caused some 
turbulence. Annex II to UNCLOS provides that ‘[t]he State Party which submitted 
the nomination of a member of the Commission shall defray the expenses of that 
member while in performance of Commission duties’.
315
 Subedi has noted that ‘[t]his 
can be an impediment to the independence of the Commissioners and may make 
them more accountable to the nominating State than to the [Meeting of States 
Parties]’.
316
 On the other hand it has been pointed out that ‘[t]he election process 
itself is only marginally more open to criticism than the process, found elsewhere, of 
State sponsorship of candidatures, even to international adjudication bodies’ such as 
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the ICJ, ITLOS and the International Criminal Court.
317
 It would perhaps be rather 
more in the spirit of impartiality if ‘the expenses of each Commission member 
should be borne by the United Nations to make it a real independent Commission’, as 
a former member of the Commission has suggested.
318
 
3.3.3. What kind of Entity is the CLCS?  
As mentioned above, it can be difficult to define what kind of entity is the CLCS. 
The Commission has been categorised in various ways and from various 
perspectives. The UN Legal Counsel, in his legal opinion regarding the applicability 
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to the 
members of the Commission, stated that ‘the Commission is neither a principal nor a 
subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but might be considered as a “treaty organ” 
of the Organization’.
319
 Treaty organs have been defined as a ‘category of global 
organisations, which includes bodies created within the framework of a treaty 
intended to establish substantive rules regulating conduct within a specialised area, 
but that are not (fully) part of the United Nations system’.
320
  Many of these organs 
‘have international legal personality and varying capacities and powers at 
international and national levels, rules of procedure and membership and enumerated 




In this context the question must be asked whether the CLCS has independent 
legal personality. A few facts must be taken into account when this issue is observed. 
The secretariat of CLCS is provided for by the Secretary-General. The members of 
the Commission are elected by the Meeting of States Parties. The fact that the UN 
Legal Counsel suggested that the CLCS is a treaty organ of the UN seems to suggest 
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that it does not have its own legal personality. It must also be noted that the way in 
which the CLCS has chosen to operate, that is largely through requests through other 
bodies rather than act independently, as will be discussed below, seems also to 
indicate that it does not have independent legal personality. Moreover, UNCLOS 
only provides the Commission with the power to enter into cooperation arrangements 
with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
322
 and the International 
Hydrographic Organisation
323
 and other competent international organisations, and it 
cannot bring and receive claims, as will be discussed in next chapter. This seems to 
indicate that the CLCS does not have independent legal personality.
324
  
It is clear that the CLCS cannot be categorised as an international 
organisation in the meaning of article 305(1)(f) of UNCLOS since it is not ‘an 
intergovernmental organization constituted by States which its member States have 
transferred competence over matters governed by’ UNCLOS.
325
 It is also clear that 
the Commission is not a court or tribunal and its role is not to resolve disputes. There 
are at least three factors supporting this view. The first factor, as aforesaid, is that the 
members of the CLCS are not required to be specialists in law, as are judges of 
international courts and tribunals.
326
 The second factor is that the outcome of the 
CLCS procedure is a recommendation not a judgement or award. A recommendation 
of the CLCS is only binding if a submitting coastal State establishes the limits of the 
outer continental shelf on the basis of the recommendation. A decision of the ICJ is, 
by contrast, binding between the parties
327
 and its judgement is final and without a 
right to appeal.
328
 Moreover, there is no enforcement mechanism behind 
recommendations, such as can be found in the case of ICJ judgements.
329
 The third 
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factor is that the expenses of CLCS members, whilst in the performance of their 
duties, are to be paid by the State party which nominated the member that was 
elected, not the UN.  
McDorman has convincingly argued that the CLCS is what he calls a 
legitimator. He clarifies this concept as follows: 
Legitimation is not the same thing as legal or political approval. Moreover, legitimation must be 
understood not in terms of black-and-white (legitimate or illegitimate) but as a spectrum between 
greater legitimacy and lesser legitimacy.
330
 The calculation by a state whether the establishment of 
a continental margin outer limit by another state is legitimate and whether a protest will or will not 
be issued by a non-claiming state involves law and politics. The state parties to the LOS 




Moreover, McDorman suggests that ‘the only concrete role of the Commission in the 
delineation of the outer limits is procedural’.
332
 He points out that ‘[t]he 
Commission’s task as legitimator and guardian must take priority over the natural 
tendency of technical professionals to seek precision and apply rigorous scientific 
standards of proof’.
333
 Similarly, Noyes notes that ‘[t]he CLCS does not set or certify 
outer limits; it fills a procedural role, issuing recommendations that can help 
legitimate the outer limits that coastal states establish’.
334
 Subedi reaches the 
conclusion that the status of the CLCS ‘seems to fall somewhere between a quasi 
judicial and an administrative body’ and perhaps could ‘best be described as a 




Some might attempt to compare the CLCS to mixed boundary commissions, 
namely commissions responsible for the technical aspects of land-boundary making 
or frontier delineation. A mixed boundary commission is an entity which ‘may be 
designated to carry out any boundary-making function which requires some degree 
of expert and technical knowledge’.
336
 A striking similarity between the CLCS and 
mixed boundary commissions is not only their technical mandate and purpose but 
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also that ‘international practice, as a rule, regards the findings of Mixed 
Commissions as subject to approval by the adjoining States delimiting their common 
boundary. They do not bind the parties until they are constituted formal agreements, 
for example, by exchange of notes.’
337
 In the context of the outer continental shelf, as 
already stated, the recommendations of the CLCS do not become binding except in 
the event that the coastal State establishes the limits of the shelf on the basis of the 
Commission’s recommendations.  
It must be noted that the proposals which later became article 76 of UNCLOS 
made mention of a body called the Continental Shelf Boundary Commission.
338
 This 
indicates that the idea of creating the CLCS originates, to some extent, from the long 
tradition of mixed boundary commissions. However, as Suarez points out, the CLCS 
is different from other technical boundary commissions since ‘[i]t is the only 
technical and scientific commission of its kind that is established by a multilateral 
convention with the principal mandate of evaluating claims for a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm’.
339
 It can also be pointed out that such mixed boundary commissions 
have usually been established on an ad hoc basis with limited and highly temporary 
functions in resolving bilateral disputes.
340
 It is therefore questionable how far any 
resemblance goes between the CLCS and mixed boundary commissions, although 
the CLCS can be seen as an entity created in the spirit of mixed boundary 
commissions.  
3.3.4. Does the CLCS Represent the International Community? 
The question can be asked of whether the CLCS represents the international 
community. This can be answered in two ways. From a formal perspective which 
focuses mainly on the organisation of the CLCS and its procedural function, on the 
one hand, or from a more substantive viewpoint that focuses on its mandate, on the 
other.  
From a formal viewpoint, which can be said to be more legalistic, McDorman 
has argued that it is not possible to view the CLCS as the representatives of ‘the 
international community of states in a manner similar to, for example, the way in 
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which the United Nations or other intergovernmental organisations can be said to 
represent or speak for its member states’.
341
 Moreover, McDorman argues that ‘[t]he 
wording of the LOS Convention contains no explicit delegation of authority from 
state parties to the LOS Convention to the Commission and no explicit yielding by 
state parties of their ability to claim, react, protest or reject actions related to the 
outer limits of the continental shelf’.
342
 In support of this argument he quotes the 
statement of the chairman of the CLCS that the Commission is an ‘autonomous body 
established by the Convention with no formal accountability to the Meeting of States 
Parties’
343
 and the work of a former member of the Commission which stated that 




This view must be questioned. It is not clear cut that the CLCS can be seen as 
a completely autonomous entity with no formal accountability to anyone. After all, 
CLCS has a strong connection to the Meeting of States Parties. Indeed the CLCS has 
sought advice from the Meeting which suggests that they themselves may feel 
accountability towards the institution. This seems to indicate that States parties are 
able to hold the CLCS to account to some degree. In addition, as will be discussed in 
next chapter, an international court or tribunal could invalidate a decision of the 
CLCS which would seem to be another accountability mechanism.  
From a substantive viewpoint it can be argued that the CLCS represents the 
international community, or at least works for the common good of the international 
community, since its work promotes stability and predictability of international 
relations. The important role played by the CLCS for the international community 
has been touched upon in various fora. For example, the UN Legal Counsel stated in 
an address to the CLCS:  
[T]he work of the Commission was one of the vital elements in the establishment of the last of the 
extensive limits of national jurisdiction, and it brought much-needed precision to its important task 
of determining whether a coastal State, in delineating the outer limits of its continental shelf where 
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it extended beyond 200 nautical miles, had correctly applied the complex formulas contained in 
article 76 of the Convention.
345
 
3.3.5. The Commission’s Connections to other International Entities 
3.3.5.1. Independence of the Commission 
The CLCS has no formal ties with ITLOS or the Authority. The Commission is 
however not isolated from other international organs. It is part of the UN system with 
various ties to UN entities, especially the Secretariat and the Meeting of States 
Parties, where it has been granted observer status.
346
 The Secretariat has the 
obligation to ‘perform all the work that the Commission may require for the effective 
performance of its functions’.
347
 In practice, the employees of the Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea execute the roles on behalf of the Secretariat and the 
Secretary-General.
348
 It must also be noted, as mentioned above, that the CLCS can 
cooperate with other international entities. Article 3(2) of Annex II to UNCLOS 
provides: 
The Commission may cooperate, to the extent considered necessary and useful, with the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the International Hydrographic 
Organization and other competent international organizations with a view to exchanging scientific 
and technical information which might be of assistance in discharging the Commission's 
responsibilities.  
 
Such cooperation is supposed to be ‘decided by the Commission on a case-by-case 
basis’.
349
 Moreover, it must be noted that although the Commission has no formal 
connection with ITLOS or the Authority the activities of these three bodies ‘are 
complementary to each other so as to ensure coherent and efficient implementation 
of the Convention’.
350
 To conclude, the Commission is an independent body with 
various ties to UN bodies and is supposed to work in harmony with the other two 
bodies established by UNCLOS. 
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3.3.5.2. Meeting of States Parties 
With regard to the relationship of the CLCS with other international entities, the 
relations between the Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS
351
 and the Commission 
is the most interesting from the perspective of international law-making. Even 
though it is true that the CLCS is not formally accountable to the Meeting of States 
Parties ‒ as the chairman of the CLCS has stated ‒ the Commission has sought the 
advice of the Meeting on various issues to legitimise important decisions such as the 
adoption of the Rules of Procedure and its annexes.
352
 Moreover, the Meeting of 
States Parties has made de facto modifications
353
 to some administrative provisions 
of UNCLOS relevant to the CLCS. Interestingly, ‘there is a clear indication that once 
they were made, the decisions were deemed to be binding on the States Parties and 
they could not be reversed by a subsequent majority decision’.
354
  
The first decision of this kind taken by the Meeting of States Parties was to 
postpone the first election of members to the Commission with the consequence that 
the elections were not held within 18 months after the date of entry into force of 
UNCLOS, as is required by article 2(1) of Annex II to UNCLOS.
355
 As 
aforementioned, article 2(3) of Annex II to UNCLOS provides that ‘[n]ot less than 
three members shall be elected from each geographical region’. However, the 
Meeting of States Parties accepted that ‘[f]or the purpose of the first election only, 
the Group of Eastern European States has decided not to fill the third seat to which it 
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 The Group of Eastern European States permitted that seat to be filled 
by a member from the Western European and Other States Group.
357
 The third 
decision of this kind taken by the Meeting of States Parties was to delay the date of 
commencement of the ten-year period for making submission.
358
 The fourth was to 
accept that the previously delayed commencement date could be ‘satisfied by 
submitting to the Secretary-General preliminary information indicative of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and a description of the 
status of preparation and intended date of making a submission’.
359
  
All of these decisions clearly contradict provisions in Annex II to UNCLOS 
and were made outside the amendment procedure found in articles 312 and 313 of 
the Convention. It perhaps seems peculiar that the amendment procedure of the 
Convention was obviated, however, there are strong practical reasons for doing so: 
Amendment of the 1982 UNCLOS has proved [unattractive] to states parties. Amendments 
proposed at a negotiating conference can be adopted by vote when all efforts to reach consensus 
have failed, but once such a conference is convened there is again no means of controlling what 
other amendments are put forward. A simplified procedure provided for in Article 313 eliminates 
this risk by dispensing with the need for a negotiating conference. Non-objection will secure 
adoption of an amendment, but it only takes one objection for the procedure to fail. A further 
drawback is that only the treaty parties can initiate amendment procedures. The non-parties, 
including the United States, would have no vote in such procedures, yet their participation in UN 
discussions on law of the sea shows their continuing interest in further development of the 




Harrison points out that the main arguments for using the decisions of the States 
Parties to modify the provisions of UNCLOS are that ‘this mechanism is quicker than 
invoking the amendment procedures, which not only require the circulation of 
proposed amendments to States Parties, but also formally require individual consent 
before amendments become binding’.
361
 Decisions of the Meeting of the States 
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 See Decision regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for making submissions 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in article 4 of Annex II to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Eleventh Meeting of the State Parties, Doc. SPLOS/72 of 
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Parties can, by contrast, have immediate effect.
362
 Further justifications for the non 
ultra vires of the de facto amendments are that they were adopted by consensus
363
 at 
the Meeting of States Parties and can be seen as an amendment by agreement by the 
Parties in the meaning of the VCLT.
364
 The ILC’s Commentary to the VCLT notes 
that ‘[a]n amending agreement may take whatever form the parties to the original 
treaty may choose. Indeed … a treaty may sometime be modified even by an oral 
agreement or by a tacit agreement evidenced by the conduct of the parties in the 
application of the treaty.’
365
 Aust notes similarly ‘it is perfectly possible to amend a 




An alternative but related argument is that the decisions constitute 
‘subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation or application 
of the treaty’.
367
 The VCLT Commentary notes that ‘an agreement as to the 
interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty represents an 
authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the treaty for purposes 
of its interpretation’.
368
 Aust explains that since parties to a treaty ‘can agree later to 
modify the treaty, they can subsequently also agree on an authoritative interpretation 
of its terms, and this can amount in effect to an amendment’.
369
 There is in this 
context ‘no need for further treaty, since the paragraph refers deliberately to an 
“agreement”, not a treaty. Provided the purpose is clear, the agreement can take 
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various forms, including a decision adopted by meeting of the parties.’
370
 This is 
indeed the avenue adopted by the Meeting of States Parties. Aust points out if a 
‘treaty does have a built-in amendment procedure, the process can be lengthy and 
uncertain, especially if it is a multilateral treaty and any amendment is subject to 
ratification’.
371
 He notes that even if this is the case, and depending on circumstances, 
particularly when the modification is essentially procedural, ‘it may be possible to 
embody it in an agreement as to the application of the treaty’.
372
 Aust argues that 
‘[t]his technique is particularly useful if there is a need to fill a lacuna, to update a 
term or postpone the operation of a provision’.
373
 
3.4. Recommendations and Resubmissions 
3.4.1. Introduction 
The recommendations of the CLCS are a key element in the establishment of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. It can be difficult for a coastal 
State to argue that its established outer limits are final and binding if the limits are 
not based on the recommendations of the Commission. The procedure of the CLCS 
is complicated and time-consuming, but is nevertheless appropriate when one bears 
in mind the scale of interests involved. It has been pointed out that ‘[t]he purpose of 
article 76 is to define the continental shelf with a view to promoting certainty and 
stability for the coastal States, in the first instance, but also for the International 
Seabed Authority in the exercise of its responsibilities and for the international 
community generally’.
374
 Franckx has noted that ‘[t]he CLCS seems to be the 
naturally ally of the common heritage of mankind, for it is generally admitted that 
this body was created to act as a watchdog against excessive outer continental shelf 
claims by coastal states’.
375
 Consequently, the Commission ‘offers protection to the 
common heritage of mankind against the expansionist tendencies of coastal states’.
376
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 Smith & Taft (n 123) 24. 
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In its effort to protect the common heritage of mankind, the main tool at the disposal 
of the Commission is its recommendations. Importantly, the Commission provided in 
one of its recommendations that ‘[t]he Recommendations of the Commission only 
deal with issues related to article 76 and Annex II to the Convention and are without 
prejudice to matters relating to delimitation between states or application of other 
parts of the Convention or any other treaties’.
377
  
3.4.2. Main Aspects of the Procedure 
The Rules of Procedure provide that ‘[t]he Commission shall hold sessions at least 
once a year and as often as is required for the effective performance of its functions 
under the Convention, in particular, to consider submissions by coastal States and to 
make recommendations thereon’.
378
 In practice, the Commission has met twice a 
year for a few weeks, with some exceptions. It is provided that the Commission, its 
subcommissions and subsidiary bodies shall try to accomplish their work by general 
agreement.
379
 They ‘shall make every effort to reach agreement on substantive 
matters by way of consensus and there shall be no voting on such matters until all 
efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted’.
380
  
The principal rule is that recommendations of the Commission are prepared 
and developed in subcommissions ‘composed of seven members, appointed in a 
balanced manner taking into account the specific elements of each submission by a 
coastal State’ as provided by article 5 of Annex II to UNCLOS. The article also 
provides that:  
Nationals of the coastal State making the submission who are members of the Commission and 
any Commission member who has assisted a coastal State by providing scientific and technical 
advice with respect to the delineation shall not be a member of the subcommission dealing with 
that submission but has the right to participate as a member in the proceedings of the Commission 
concerning the said submission.  
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In other words, members of the Commission deemed insufficiently impartial to work 
on a coastal State’s submission in a subcommission are deemed to be impartial to do 
so before the whole Commission. It has been pointed out that this arrangement 
‘clouds perceptions of impartiality’.
381
 On the other hand, it has been argued that 
‘[t]he participation in decision-making of nationals or advisers of a coastal State 




Article 5 of Annex II is elaborated upon in rules 42 and 51(4) of the Rules of 
Procedure. According to rule 42(2) ‘[t]he term of a subcommission shall extend from 
the time of its appointment to the time that the submitting coastal State deposits,’ the 
charts and relevant information, in accordance with article 76(9) of UNCLOS. To 
deal with the increased workload of the Commission the decision was taken to 
amend some provisions of the Rules of Procedure.
383
 Following the amendments, 
rule 51(4 bis) provides that ‘[u]nless the Commission decides otherwise, only three 
subcommissions shall function simultaneously while considering submissions’. 
Furthermore, rule 51(4 ter) provides that ‘[t]he submissions shall be queued in the 
order they are received. The submission next in line shall be taken for consideration 
by a subcommission only after one of the three working subcommissions presents its 
recommendations to the Commission.’ Given the current workload of the CLCS, 
several decades will be required for its mandate to be fulfilled.
384
 
Part V of Annex III to the Rules of Procedure sets out the procedure 
regarding the preparation of recommendations by a subcommission. Para. 11 of the 
Annex deals with the formulation of a recommendation. It provides as follows: 
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1. The recommendations prepared by the subcommission shall be in accordance with article 76 of 
the Convention, the Statement of Understanding, these Rules and the Guidelines. 
2. The recommendations prepared by the subcommission shall focus on the data and other material 
submitted by the coastal States in support of the establishment of the outer limits of their 
continental shelf. 
3. The recommendations prepared by the subcommission shall include a summary thereof, and 
such summary shall not contain information which might be of a confidential nature and/or which 
might violate the proprietary rights of the coastal State over the data and information provided in 
the submission. The Secretary-General shall make public the summary of the recommendations 
upon their approval by the Commission. 
 
The Annex includes detailed provisions on the drafting of recommendations
385
 and 
their adoption by the subcommission.
386
 The same rules regarding the decision-
making process of the Commission apply vis-à-vis the subcommission. Furthermore, 
the Annex provides that ‘[t]he recommendations prepared by the subcommission 
shall be submitted in writing to the Chairperson of the Commission in accordance 
with rule 51, paragraph 4, through the Secretariat’.
387
 The submission marks the end 
of the subcommission’s mandate. It is then up to the Commission to ‘consider and 
approve or amend the recommendations prepared by the subcommission’.
388
 A 
majority of two thirds of Commission members present and voting is required for 
approval by the Commission of the subcommission’s recommendations.
389
 In other 
words, the recommendations do not have to be adopted by consensus. 
3.4.3. Adopted Recommendations and Resubmissions 
The recommendations of the Commission must ‘be submitted in writing to the 
coastal State which made the submission and to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations’.
390
 The CLCS has, at the time of writing, issued 18 recommendations. If the 
coastal State accepts the recommendations, the work of the Commission ‒ in relation 
to that submission ‒ is concluded. If it does not ‘the coastal State shall, within a 
reasonable time, make a revised or new submission to the Commission’.
391
  
It can be difficult for third States to verify whether the recommendations of 
the Commission have been followed by a coastal State because of the rules on 
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 To improve this state of affairs, the CLCS decided ‘that the 
recommendations should include an executive summary, containing a general 
description of the extended continental shelf, as well as a set of coordinates to 
identify the line describing the outer limits recommended by the Commission and 
illustrative charts, if appropriate’.
393
  
3.4.3.1. Adopted Recommendations  
As aforementioned the CLCS has thus far adopted 18 recommendations. The first 
recommendations concerned the Russian submission, the first to be received by the 
CLCS. The submission made claims to the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea, the Bering 
Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. Five States reacted to the submission: Canada, 
Denmark, Japan, Norway and the US. Japan noted that the Russian submission did 
not mention any territorial disputes between the States although a dispute of that kind 
clearly exists between them.
394
 Canada and Denmark criticised an absence of specific 
data.
395
 The US pointed out that the submission contained major flaws regarding the 
Arctic Ocean.
396
 Norway mentioned the ongoing delimitation between the countries 
(which has now been finalised, as discussed in chapter five).
397
 Consequently, the 
Commission did not accept the submission. The Commission’s recommendations 
were summarised at UNGA in the following manner:  
 39. In the case of the Barents and Bering seas, the Commission recommended to the Russian 
Federation, upon entry into force of the maritime boundary delimitation agreements with Norway  
in the Barents Sea, and with the United States of America in the Bering Sea, to transmit to the 
Commission the charts and coordinates of the delimitation lines as they would represent the outer 
limits of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation extending beyond 200 nautical miles in the 
Barents Sea and the Bering Sea respectively. 
40. Regarding the Sea of Okhotsk, the Commission recommended to the Russian Federation to 
make a well-documented partial submission for its extended continental shelf in the northern part 
of that sea … 
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41. As regards the Central Arctic Ocean, the Commission recommended that the Russian 
Federation make a revised submission in respect of its extended continental shelf in that area based 




The next submission received by the CLCS was from Brazil. Brazil received its 
recommendations in 2007 which have, however, not been published on the website 
of the CLCS. There is speculation that the reason for this is that ‘Brazil disagrees 
with the recommendations to such an extent that it does not intend to establish its 
outer limits “on the basis of” them’.
399
  
The majority of the CLCS’ recommendations have been uncontroversial. 
Disagreements between the Commission and the submitting State have usually been 
resolved in the interactions between the CLCS and the representatives of the 
submitting State. The disagreement has often regarded the location of a small number 
of foot of the slope points. Some recommendations have, however, raised questions 
as to whether the CLCS has reached a reasonable conclusion.
400
 States have in most 
instances, however, decided not to rock the boat and have accepted the 
recommendations of the CLCS. A cost-benefit analysis may explain why. The 
toughest documented confrontation between a submitting State and the Commission, 
publicly available, concerns the UK’s partial submission regarding Ascension Island. 
The UK made a partial submission regarding the Ascension Island in May 
2008. In its recommendations from April 2010 the CLCS fully rejects the 
submission.
401
 The main reasons for the rejection were that Ascension Island, which 
is a ‘sub-aerial expression of a volcanic seamount that is located in the central 
Atlantic Ocean about 90 km west of the median rift valley of the Mid Atlantic 
Ridge’
402
 was, in the view of the CLCS, not an integral part of the Mid-Atlantic 
Ridge mainly because its edifice sits directly on deep ocean floor.
403
 Subsequently, 
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the UK could not establish foot of the slope points that created entitlement to the 
outer continental shelf. The UK did not take this conclusion lightly. In a paper which 
summarises the legal view of the UK, three fundamental issues are discussed which 
the UK believes the CLCS got wrong. These are: The definition of ‘deep ocean floor’ 
in article 76(3), the definition of ‘natural prolongation’ in article 76(1) and the use of 
morphology over geology.
404
 These points are of general importance and touch upon 
fundamental issues about the interpretation of article 76 and the nature of the CLCS. 
The most important issue at stake was the interpretation of the phrase ‘deep 
ocean floor’ within the meaning of article 76(3) of UNCLOS. The provision states 
that the continental margin does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic 
ridges. The subcommission reached the conclusion that mid-oceanic ridges, 
especially the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, represent ‘deep ocean floor’ in the context of 
article 76(3). In fact, it seems that the subcommission was of the opinion that all mid-
oceanic ridges are deep ocean floor.
405
 This interpretation could have a significant 
impact for other submitting States located on mid-ocean ridges. The UK made 
several arguments from the perspective of the law of treaties and science in 
attempting to show that the CLCS had erred. UK for instance pointed out:  
[I]t follows that terms and phrases in the Convention which may be technical terms of art, do not 
necessarily import a technical meaning for the purposes of the Convention. Article 31(4) of the 
Vienna Convention provides that ‘A Special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established 
that the parties so intended …’. It is clear for the purposes of article 76 that the State Parties did 
not intend for a number of the concepts, (e.g. ‘deep ocean floor’ in 76(3), or ‘continental shelf’ in 




Moreover, the UK criticised the CLCS for taking a reverse approach to the 
establishment of the outer continental shelf by ‘first establishing the extent of deep 
ocean floor’
407
 instead of taking a land-based approach since ‘[t]he sovereign rights 
of coastal states with respect to continental shelf emanate from their sovereignty over 
the land territory’.
408
 Furthermore, the UK provided that in its view ‘the term 
“oceanic ridges” in article 76(3) does not encompass all undersea ridges because 
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76(6) specifically refers to another category, i.e. “submarine ridges”, and expressly 




Of more general importance, the CLCS disregarded the natural prolongation 
concept of article 76(1). In its recommendations, the CLCS made statements 
regarding its interpretation of UNCLOS, including that: ‘The outer edge of the 
continental margin in the sense of article 76, paragraph 3, is established by applying 
the provisions of article 76, paragraph 4, through measurements from the [foot of the 
slope].’
410
 No explanation was given for this interpretation. The UK responded by 
criticising the CLCS for proceeding ‘on the basis that the outer edge of the 
continental margin in the sense of article 76(3), is established by applying the 
provisions of Article 76(4) through measurements from the foot of continental 
slope’.
411
 The UK pointed out that ‘[b]y jumping immediately to the formulae in 
76(4) in this way the Subcommission overlooks the requirement in Article 76(1) to 
first determine the extent of natural prolongation of the land territory’;
412
 something 
which is also recognised in article 76(3).
413
 Consequently, the UK stated that it can 
‘not consider that natural prolongation, an inherent property of any landmass, can be 
defined by applying the formulae in Article 76(4)’.
414
 Unfortunately for the UK, on 
this issue ITLOS adopted the same position as the CLCS in the Bay of Bengal Case, 
as described in the previous chapter. In other words, ITLOS approved the 
Commission’s interpretation on this matter.  
The third issue the UK had difficulty accepting was the CLCS’ preference for 
morphology. The UK stated that ‘[t]hroughout its examination of the United 
Kingdom’s submission, the Subcommission has shown strong preference for relying 
on morphological over geological criteria’.
415
 Moreover, ‘[o]n a number of occasions 
morphological arguments have been adopted by the Subcommission as the only 
criteria, to the exclusion of geology’.
416
 The UK stated that it found ‘no basis in the 
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 Ibid 5, para. 23. 
415






Convention for weighting one type of data over another’.
417
 It noted that article 
76(4)(b) actually ‘calls for the use of a range of data, not just morphology’
418
 and 
complained that the Commission dealt with unusual circumstances in a general 
manner.
419
 Finally, the UK noted that it did ‘not accept that there is any one scientific 
criterion which should be relied on to the exclusion of others in applying Article 76’ 
and that  ‘this was not the intention of the framers of the Convention. Why else 
would the Convention provide for a range of disciplines to be represented on the 
Commission?’
420
 Again unfortunately for the UK, ITLOS adopted a 
geomorphological view in the Bay of Bengal Case to the exclusion of a geological 
one. 
In its concluding remarks, the UK noted that ‘Article 76 appears in an 
international agreement, and would have to be interpreted in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principles laid down in many 
international judicial decisions’.
421
 Finally, the UK stated that ‘[s]ince there are clear 
differences in legal interpretation between the United Kingdom and the 
Subcommission, we suggest that the Commission should consider seeking 
specialised outside legal advice on these questions’.
422
 The CLCS seems to have 
responded to this request since this was one of the topics discussed at the twenty 
eighth session of the CLCS.
423
 In the next session, however, it decided not to pursue 
the issue any further.
424
 
Given the fact that ITLOS interpreted Article 76 in harmony with the 
Commission’s interpretation of the term natural prolongation and gave 
geomorphology a superior status, it is doubtful whether the CLCS would adopt a 
different position on these issues were the UK to make a new submission in 
accordance with article 8 of Annex II to UNCLOS. It is also doubtful whether an 
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international court or tribunal would adopt a different position on the same issue 
were the UK to somehow manage to bring the Commission’s application or 
interpretation of article 76 before an international court or tribunal, as they tend to try 
to avoid undermining the coherence of international law, as discussed in next 
chapter. The disagreement between the UK and the CLCS regarding the definition of 
‘deep ocean floor’ is, however, more open for debate since the Bay of Bengal Case 
did not address this issue. 
3.4.3.2. Resubmissions 
As noted above, if the coastal State does not accept the recommendations of the 
Commission ‘the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new 
submission to the Commission’.
425
 No resubmissions have thus far been made. It is 
expected, however, that Russia will make such a resubmission in the near future. As 
no special rules apply to resubmissions, the conclusion may be drawn that such 
resubmissions must once again go through the whole process before the CLCS. 
Franckx calls this result a ‘legalistic carousel’.
426
 It has been optimistically noted, 
however, that ‘[a]lthough this process can in theory continue without end, it is to be 
expected that possibly already after the first revised or new submission it will emerge 
that the difference between the coastal State and the CLCS cannot be resolved’.
427
 
The ILA Committee notes that ‘[t]he coastal State is to fulfil in good faith the 
obligations assumed under article 76 of the Convention and the CLCS is to make 
recommendations in accordance with article 76’.
428
 This does not however ‘amount 
to an obligation for the coastal State to accommodate the views of the CLCS or vice 
versa’.
429
 There is no enforcement procedure for recommendations of the 
Commission and, as will be pointed out in chapter four, the CLCS does not have 
standing before the dispute settlement mechanisms of Part XV of UNCLOS. 
Consequently, this disagreement cannot be solved directly before an international 
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 It has been argued that ‘in the case of a continued difference 
between the Commission and the coastal State, the latter eventually might establish 
the outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with its submission’.
431
 In this 
case, however, the outer limits will not be opposable to other States.
432
   
There is no fixed time limit for resubmission. The only requirement is that a 
resubmission should be made within a reasonable period of time. The ILA 
Committee has noted that ‘[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time will depend on an 
assessment of all the circumstances of the particular case’.
433
 It is possible that ‘[a] 
reasonable time may be a considerable period of time if the recommendations of the 
Commission imply that a coastal State will have to gather further data on its 
continental shelf’.
434
 It also notes that ‘[j]ust as is the case for compliance with the 
time limits in article 4 of Annex II to the Convention, article 8 does not indicate what 
consequences attach to non-compliance with the requirement to make a new or 
revised submission within a reasonable time’.
435
 It is highly unlikely that there would 
arise any consequences as the CLCS process has no impact on the entitlement of the 
State to the continental shelf, because the coastal State’s right to the continental shelf 
is inherent. If, however, the coastal State accepts a recommendation of the 
Commission, the coastal State may establish the outer limits of the continental shelf 
on the basis thereof recommendations and in accordance with the appropriate 
national procedures, such limits becoming final and binding.  
3.5. Four Fundamental Issues of Interpretation 
3.5.1. Are States obliged to make a Submission to the CLCS? 
Article 4 of Annex II provides that:  
Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the 
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Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case 




UNCLOS entered into force on 16 November 1994. This means that coastal States 
were required to make their submissions no later than 16 November 2004. At the 
eleventh meeting of the State Parties to UNCLOS in May 2001, however, it was 
decided that the date of commencement of the 10-year time period would be 13 May 
1999
437
  for a State for which the Convention entered into force before that date.
438
 A 
total of 129 member States to UNCLOS were subject to the amended 
commencement date.
439
 The deadline was delayed mainly because of problems faced 
by developing States, particularly in compliance with the time requirements. At the 
eighteenth Meeting of States Parties of UNCLOS in June 2008, the decision was 
taken that the time period referred to in article 4 of Annex II to the Convention and 
the previous decision of the Meeting of the State Parties to delay the commencement 
date ‘may be satisfied by submitting to the Secretary-General preliminary 
information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles and a description of the status of preparation and intended date of making a 
submission’.
440
 The decision was based on several factors such as the workload of 
the Commission, coastal States inherent right to the continental shelf and the fact 
‘that some coastal States, in particular developing countries ... continue to face 
particular challenges in submitting information to the Commission ... due to a lack of 
financial and technical resources and relevant capacity and expertise, or other similar 
constraints’.
441
 At the time of writing, the CLCS has received 45 communications 
from a total of 42 coastal States containing preliminary information with regard to 
future submissions to the CLCS.
442
 Franckx has summarised the deadline 
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 Preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles at 19 October 2011 ˂http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_preliminary.htm˃ 




development and stated that ‘from a fixed deadline on paper, the State Parties to the 
1982 Convention have moved to a rather flexible one in practice, which leaves ample 




According to article 4 of Annex II to UNCLOS, it is obligatory for a coastal 
State wanting to establish a continental shelf beyond 200 nm to make a submission, 
or in the words of the ICJ: ‘[A]ny claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles 
must be in accordance with article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf established thereunder.’
444
 If a coastal State 
fails to do so, whatever the time limits for that State might be, it does not lose its 
rights over the outer continental shelf.  
It must be emphasised that the CLCS is only concerned with the 
establishment of the outer limits of the outer continental shelf. This is confirmed in 
article 77(3) of UNCLOS which provides that ‘the rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express 
proclamation’. However, this provision does not eradicate a coastal State’s burden of 
demonstrating its entitlement to the outer continental shelf. Although a coastal State 
does not have an obligation to establish its outer continental shelf, certain negative 
implications may arise from inaction. For instance, ‘[t]he absence of such an outer 
limit is bound to raise doubts over the exact extent of the coastal State’s rights over 
this part of its continental shelf, with the attendant difficulties for the coastal State in 
enjoying these rights’.
445
 Another negative consequence is that ‘the absence of an 
internationally recognized outer limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines in any area may afford a lesser degree of precision as to the 
area under the jurisdiction of the coastal State’.
446
 Furthermore, ‘[t]he legal 
uncertainty may hinder the activities to be undertaken in the international seabed area 
and raise the issue of the payments and contributions which the coastal State should 
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make annually’ according to Article 82 of UNCLOS.
447
 Even although there is a 
possibility that a State will not seek to establish its outer continental shelf, it is highly 
unlikely that a State will ignore its economic or political interests by at some time 
failing to make a claim to the outer continental shelf.  
3.5.2. Can a Non-Party to UNCLOS make a Submission to the CLCS? 
It is commonly discussed in the literature whether non-parties to UNCLOS can make 
a submission to the CLCS. The reason for this is that article 76(8) uses the term 
‘coastal State’, instead of for example ‘State party’. Consequently, it is possible to 
interpret ‘coastal State’ as all coastal States, whether a party to UNCLOS or not. If 
the term encompasses every coastal State, then it would be possible for non-parties to 
make a submission to the CLCS. Another problem is that ‘there does not exist an 
obligation (or a right) to make a submission to the CLCS concerning the outer limits 
of the continental shelf’.
448
 At the second session of the CLCS, in September 1997, 
the Commission decided to submit some issues for clarification to the Meeting of 
States Parties. One of the questions was as follows:  
In the light of article 4 of annex II to the Convention, do the terms ‘a coastal State’ and ‘a State’ 
include a non-State party to the Convention, or do they only refer to a coastal State or a State 




At the eighth Meeting of States Parties in 1998, the opinion prevailed that ‘the 
Meeting did not have the competence to provide such a legal interpretation and that 
the Commission should request the Legal Counsel for an advisory opinion only if the 
actual need arose’.
450
 The question must be asked as to whether it is a correct view 
that the Meeting of States Parties lacks such competence and whether it is 
appropriate to rely on the advice of the Legal Counsel in this context. It can be 
argued that the Meeting of States Parties is exactly the appropriate forum for giving 
an authoritive interpretation under the law of treaties, as explained earlier.
451
 An 
advisory opinion of the Legal Counsel cannot, by contrast, have the same effect. 
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Consequently, the view may be taken that the Meeting of States Parties has erred on 
this issue.  
It is unclear what the actual outcome will be should a situation arise in which 
an answer to this question is required. According to the VCLT, parties to a treaty can 
accord rights flowing from the treaty to non-parties of the treaty.
452
 Clingan asserted 
that the CLCS was ‘directed to consider the submission by any coastal state, and no 
distinction is drawn between those that are parties to the Convention and those which 
are not’.
453
 He also stated that a non-party should be able to submit its data to the 
Commission for confirmation.
454
 A different stand was however taken by Koh in his 
closing statement as President of the Third Conference. Koh expressed the view that 
because of the revenue-sharing mechanism in Article 82 ‘a State which is not a party 
to this Convention cannot invoke benefits of article 76’.
455
 The arguments from each 
perspective will be explored below. 
There are four arguments against rights deriving for non-parties. First, if 
article 76(8) is interpreted in a contextual way
456
 in conjunction with article 4 of 
Annex II the term coastal States must be interpreted as a coastal State which is a 
party to UNCLOS because article 4 states that a coastal State shall make its 
submission ‘as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force 
of this Convention for that State’.
457
 This seems to imply that a submission to the 
CLCS is linked to the date of entry into force of UNCLOS for the relevant 
submitting State. Second, no mention is made of non-parties in the revenue-sharing 
regime established by article 82 of UNCLOS. This seems to imply that non-parties 
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cannot file a submission to the CLCS because ‘[t]he regime embodied in article 76 of 
the Convention resulted from a compromise between coastal States and land-locked 
and geographically disadvantaged States (LLGDS)’.
458
 The trade-off was that 
‘coastal States secured the possibility of extending their jurisdiction over a wider 
continental shelf, while LLGDS were included in the revenue sharing regime’.
459
 
Third, nothing in the preparatory work of UNCLOS suggests that non-parties possess 
this right. Fourth, from the perspective of customary international law it must be 
noted that there is no State practice of this kind supporting the view that non-parties 
to UNCLOS can submit data and information to the CLCS with the aim of 
establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf.  
On the contrary, it has been noted that ‘if a coastal State is ipso facto entitled 
to its continental shelf, it is in the best interest of the international community to have 
a clear delimitation of the continental shelves of all coastal States, irrespective of 
whether they are or are not a party to the Convention’.
460
 This is especially important 
when it is kept in mind that the delineated line marks the end of a coastal State’s 
outer continental shelf and the beginning of the Area. In support of this argument, 
reference has been made to the principle of economic cooperation contained in 
article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
461
 which provides 
that ‘[i]n the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each 
State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultations 
in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the 
legitimate interest of others’.
462
 In this context Zinchencko argued that: 
Although the typical case covered by this principle is that of mineral resources that straddle the 
boundaries of two or more countries, or on which there are overlapping claims by analogy one 
could claim that the case of resources shared by the coastal State and the international community 
(as represented by the Authority) is also covered. Allowing the coastal State to resort to the 
Commission would amount to an example of cooperation consistent with the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States. Even though such a duty to cooperate is by now questionable, there is 
no mandatory form that such cooperation must take: one form could be recourse to the 
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Of the 61 submissions the CLCS has received, none is from a non-party to UNCLOS 
and there are currently no indications that a non-party is about to make a submission 
to the CLCS. As the number of parties to UNCLOS increases, so does the 
unlikelihood that non-parties will make a submission.  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that, if a closer look is taken of the practice of 
States the picture becomes more complicated. McDorman has pointed out that:  
[T]here appears to exist sufficient state practice based on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and upon Article 76 of the LOS Convention itself to support the view that, as a 
matter of customary international law, a state may legally exercise jurisdiction over the continental 




He also notes that the clearest example of this State practice is the maritime 




The implications of this clash of legal regimes are unclear. It can be argued 
that the clash is an example of fragmentation in the law of sea. On the other hand it 
can be argued that there are two different legal realities at work which is a situation 
accepted by implication in article 311(1) of UNCLOS,
466
 as discussed in chapter 
five. One ‘reality’ is UNCLOS, the other the 1958 Geneva Convention. The latter 
still constitutes the main treaty law in the field of the law of the sea for some non-
parties such as the US and Venezuela. Whether this is an issue that will in future 
cause turbulence in the international community is uncertain. It depends on whether 
non-parties join and whether they engage in further actions to establish their outer 
continental shelf without any regard for the CLCS procedure. 
3.5.3. What does ‘on the basis’ mean? 
Two proposals were introduced at the third session of the Third Conference in 1975, 
one from USA and the other from the informal group of juridical experts, commonly 
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known as the Evensen group,
467
 regarding a Continental Shelf Boundary 
Commission. If these proposals had been accepted and included in UNCLOS the 
CLCS would have been a more powerful body. Para. 5 of the US proposal provided 
that:  
Every delineation pursuant to this Article shall be submitted to the Continental Shelf Boundary 
Commission for review in accordance with Annex. . . . Acceptance by the Commission of a 
delineation so submitted, or the final decision of the Commission in accordance with Annex . . .  




The Evensen group proposal was in many ways similar to that of the US but was 
more open with regard to interested third States and the Authority. Para. 5 of the 
proposal reads:   
The coastal State, any State with a particular interest in the matter, or the International Authority, 
may submit any delineation pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article to the Continental Shelf 
Boundary Commission for review in accordance with Annex. . . The decision of the Commission 




The Soviet Union submitted a proposal at the eighth session of the Third Conference 
in 1979 which stated that: 
The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the 
establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a 




Reacting to the Soviet proposal, Singapore, advocated a more powerful commission 
and proposed ‘that the limits of the shelf established by a coastal State should be “in 
accordance with” … the recommendations of the Commission, although the coastal 
State could deviate from those recommendations in consultation with, and with the 
consent of, the Commission’.
471
 
At the resumed ninth session of the conference in 1979, the Federal Republic 
of Germany introduced a similar proposal to that of the US delegation and the 
Evensen group in 1975 which ‘would have strengthened the role of the Commission 
by making its “decisions” on the limits of the continental shelf final and binding’.
472
 
At the eleventh session the UK proposed that the words ‘on the basis of’ be changed 
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The wording ‘on the basis of the commission’s recommendation’ was heavily 
criticised by Canada, first and foremost because it believed it to erode ‘the sovereign 
rights of coastal States which have unmistakably been recognized’ by article 76.
474
 
Moreover, Canada argued: 
The commission is primarily an instrument which will provide the international community with 
reassurances that coastal States will establish their continental shelf limits in strict accordance with 
the provisions of article 76. It has never been intended, nor should it be intended, as a means to 
impose on coastal States limits that differ from those already recognized in article 76. Thus to 
suggest that the coastal States limits shall be established ‘on the basis’ of the commission’s 
recommendations rather than on the basis of article 76, could be interpreted as giving the 





The wording ‘on the basis of’ seems to imply a closer relationship between the 
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf and the recommendations of 
the CLCS than the wording ‘taking into account’.
476
 The wording ‘provides certainty 
and consistency for the international community, while preserving sufficient, 
although unspecified, flexibility for the coastal State’.
477
 Within this framework 
deviations seem to be permissible from the recommendations of the Commission, so 
long as the coastal State honours its obligations under article 76. This assumption is 
first and foremost based on the view that ‘[t]he coastal State exercises over the 
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its 
natural resources’
478
 and has also a full sovereign right to delineate the outer limits in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of article 76. Furthermore, there is nothing in 
UNCLOS that provides that the coastal State must fully comply with the 
recommendations of the CLCS. The Convention merely States that ‘the limits of the 
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An important, unanswered question is how much difference there can be 
between recommendations of the CLCS and the limits of the outer continental shelf 
subsequently established by the coastal State. Presumably the difference cannot be 
too great considering that the wording used is ‘on the basis of’. UNCLOS is, 
however, silent on who has the authority to decide whether the outer limits are based 
on the Commission’s recommendations. It is clear that the CLCS cannot indicate 
whether a coastal State has established the outer continental shelf on the basis of 
those recommendations. Other States can do so,
480
 however, as will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
 It has been pointed out that reference can be made to the interpretation of the 
wording ‘as a basis of’ given by the WTO Appellate Body in the EC Sardines 
Case.
481
 Using the definition of ‘basis’ in The New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary on Historical Principles, the Appellate Body concluded that ‘there must 
be a very strong and very close relationship between two things in order to be able to 
say that one is “the basis for” the other’.
482
 Furthermore, ‘it can certainly be said – at 
very least – that something cannot be considered a “basis” for something else if the 
two are contradictory’.
483
 This means that should this interpretation be used in the 
context of the establishment of the outer continental shelf, in order for outer limit 
lines to be considered established on the basis of the CLCS’s recommendations, there 
must be a very strong and very close relationship between the recommendations of 
the CLCS and the established outer lines of the coastal State. 
The consequences for establishing an outer continental shelf otherwise than 
on the basis of the CLCS’ recommendations are not detailed in article 76(8). 
Eiriksson is of the opinion that ‘if the State does not follow the Commission’s 
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recommendations to the letter, that is, as long as there is any doubt on this, article 76, 
paragraph 8, will not result in a final unopposable determination for the State 
concerned’.
484
 It will be for third States to recognise the established outer continental 
shelf. Delineation lines not based on the CLCS’ recommendations are unlikely to be 
recognised as final and binding and are likely to be liable to challenge before an 
international court or tribunal. 
3.5.4. What does ‘final and binding’ mean? 
According to the wording of article 76(8) ‘the limits of the shelf established by a 
coastal State on the basis of’ the CLCS’s recommendations ‘shall be final and 
binding’. It has been noted that ‘[t]he term “final and binding” actually consists of 
two separate terms, each of which has a separate meaning. The reference to “final” 
entails that the outer limit line shall no longer be subject to change but becomes 
permanently fixed.’
485
 Meanwhile ‘[t]he reference to “binding” implies an obligation 
to accept the outer limit line concerned’.
486
 For the established outer limits to be 
considered final and binding, it is clear that they must be based on the CLCS’s 
recommendations. However, the CLCS neither possesses the competence to interpret 
the meaning of the words ‘final and binding’
487
 nor enforce its recommendations. 
The ILA Committee has stated that: 
The recommendations of the Commission upon a submission by a coastal State are not decisions 
which are binding upon that State or any other State party to the Convention. Only the coastal 
State is competent to decide what follow-up it will give to the recommendations of the 





One consequence of the reference to ‘final and binding’ for other States parties to the Convention 
is that they can no longer challenge an outer limit line that has become final and binding, even if 
the parameters on which it is based, such as the baseline, changes. This conclusion follows from 
the fact that the outer limit line becomes final and binding on the coastal State. Only the coastal 
State is competent to establish the outer limit of its continental shelf and it would thus be 
impossible that an outer limit line that is final and binding on the coastal State can still be changed 
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According to article 76(9) ‘[t]he coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations charts and relevant information, including geodetic 
data, permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf’.
490
 The words 
‘permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf’ imply that it is 
impossible for the coastal State to alter the outer limits of the continental shelf when 
they have been established except when ‘another State has successfully challenged 
the outer limit lines established by the coastal State’.
491
 If paras. 8 and 9 of article 76 
are interpreted contextually the conclusion must be that the wording ‘final and 
binding’ implies that the established outer limits are not alterable and are supposed to 
have perpetual effect so long as ‘the limits are submitted to the Secretary-General 
and publicity given thereto, following a reasonable time period no protest or 
objection is registered’.
492
 Regarding the role of the Secretary-General in this process 
McDorman notes: 
[Article 76(9)] does not require that the submitted material or outer limit location be that on which 
there is accord signified by the Commission. The Secretary-General has no independent authority 
to review or evaluate the information provided by the submitting state. Acceptance by the 
Secretary-General of submitted material does not mean that the outer limit established in the 
material is binding on other states. Article 76(9) must be treated as placing upon the Secretary-
General a responsibility similar to that of a treaty depositary,
493
 which means that the Secretary-





Article 76(8) is not clear on who is bound by a coastal State’s establishment of its 
outer continental shelf. Various interpretations exist. The US Government has 
interpreted the words final and binding as following: ‘If the coastal State agrees, the 
limits of the continental shelf established by the coastal State on the basis of these 
recommendations are final and binding (article 76(8)), thus providing stability to 
these claims which may not be contested.’
495
 Other authors believe that the 
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established limit becomes erga omnes.
496
 According to this view not only the 
submitting state but also other States are bound even although they are not parties to 
UNCLOS. The ILA Committee has however stated that the outer limit line cannot 
become ‘final and binding’ on non-parties ‘by operation of article 76(8) as a 
consequence of the pacta tertiis rule’.
497
 McDorman has argued convincingly that:  
[Final and binding] refers only to the submitting state in that the submitting state, having 
delineated its outer limit of the continental shelf and that limit not being challenged by other 
states, cannot subsequently change the location of its outer limit. To this extent, and this extent 





In the case law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal the term, ‘final and 
binding’ is explained in the context of article IV(1) of the Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), from 
19 January 1981.
499
 The provision reads: ‘All decisions and awards of the Tribunal 
shall be final and binding on the parties.’  The Tribunal has stated that:  
The terms ‘final’ and ‘binding’, when used in instruments relating to international arbitration, do 
not ordinarily mean that an award is self-enforcing. Rather, as is generally recognized, a ‘final’ and 




Although article 76(8) of UNCLOS does not indicate who is bound by the outcome 
of the process, as the Algiers Declaration does, it seems safe to deduce from the 
statement of the Tribunal that the final and binding nature of the recommendations of 
the CLCS is not the same as the nature of awards since they are not ‘ripe for 
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enforcement’. This is a clear example of the difference between recommendations of 
CLCS and judgements and awards of international courts and tribunals. 
It must be borne in mind that the terms ‘final and binding’ and ‘on the basis’ 
are interlinked. If the outer limits are not established on the basis of the 
Commission’s recommendations, they are unlikely to be viewed as final and binding 
by third States and are a target for challenge by third States before international 
courts and tribunals. It must therefore be in the best interests for a state to make a 
good and proper submission and follow the recommendations of the CLCS so long as 
they are acceptable from a scientific, technical and legal perspective.  
3.6. The CLCS, Maritime Boundary Delimitations and unresolved Land 
and Maritime Disputes 
3.6.1. What is not the Role of the CLCS  
As previously explained, the text of UNCLOS attempts to create a firewall between 
the delineation and delimitation process of the outer continental shelf. Article 76(10) 
states that the provisions of the ‘article are without prejudice to the question of 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts’. 
The Virginia Commentary explains that ‘paragraph 10 is a saving provision for all 
questions regarding the delimitation of overlapping claims between States to 
continental shelf’ and that the ‘provision emphasizes that article 76 prescribes the 
method of determining the outer limits of the continental shelf’.
501
 On the other hand, 
‘it does not address in any way the question of delimitation of the continental shelf 
between opposite or adjacent States, which is addressed exclusively in article 83’.
502
 
Similarly, the ILA Committee observes that ‘[a]rticle 76(10) guarantees that the 
implementation of article 76 by one State does not affect the rights of another State, 
in a case where the delimitation of the continental shelf between the States concerned 
is at issue’.
503
 Moreover, the Committee notes that the ‘clause suggests that the 
existence of overlapping claims to a continental shelf area should not be invoked by 
a State to argue that the CLCS should not consider a submission in respect of the 
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outer limits of such an area’.
504
 This is what is done in practice, as will be discussed 
below. 
The distinction between delineation and delimitation is reinforced by article 9 
of Annex II and article 134(4) of UNCLOS. Article 9 of Annex II declares that ‘[t]he 
actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of 
boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts’. According to the 
Virginia Commentary, the article is a saving provision, as article 76(10), focusing on 
the role of the Commission.
505
 In addition, the Commentary states that:  
The phrase ‘matters relating to delimitation of boundaries’ emphasizes that the Commission is not 
to function in determining, or to influence negotiations on, the continental shelf boundary between 
States with overlapping claims … It also indicates that the Commission is not to be involved in 
any matters regarding the determination of the outer limits of a coastal State’s continental shelf 
where there is a dispute with another State over that limit. The Commission’s role is to make 
recommendations on the outer limits of a coastal State’s continental shelf, not to be involved in 




Article 134(4) provides that nothing in Part XI of the Convention affects ‘the validity 
of agreements relating to delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts’. Importantly, it was explained by ITLOS in the Bay of Bengal Case that: 
Just as the functions of the Commission are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the 
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, so the exercise by international 
courts and tribunals of their jurisdiction regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries, 
including that of the continental shelf, is without prejudice to the exercise by the Commission of 




In other words, the Tribunal is stating that the delimitation process should not have 
an impact on the Commission’s role of delineating the outer limits of the continental 
shelf. This is an elaboration of the ‘non-prejudice provisions’. 
The ‘non-prejudice provisions’ are further developed in the Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission and Annex I to the Rules which is entitled: 
‘Submissions in case of a dispute between States with opposite or adjacent coasts or 
in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes.’ Rule 46 provides that: 
1. In case there is a dispute in the delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite or 
adjacent States or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes, submissions may be 
made and shall be considered in accordance with Annex I to these Rules. 
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2. The actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of 
boundaries between States. 
 
Annex I to the Rules was adopted ‘in an attempt to balance, on the one hand, the 
interest in allowing the Commission to carry out its delineation work with, on the 
other hand, the interest in avoiding prejudice to Parties involved in unresolved 
disputes’.
508
 It must be highlighted that although unresolved land and maritime 
disputes are not mentioned in article 76(10) and article 9 of Annex II to UNCLOS 
they are treated in the same manner as delimitation disputes in Annex I of the Rules 
of Procedure, as will be discussed below.  
Para. 1 of Annex I states that ‘[t]he Commission recognizes that the 
competence with respect to matters regarding disputes which may arise in connection 
with the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf rests with States’. 
Article 76(10) and article 9 of Annex II to UNCLOS are incorporated and elaborated 
by para. 5 of the Annex which provides that:  
a) In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify 
a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission may 
consider one or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent given by all States 
that are parties to such a dispute. 
 
b) The submissions made before the Commission and the recommendations approved by the 
Commission thereon shall not prejudice the position of States which are parties to a land or 
maritime dispute. 
 
It has been noted that ‘[t]he practical result of this provision is that States are in a 
position to block Commission consideration of their neighbors’ submissions’.
509 This 
means that land and maritime disputes should not be considered by the CLCS 
without explicit approval from the relevant third State. Examples of blocked 
submissions are the joint submission of Vietnam and Malaysia and the partial 
submission of Vietnam blocked by China and the Philippines. China blocked the 
submission due to a sovereignty dispute over islands in the South China Sea,
510
 in 
particular Spratley Island. The Philippines’ reason for blocking the submission is not 
only because the claims overlap with those of its owns but also because of the 
‘controversy arising from the territorial claims on some of the islands in the area 
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 Note Verbale of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (7 
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 South Korea and China blocked a part of the submission 
of Japan. The reason for blocking in this case was Japan’s usage of Oki-no-Tori 
Shima as a basepoint. Japan is of the opinion that Oki-no-Tori Shima is an island 
whilst South Korea and China argue that it is in fact a rock and point out that article 
121(3) of UNCLOS clearly provides that ‘[r]ocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no [EEZ] or continental shelf’.
512
 
A further example of a blocked submission is the UK’s partial submission regarding 
the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. 
Argentina has blocked the submission because it claims that islands to be 
Argentinean territory, not British.
513
 This is an extreme situation. 
Articles 76(10), 134(4) and 9 of Annex II of UNCLOS and para. 5 of Annex I 
to the Rules of Procedure emphasise that it is the responsibility of coastal States 
themselves to delimit their outer continental shelves. They have exclusive 
competence to do so. This in fact applies to all boundary delimitations, as noted in 
the Encyclopedia of Public International Law: 
The actual course of a boundary is a matter to be determined by the two adjacent States, a question 
subject to the exclusive competence of the two States. Other States cannot but accept what these 
two States decide ... In this sense, the two adjacent States create an objective situation which is 
valid erga omnes. If other States expressly recognize such a situation, the function of such 




To prevent the CLCS from overstepping its mandate, the Rules of Procedure provide 
that ‘[t]he Commission may request a State making a submission to cooperate with it 
in order not to prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between 
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opposite or adjacent States’.
515
 Moreover, in the case of delimitation disputes or in 
other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes relating to a coastal State’s 
submission, the Rules of Procedure provide that the Commission shall be ‘[i]nformed 
of such disputes by the coastal States making the submission; and ... [a]ssured by the 
coastal States making the submission to the extent possible that the submission will 
not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States’.
516
 
Although UNCLOS does not mention the possibility of making a submission 
where there is a delimitation dispute between neighbouring States, two paragraphs of 
the Rules of Procedure provide how States involved in land or maritime disputes can 
make a submission to the CLCS without infringing the basic rule on non-
involvement of the CLCS in boundary delimitations. These two paragraphs introduce 
the possibility of making partial, separate or joint submissions.
517
 It is obvious, 
however, that the CLCS cannot, due to the provisions discussed above, make 
recommendations regarding the outer limits of the shelf unless and until delimitation 
disputes affecting the submitting party have been resolved, or all the disputing States 
have indicated their non-objection to the Commission proceeding.  
3.6.2. What is a Dispute? 
There is no definition of the term dispute either in UNCLOS or the Rules of 
Procedure. The definition must instead be sought in the jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals. The PCIJ in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case 
stated famously that: ‘A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict 
of legal views or of interests between two persons.’
518
 In the South West Africa Case 
the ICJ added: ‘It must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by 
the other.’
519
 Oude Elferink notes that this indicates ‘that land and maritime disputes 
in the sense of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure also include conflicts of legal 
views over the provisions contained in article 76 or other articles of the Convention 
if they have an impact on the establishment of the outer limit of the continental 
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 The Chairman of the CLCS pointed out in 1998 that Annex I ‘dealt with the 
complex issue of how the Commission should treat possible submissions containing 
areas under actual or potential delimitation dispute’.
521
 This shows that the CLCS has 
adopted a more cautious understanding than the Court of the term dispute.
522
  
In the Advisory Opinion of the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the ICJ held that ‘[w]hether there exists an 
international dispute is a matter for objective determination [by the Court]. The mere 
denial of the existence of a dispute does not prove its non-existence.’
523
 This 
principle is reflected in article 288(4) of UNCLOS. The ILA Committee noted that 
Annex I ‘does not indicate how the CLCS will proceed when States differ over the 
question whether a dispute in relation to a submission exists’.
524
 The Committee 
argues  that ‘[i]t would seem that the Commission in principle should include all 
areas for which there prima facie appears to be a dispute in the sense of Annex I in 
the area in dispute for the purposes of the Annex’.
525
 Oude Elferink notes that ‘[i]t is 
not likely that the CLCS, which is not a court of law and which has the task of 
making recommendations concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf and not 
settling disputes related to these limits, can or will adopt a similar approach’.
526
 
Moreover, he notes that:  
Annex I to the Rules of Procedure recognizes that the competence with respect to such disputes 
rests with States. This suggests that the CLCS will not characterize the real dispute between the 
States involved. At the same time, the rules adopted by the CLCS indicate that it will make an 




It must be underlined that it is the task of the subcommissions established to assess 
each and every recommendation including to evaluate ‘all information regarding any 
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 Oude Elferink, ‘Submissions of Coastal States to the CLCS in cases of Unresolved Land or 






disputes related to the submission, in accordance with rule 46’ and, if it deems 
necessary, ‘take action based on the procedures in annex I to these Rules’.
528
 
Serdy has criticised the CLCS for showing counterproductive oversensitivity 
to disputes and for seriously misunderstanding the non-prejudice clauses in 
UNCLOS.
529
 He argues that para. 5(a) of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure is not in 
conformity with article 76(10) and article 9 of Annex II to UNCLOS since ‘these 
refer only to delimitation, not to disputes, and the two concepts are far from 
synonymous’.
530
 Serdy highlights that the second sentence of article 76(8) is 
mandatory in nature: ‘The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal 
States’. He points out that the wording ‘entitles the submitting State to expect that its 
submission will be examined on its technical merits’.
531
 Moreover, he argues that 
‘[t]here is no provision other than the tendentious reading given to the non-prejudice 
clauses that would justify the CLCS refusing, as it has, to carry out the very task that 
the LOSC brought it into being to perform and has assigned to’.
532
 As a counter 
argument, it can be noted that the Rules of Procedure were accepted at the Meeting 
of States Parties and could be seen as an amendment by agreement by the Parties in 
the terms of the VCLT.
533
 It can also be pointed out that the CLCS is not a suitable 
forum for resolving sensitive disputes regarding territory and maritime space as the 
Commission is a scientific and technical body, not a court of law. It is thus not as 
clear cut as concluding, as does Serdy, that the CLCS is conducting itself 
counterproductively.  
3.6.3. Third Parties 
UNCLOS is silent about the rights of third parties in the CLCS procedure and little is 
said about their rights in the Rules of Procedure. Rules 50 and 51(1) contain 
important provisions for third States.
534
 Rule 50 provides that: 
The Secretary-General shall, through the appropriate channels, promptly notify the Commission 
and all States Members of the United Nations, including States Parties to the Convention, of the 
receipt of the submission, and make public the executive summary including all charts and 
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 See discussion in chapter 3.3.5.2. 
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coordinates referred to in paragraph 9.1.4 of the Guidelines and contained in that summary, upon 
completion of the translation of the executive summary referred to in rule 47, paragraph 3. 
 
The executive summary includes information which should be adequate for other 
States seeking to locate their claimed outer limits, the basis for their respective 
claims and whether it involves areas they also claim or are going to claim. Para. 9.1.4 
of the Guidelines provide that the executive summary will contain information on 
four specific issues: 
a) Charts at an appopriate scale and coordinates indicating the outer limits of the continental shelf 
and the relevant territorial sea baselines;  
b) Which provisions of article 76 are invoked to support the submission; 
c) The names of any Commission members who gave advice in the preparation of the submission; 
and 
d) Any disputes as referred to in rule 44 [rule 46 after amendments] and annex I to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission. 
 
Rule 51(1) provides that:  
Upon receipt of a submission by the Secretary-General, the consideration of that submission shall 
be included in the provisional agenda of the next ordinary session of the Commission ... provided 
that that session ... is held not earlier than three months after the date of the publication by the 
Secretary-General of the executive summary including all charts and coordinates referred to in rule 
50 (emphasis added).  
 
Although the rules do not state so explicitly, the three month waiting time seems to 
indicate that third States can review and respond to the information published in the 
executive summaries.
535
 Other States can respond to a submission by written 
communication with the CLCS through the Secretary-General in the period between 
the latter notification of receipt of a submission and the consideration thereof by the 
CLCS.
536
 A State representative, when representing a submission to the CLCS, shall 
comment ‘on any note verbale from other States regarding the data reflected in the 
executive summary’.
537
 This means that States must respond to the input of third 
parties before the CLCS, and demonstrate that the voices of third parties are not 
ignored in the process.  
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The majority of submissions have provoked written communications. Lathrop 
has regarded there to be three categories of responses: ‘(1) communications 
expressing concerns about the scientific or technical basis of the outer limit, (2) 
communications expressing concerns related to undermining Article 4 of the 
Antarctic Treaty, and (3) communications related to unresolved disputes’.
538
 The 
latter category is also the largest. In communications regarding unresolved disputes, 
Lathrop notes that States have either ‘(1) expressly consented to the Commission’s 
consideration of the submission, notwithstanding the unresolved dispute, (2) reserved 
their position without giving express consent, or (3) expressly objected to 
Commission consideration of the submission’.
539
 It can be argued that the CLCS has 
become a kind of land and maritime ‘dispute highlighter’ and has played a central 
role in crystallising the main aspects of various disputes.  
3.6.4. Partial Submissions 
The possibility of making a partial submission is made available by para. 3 of Annex 
I of the Rules of Procedure. It reads:     
A submission may be made by a coastal State for a portion of its continental shelf in order not to 
prejudice questions relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States in any other portion 
or portions of the continental shelf for which a submission may be made later, notwithstanding the 
provisions regarding the ten-year period established by article 4 of Annex II to the Convention. 
 
More than half of the submissions made so far ‒ 31 out of 61 ‒ are partial. This may 
come as a surprise since some authors were sceptical of the usefulness of this type of 
submission.
540
 Partial submissions are principally made to avoid disputed areas 
without making it impossible for States to delineate undisputed areas. This intention 
is clearly stated in the Philippine’s submission: 
As a gesture of good faith, the Philippines makes this partial submission in order to avoid creating 
or provoking maritime boundary disputes where there are none, or exacerbating them where they 
may exist, in areas where maritime boundaries have not yet been delimited between opposite or 
adjacent coastal States. This is to build confidence and promote international cooperation in the 
peaceful and amicable resolution of maritime boundary issues. It does not in any manner prejudice 
the position of any coastal State.
541
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It has been pointed out that ‘[t]he idea of a partial submission covering only the 
dispute-free portion of the outer limits is that potential third states will refrain from 
disturbing the consideration by the CLCS and that this may help speed up the CLCS 
recommendation process’.
542
 When a partial submission is made, some consideration 
has to be given to the portions of the continental shelf that will be excluded from the 
submission but claimed in future submissions. This is a difficult task that often 
involves tactical and political considerations.  
The advantage of a partial submission is that it requires ‘only minimal 
communication or coordination with neighbors: only enough to ascertain the spatial 
extent of their claims in the area under consideration’.
543
 However, ‘to copper-fasten 
the validity of the submission and to assist the CLCS in its deliberations, it may be 
desirable from a fail-safe point of view ... to agree clearly in advance with all 
possible neigboring claimants just what seabed areas will be subject to the partial 
submission’.
544
 The disadvantage of a partial submission ‘may be that the very fact 
of inclusion of a particular area in such a partial submission may put the international 
spotlight on such an area, leading to a sudden concentration of attention from 
neighboring states and a potential scramble for seabed rights there’.
545
 Another 
possible disadvantage is the temptation that, ‘by opting for a partial submission, the 
submitting state is hoping to disguise the true extent of a dispute situation’.
546
 
Symmons argues that Ireland disguised the true extent of a dispute situation with 
Iceland and Denmark (the Faroe Islands) in its partial submission regarding the area 
abutting the Porcupine Abyssal.
547
 In some circumstances partial submissions could, 
‘depending on the domestic climate, be politically unpalatable if it appears to leave 
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Partial submissions are not only used to avoid areas of dispute, but also for 
other purposes. Some ‘[s]tates with several, non-contiguous parcels of territory, such 
as France, the United Kingdom, and South Africa, have made multiple, partial 
submissions for different parcels of territory’.
549
 In other instances ‘partial 
submissions have been necessary where preparation for a complete submission has 
not been politically or technically possible by the submission deadline’.
550
 
Resubmissions made under article 8 of Annex II to UNCLOS can also be 
partial. This is envisaged in the Commission’s recommendations to the Russian 
submission regarding the part of the Sea of Okhotsk where ‘the Commission 
recommended to the Russian Federation to make a well-documented partial 
submission for its extended continental shelf in the northern part of that sea’.
551
 
It is clear from the wording of para 3. of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure  
that ‘a submission for the areas not included in the initial submission may be made 
after the 10-year limit specified in article 4 of Annex II to the LOS Convention’,
552
 
i.e. after 13 May 2009, as discussed above. Nevertheless, as noted, a ‘State would be 
expected to make such submission in good faith within a reasonable time’.
553
 What 
constitutes a reasonable period of time in this context must vary with the 
circumstances of each case. It must also be stressed that para. 3 of the Rules of 
Procedure does not provide that States must submit the remainder of their claims 
together. The provision makes references to ‘portion or portions of the continental 
shelf for which a submission may be made later’. States can consequently make 
several partial submissions for different areas at different times.  
3.6.5. Joint and Separate Submissions 
Para. 4 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure introduces the possibility for States to 
make a joint or separate submission to the CLCS. It reads: 
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Joint or separate submissions to the Commission requesting the Commission to make 
recommendations with respect to delineation may be made by two or more coastal States by 
agreement: 
 
(a) Without regard to the delimitation of boundaries between those States; or 
(b) With an indication, by means of geodetic coordinates, of the extent to which a submission is 
without prejudice to the matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries with another or other 
States Parties to this Agreement. 
 
The paragraph provides for two different types of submissions, joint or separate. It is 
important to notice that under the provision all concerned States are required to agree 
on the approach taken in the submission. Oude Elferink notes that ‘such agreement 
may be difficult to attain if these States have different views on the area of overlap of 
continental shelves or the area of relevance for the delimitation’.
554
  
Given the circumstances in each individual case, States can either decide that 
the submission is without regard to the delimitation of boundaries between them, or 
adopt an approach that has elements similar to partial submissions. The former 
approach is more likely to be successful where no other claims exist upon the 
claimed area. The latter approach is probably more useful where the circumstances 
are more complex. Under para. 4(b) of Annex I, coastal States must choose which 
areas they are going to exclude due to a dispute with a State not taking part in the 
submission. A factor underlying the provisions is that ‘the CLCS needs to be assured 
by all the submitting states of a joint or separate submission that none of them is 




3.6.5.1. Joint Submissions 
Thus far, five of the existing 61 submissions have been joint submissions. Two of 
these have been accepted by the CLCS, the remainder still awaiting consideration. 
All joint submissions have been partial in extent. The spokesperson for the first joint 
submission (made by France, Ireland, Spain and the UK)
556
 stated that: 
[A]ll four coastal States could have made potentially overlapping, separate submissions. However, 
they considered it more appropriate to avail themselves of the possibility of making a joint 
submission since, upon the issuance of recommendations by the Commission, the four coastal 
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This group of States avoided involving areas that are also claimed by States that were 
not involved in the submission. Lathrop notes that ‘[t]he result of this approach is 
that the four States have moved quickly through the Commission process, 
ascertained the size and scope of their shared area, and may now set about splitting it 
up through the usual bilateral processes and at their leisure’.
558
 
Joint submissions entail considerable cooperation. It has been pointed out that 
‘[t]here would normally be full disclosure of submission data and materials between 
the coastal States and the technical team preparing the submission would operate as a 
single technical team cooperating on all facets of the submission’.
559
 Lathrop notes 
that joint submissions ‘will increase some transactions costs, but may result in 
efficiencies as well’ and ‘[i]n the right circumstances the effort can remove 
unresolved disputes from the equation’.
560
 There are also a few technical advantages 
in making joint submissions such as pooling of datasets, pooled expertise, division of 
labour and the gaining of experience and insights for States who have other 
submissions to make.
561
 However, the Chairman of the CLCS stated in September 
2007 that henceforth ‘in any joint submission, each coastal State has to establish its 
own criteria for the feet of the continental slope, applied formulas, constraints and 
respective outer limits’.
562
 In other words, ‘henceforth each jointly submitting State 
will be required to show independently what part of the area landward of the jointly 
submitted outer limit would have fallen within a putative individually submitted 
limit’.
563
 This is not a requirement according to Annex I of the Rules of Procedure. 
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It must be emphasised that ‘without all necessary Parties a joint submission 
may ... fail to overcome the obstacle presented by uncooperative neighboring States 
willing to invoke unresolved disputes to block Commission consideration’.
565
 That 
was exactly what happened with the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam, 
discussed above. If, however, no State expresses objections, a significant amount of 
time has been spared and the CLCS has been assisted in managing its workload. 
Moreover, disputes can perhaps be averted or at least crystallised, and a spirit of 
cooperation and understanding between the parties involved in making the 
submission can spill over into the delimitation procedure and affect it positively. 
3.6.5.2. Separate Submissions 
If States do not manage to agree on making a joint submission they can make 
separate submissions indicating that the submissions should be considered together 
by the CLCS.
566
 Two paths have generally been followed by States in this context.  
The first involves presubmission cooperation that might include data exchange, an exchange of 
views on extended shelf boundary positions, the beginnings of the negotiation of those boundaries, 
or securing some form of pre-submission agreement from neighbors not to object. The second 
approach involves lodging a separate submission that will create areas of overlap but without pre-




An exceptional example of the former approach can be found in the trilateral Agreed 
Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles 
between Denmark (the Faroe Islands), Iceland and Norway (Jan Mayen and 
mainland Norway) in the Southern Part of the Banana Hole of the Northeast Atlantic 
from 20 September 2006.
568
 The Agreed Minutes provisionally delimit the outer 
continental shelf between the States, who then make separate submissions to the 
CLCS (which they have done) and thereafter create a binding boundary delimitation 
agreement. The paragraphs on separate submission read:  
6. Each State will, when submitting its documentation concerning the outer limits of its continental 
shelf in the area, request that the Commission consider it and make its recommendations on this 
basis, without prejudice to the submission of documentation by the other States at a later stage or 
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to delimitation of the continental shelf between the three States. The State concerned will in this 
connection declare that such a request is agreed between the three States. 
 
7. When one State submits documentation to the Commission, the other States will notify the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the Commission’s rules of procedure 
that they do not object to the Commission considering the documentation and making 
recommendations on this basis, without prejudice to the submission of documentation by these 





This approach has been effective. When a party to the agreed minutes has made a 
submission the other has submitted ‘no objection’ notes to the Commission. 
Although the intellectual approach found in the Agreed Minutes has proved 
successful, it has not been adopted by other States.  
Another example is to be found in the approach taken by some members of 
the Economic Community of West African States. In a meeting held in February 
2009, Benin, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana and the Ivory Coast made the following decision:  
Issues of the limit of adjacent and opposite boundaries shall continue to be discussed in spirit of 
cooperation to arrive at a definite delimitation even after the presentation of the preliminary 
information/submission, Member States would therefore write ‘no objection note’ to the 




This approach has been likewise successful. None of the parties to the agreed 
minutes have objected to the considerations of the CLCS of submissions made by the 
other parties despite overlapping claims.  
An example of failed separate submissions, which were made without the 
cooperation of a State with overlapping outer continental shelf claims, are those 
made by Myanmar and India. Bangladesh, which is sandwiched between its two 
neighbours, objected to the submissions by invoking para. 5(a) of Annex I to the 
Rules of Procedure and referring to unresolved maritime boundary disputes.
571
 So, in 
fact, did Myanmar with regard to the Bangladeshi submission.
572
 Interestingly, India 
did not object to the consideration by the CLCS of the Bangladeshi submission 
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although it made some observations regarding it.
573
 Because the maritime boundary 
dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar has now been resolved, the question 
arises as to whether the States have to withdraw their objections so the CLCS can 
continue the delineation process or whether the CLCS can continue the delineation 
procedure without communicating with the parties to the dispute. The CLCS, very 
likely with the Bay of Bengal Case in mind, stated shortly after the ruling in the case:  
[I]n at least one case, the circumstances which had led to the postponement of the consideration of 
the submission might no longer exist. However … in order to be able to proceed with the 
establishment of a subcommission and the consideration of the submission, an official 




It must be questioned whether this position is logical given that the cause of the 
objection no longer exists and because it creates the possibility for a State to block 
the consideration of a submission, for no valid reason, by not submitting an official 
communication to the CLCS. Perhaps this shows how strictly CLCS interprets para. 
1 of Annex I of the Rules of Procedure, i.e. that ‘the competence with respect to 
matters regarding disputes which may arise in connection with the establishment of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf rests with States’. 
3.7. Concluding Remarks 
At the beginning of the chapter the question was asked as to what is the role of the 
CLCS in delineations and delimitations of the outer continental shelf. In the 
delineation procedure the CLCS plays the role of a scientific and technical 
administrative buffer zone to curtail the territorial temptation of broad margin States 
and to protect the international seabed area which is beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. Another role is to assist States in the submission procedure. The 
Commission can be seen as an entity created in the spirit of mixed boundary 
commissions even if it does not share all the characteristics of such commissions. 
The CLCS has no formal ties with the two other bodies established by UNCLOS. It 
must be noted, however, that the activities of the bodies established by UNCLOS are 
supposed to be complementary. The ties between the CLCS and the Meeting of 
States Parties have been rather strong and the CLCS has sought the advice of the 
Meeting to legitimise important decisions. The Commission is comprised of 
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individuals and not representatives of States, although the State that nominated a 
CLCS member covers his expenses. Some of the Commission’s recommendations 
have provoked harsh responses, especially regarding its interpretation of the term 
natural prolongation. Because ITLOS supported the Commission’s interpretation it is 
unlikely that the responses to this issue will be as strong in the future.   
There is no role for the CLCS with regard to delimitation, according to 
UNCLOS. The non-prejudice clauses of the Convention are absolutely clear on this 
issue. The Rules of Procedure have expanded the non-prejudice clauses to cases of 
unresolved land or maritime disputes, such as the dispute between Argentina and the 
UK concerning the Falkland Islands. This has been criticised even although this 
development could be seen as an amendment by agreement by the Parties within the 
meaning of the VCLT. Three methods (joint, separate and partial submissions) that 
are not described in UNCLOS have been created to allow the Commission to carry 
out its delineation work without violating the non-prejudice clauses. Partial 
submissions are the most common type of submissions, comprising more than half of 
the submissions yet made. 
In conclusion, the main role of the CLCS is to stand guard against 
exaggerated claims to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and at the same time to 
protect the territorial scope of the Area. There has been no role created for the CLCS 
with regard to delimitations between neighbouring States. It is nevertheless obvious 






4. The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in Outer 
Continental Shelf Disputes 
4.1. Introduction 
A footnote attached to the Evensen group’s 1975 proposal on the Continental Shelf 
Boundary Commission states that ‘the questions of possible appeal procedures ... and 
of the relationship with the proposed dispute settlement procedures under the new 
Convention, remain to be discussed’.
575
 These questions were never answered at the 
Third Conference because of a lack of consensus concerning the relationship 
between the dispute settlement system and the establishment of the outer continental 
shelf.
576
 Consequently, there are no provisions in UNCLOS addressing the 
relationship between the CLCS and the Convention’s dispute settlement system. 
Oude Elferink points out that ‘this raises the question of how a court or tribunal has 
to deal with the existence of the procedure involving the CLCS in a litigation 
between States parties to the LOS Convention concerning the interpretation or 
application of article 76 of the Convention’.
577
 
This chapter focuses on the settlement of outer continental shelf disputes by 
international courts and tribunals. Jurisdictional and procedural issues are the focal 
point. The main goal of the chapter is to answer the following two questions:  
-What is the role of international courts and tribunals in disputes regarding 
the establishment of the outer continental shelf? 
-Are there any special factors concerning the outer continental shelf that limit 
the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals? 
This chapter does not address in detail the role of courts and tribunals under 
UNCLOS. Neither does it deal with every jurisdictional and procedural aspect of 
dispute settlement regarding the outer continental shelf. The subjects discussed are 
either controversial issues or problems of practical nature. It must be emphasised that 
the chapter does not make as clear distinction between delineation and delimitation 
disputes, as other chapters, for the reason that the settlement of these two types of 
disputes have much in common.   
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The discussion below is divided into three parts. The first addresses the 
settlement of disputes in general. It looks into the dispute settlement mechanism of 
UNCLOS, the law-making role of international courts and tribunals and questions 
concerning the optional exception clause, standing and whether States are obliged to 
wait for recommendations from the CLCS before seeking to delimit their outer 
continental shelf. The second addresses the evaluation of scientific and technical 
evidence in cases regarding the outer continental shelf. The third briefly discusses the 
consequences of a judgement for the CLCS.  
4.2. The Settlement of Disputes 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The creation of the dispute settlement part of UNCLOS is one of the more 
progressive steps that international law has seen in recent decades. It has been argued 
that the entry into force of the Convention ‘is probably the most important 
development in the settlement of international disputes since the adoption of the UN 
Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice’.
578
 Part XV of UNCLOS 
is dedicated to the settlement of disputes, containing ‘a complex dispute settlement 
system that entails both traditional consent-based processes as well as mandatory 
procedures’.
579
 Flexibility, comprehensiveness and the binding nature of the system 
has been described as its main benefits.
580
 Boyle has noted: 
[T]he principal purposes of the Convention’s provisions on dispute settlement are to provide 
authoritative mechanisms for determining questions relating to the ‘interpretation or application’ 
of the treaty, to guarantee the integrity of the text, and to control its implementation and 




He argues that ‘[f]rom this point of view compulsory dispute settlement is designed 
to prevent fragmentation of the conventional law of the sea’.
582
 Allott, in the same 
tone, points out that:  
There was a very general feeling [at the Third Conference] that it would be pointless to create a 
legal structure of such complexity containing thousands of subtle legal relationships, if there were 
no secure means of resolving disputes of interpretation and application. The dispute settlement 
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provisions, in all their own subtlety and complexity, should be regarded as a gloss on every 




Similarly Klein notes:  
The scope and complexity of UNCLOS as a constitutive instrument demanded procedural 
guarantees. For States to enjoy the benefits of the Convention, they simultaneously consent to 
binding and mandatory dispute resolution procedures. The large number of participants at the 
Third Conference meant that referral to a distinct international process was needed to safeguard 




Although the dispute settlement mechanism was constructed carefully, to make it 
acceptable to as many States as possible, some aspects thereof could have been 
drafted in greater details. As aforementioned, an agreement was not reached at the 
Third Conference on the relationship between the CLCS and the dispute settlement 
provisions of UNCLOS. Another issue which UNCLOS fails to answer is what role 
the CLCS plays in continental shelf boundary delimitations beyond 200 nm. 
Although UNCLOS clearly provides that ‘[t]he actions of the Commission shall not 
prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts’,
585
 it does not, for instance, answer the question of whether a State 
is first required to receive recommendations from the CLCS before it delimits the 
outer continental shelf with an adjacent or opposite coastal State.  
One of the fundamental rules of international law, expressed in article 2(3) of 
the UN Charter, provides that all parties to the UN shall ‘settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered’. This rule is reflected in article 279 of UNCLOS 
which provides that: 
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the 
United Nations and, to this end shall seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33, 
paragraph 1, of the Charter.  
 
The means thereby indicated are ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means’.
586
 Part XV of UNCLOS reflects this variety of dispute settlement 
mechanisms. It is divided into three sections: The first dealing with voluntary 
procedures, the second containing the rules on compulsory procedures entailing 
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binding decisions, and the third including rules on limitations and exceptions to the 
applicability of the second section. Other Parts and Annexes to UNCLOS are also of 
importance. Part XI, section 5, contains provisions for the settlement of deep seabed 
mining; Annex V addresses conciliation; the Statute of ITLOS is found in Annex VI; 
and Annexes VII and VIII contain the rules on arbitration and special arbitration.  
4.2.2. The Main Dispute Settlement Provisions of UNCLOS 
4.2.2.1. Voluntary Procedures 
The compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions are only applicable ‘when 
informal mechanisms do not lead to the settlement of disputes’.
587
 Disputing parties 
must consider whether the voluntary procedures under the Convention are applicable 
before the compulsory procedures become available.
588
 This applies to disputes 
regarding the outer continental shelf as well as to other disputes falling under Part 
XV.  
Section 1 of Part XV provides for various peaceful methods of settling 
disputes. The ‘[s]ection highlights the continuing relevance of traditional, consent-
based modes of dispute resolution in relation to the interpretation and application of 
UNCLOS and emphasizes the flexibility that must be accorded to States in choosing 
methods for dispute resolution’.
589
 Article 280 of the Convention illustrates the 
importance of consent. It provides that nothing in Part XV ‘impairs the right of any 
States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the 
interpretation or application of [UNCLOS] by any peaceful means of their own 
choice’. The rule ‘is intended to make it as clear as possible that the parties to the 
dispute are complete masters of the procedure to be used to settle it’.
590
 States ‘can at 
any time agree to depart from the provisions of Part XV and agree to use instead any 
peaceful means of their own choice. They have the option even if any procedure 
under this Part has been started’.
591
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Article 283(1) provides for the status of negotiation as a tool for settling law 
of the sea disputes. It reads: ‘When a dispute arises between States Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties to the 
dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement 
by negotiation or other peaceful means.’ The obligation is continuing and ‘applicable 
at every stage of the dispute’,
592
 holding until the implementation of a settlement 
reached.
593
 Conciliations under Annex V is also encouraged as a resort prior to 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures.
594
 States can also solve their disputes 
outside the framework of UNCLOS if certain conditions are met, either by agreeing 
to seek the settlement of a dispute by peaceful means of their own choice or by 
procedures under general, regional or bilateral agreements.
595
  
4.2.2.2. Compulsory Procedures 
The first provision of the compulsory procedure part of UNCLOS, article 286, 
provides that:  
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of 
any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.  
 
Article 286 signifies a new era in the international law of the sea. It provides that if 
traditional, consent-based, non-compulsory methods of dispute settlement are not 
fruitful, a new phase begins which is compulsory in nature (with a few important 
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exceptions addressed in section 3).
596
 The procedure is indeed not only compulsory, 
but also final and binding between the parties.
597
  
Two factors concerning article 286 are of special importance. First, ‘there is 
an obligation (“shall,” not simply “may”) to submit the dispute to the procedure 
under section 2’.
598
 Secondly:  
Once a State ratifies or otherwise expresses its consent to be bound by the Law of the Sea 
Convention, by that very action it expresses also its consent to the applicability to disputes to 
which it is a party of the procedures specified in section 2 of Part XV. No further agreement 
between the parties to a dispute is necessary to submit the dispute to the procedures specified in 




Consequently, ‘[u]nilateral action is sufficient to vest the court or tribunal with 
jurisdiction, and that court or tribunal may render a decision whether or not the other 
party participates in the process’.
600
 This renders the role of courts and tribunals 
especially important in the law of the sea. 
4.2.2.3. Choice of Procedure 
The UNCLOS dispute settlement system is not unitary in nature. Unlike most such 
systems it embodies flexibility vis-à-vis the available jurisdictions for disputes. 
Article 287 provides that when a State signs, ratifies or accedes to UNCLOS, or at 
any time thereafter, it shall be free to choose, by written declaration, one or more of 
the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention:601 
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; 
(b) the International Court of Justice; 
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; 
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the 
categories of disputes specified therein.
602
 
                                                          
596
 Compulsory dispute settlement was not the norm but the exception, in the law of the sea, until 
UNCLOS entered into force in 1994.  
597
 Article 296 of UNCLOS. 
598
 Nandan & Sohn (n 588) 39. 
599
 Ibid 38.  
600
 Ibid 39.  
601
 The formula is often called the ‘Montreux formula’, after the Swiss town where some interested 
delegations of the Third Conference met privately and discussed which court or tribunal should have 
jurisdiction under UNCLOS.  
602
 Proceedings before a special arbitral tribunal are not available in a dispute regarding the 
establishment of the outer continental shelf because the special arbitral tribunal has only jurisdiction in 
cases regarding fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific 
research and navigation. See article 1 of Annex VIII to UNCLOS. Article 287(2) contains an 
exception to the flexible Montreux formula. The provision clearly provides that ‘a declaration made 
under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected by the obligation of a State Party to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of [ITLOS] to the extent and in the manner provided for 





Nelson has pointed out that this mechanism ‘is the distinctive feature of the dispute-
settlement system in the LOS Convention’.
603
 Nelson notes that ‘[i]t reflects the trend 
of modern international law with its diversity and flexibility of response in terms of 
peaceful settlement of disputes tailored to meet the need of present-day international 
society’.
604
 Others were, however, sceptical of this formula. Some delegates at the 
Third Conference ‘emphasized the need for uniformity of international jurisprudence 
and the danger of having too many tribunals which might render conflicting 
decisions’.
605
 In other words, they were worried about the fragmentation of 
international law. One aspect of fragmentation is the threat which the proliferation of 
judicial bodies has on the international legal system which supposedly undermines 
the coherence of international law in specialist regimes, leading to the divergence 
‘from their international law roots and expound specialist rules of limited 
application’.
606
 Although fragmentation is a large troll in the literature it is a dwarf in 
practice. In his study on whether international law was threatened by multiple 
international tribunals, Charney came to the following conclusion:  
On the basis of the available evidence, no substantial breakdown in the unity of central norms of 
general international law has developed. The ICJ’s influence and prestige are high. They do not 
appear to be threatened by the addition of other standing and ad hoc tribunals authorized to decide 




Simma similarly notes: ‘Rather than resulting in fragmentation, the emergence of 
more international courts, combined with an increasing willingness of states to 
submit their disputes to judicial settlement, has revived international legal 
discourse.’
608
 This does not mean that the fragmentation threat is non-existent. 
However, international courts and tribunals have largely managed to avoid 
fragmentation by considering international law as a whole and making reference to 
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It is important that international courts and tribunals address the problems of 
coherence and fragmentation.
610
 This will be a particularly important task in outer 
continental shelf delimitations since, as discussed in the previous chapter, the CLCS 
makes legal decisions regarding the application and interpretation of UNCLOS. As a 
scientific and technical body with a limited mandate it is possible that the 
Commission has too narrow a view of international law and does not adopt an 
integrated conception of international law. Moreover, Bangladesh and Myanmar 
have settled their boundary dispute before ITLOS, a dispute between Nicaragua and 
Colombia was recently heard before the ICJ involving claims to the outer continental 
shelf, and the second part of the maritime boundary disputes in the northern part of 
the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. India) will be litigated before an arbitral tribunal 
within the next year.
611
 International courts and tribunals will therefore not only have 
the role of settling disputes in outer continental shelf delimitations but also in 
safeguarding a holistic interpretation of the law and saving it from fragmentation. It 
is no coincidence that ITLOS addressed fragmentation during the course of its 
judgement in the Bay of Bengal Case: 
The Convention sets up an institutional framework with a number of bodies to implement its 
provisions, including the Commission, the International Seabed Authority and this Tribunal. 
Activities of these bodies are complementary to each other so as to ensure coherent and efficient 





Judges Treves and Wolfrum addressed the issue more directly in their separate 
opinions. Treves stated that ‘all courts and tribunals called to decide on the 
interpretation and application’
613
 of UNCLOS should ‘consider themselves as parts 
of a collective interpretative endeavour, in which, while keeping in mind the need to 
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ensure consistency and coherence, each contributes its grain of wisdom and its 
particular outlook’.
614
 In the same line of reasoning Wolfrum noted:  
[A]rticle 287 of the Convention entrusts three institutions with the task and responsibility of 
interpreting and, within the framework of the Convention, to progressively develop it. This 
requires them to harmonize their jurisprudence with the view avoiding any fragmentation, in 




Coming back to the forum selection clause of UNCLOS, in article 287(4) it is made 
clear that when ‘the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the 
settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure, unless the 
parties otherwise agree’.
616
 If, however, ‘the parties to a dispute have not accepted 
the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to 
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree’.
617
 
Similarly, ‘[a] State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration 
in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex 
VII’.
618
 The fact that only around a quarter of the member States to UNCLOS has 
made a declaration under article 287
619
 makes arbitration the automatic venue.  
Complications arise when a dispute involves more than two parties and they 
do not agree on the forum for dispute settlement and, given the circumstances, it is 
possible to split the dispute in two or more parts which can be adjudicated upon 
separately. This is the situation in the Bay of Bengal. As noted above, the dispute 
between Bangladesh and Myanmar was litigated before ITLOS whilst the dispute 
between India and Bangladesh will be litigated before an arbitral tribunal. Although 
the tribunals are not bound by each other’s decisions it must be very likely, in the 
interest of preventing fragmentation of the legal framework, that the tribunal will 
seriously consider the implications of its decisions in the context of other affected 
cases that is not before them. It must be pointed out that three judges (Mensah, 
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Treves and Wolfrum) in the case between Bangladesh and Myanmar will hear the 
case between Bangladesh and India, forming the majority of the arbitral tribunal. All 
voted in favour of the ITLOS judgement and Treves and Wolfrum, as discussed 
above, made special declarations warning against the threat of fragmentation. This 
fact makes it very likely that the application and interpretation of the law in the 
Bangladesh v. India case will be in harmony with the application and interpretation 
of the law in the case between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
620
  
4.2.3. The Law-Making Role of International Courts and Tribunals  
Under the ICJ Statute judicial decisions are only a subsidiary source of international 
law and are binding merely on the parties to a particular case.
621
 The impact of the 
decisions of the ICJ and other judicial settlement bodies are in practice, however, 
much more than subsidiary and have a law-making effect that does not only affect 
the parties to the case.622 Rosalyn Higgins points out that: 
States which have no dispute before the Court follow the judgements of the Court with the greatest 
interest, because they know that every judgement is at once an authoritative pronouncement on the 
law, and also that, should they become involved in a dispute in which the same legal issue arise, 
the Court, which will always seek to act consistently and build on its own jurisprudence, will reach 
the same conclusions. Although at the formal level the judgement of the Court in the case of State 
A v. State B will not bind State Z, State Z is bound by the relevant rule of international law, which 





In a similar tone, Boyle and Chinkin note that the ICJ ‘behaves as though its 
decisions have precedential value and thus consciously contributes to substantive 
law-making. It assumes the role of authoritative interpretation of procedural and 
substantive international law and its pronouncements are widely accepted as such’.
624
 
Judgements and awards of international courts and tribunals are of greater 
importance for international maritime boundary law than for other fields of 
international law. In fact, compared to other fields of international law, an unusually 
high number of maritime boundary disputes have been resolved before courts and 
tribunals. It has been argued that an explanation for this could be ‘[t]he particular 
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need for certainty in boundary delimitation and consequential resource allocation’.
625
 
Another explanation could be that judgements and awards are accompanied by full 
reasoning as to why a specific delimitation line was chosen.
626
 According to 
Charney, there are two main reasons for the particular importance of international 
courts and tribunals in this field: 
[F]irst, the existence of a unique line of jurisprudence made possible by a continuing series of 
decisions and, second, the absence of clearer guidance from codification efforts, opinio juris and 
state practice. De facto, the International Court, with some assistance from ad hoc arbitrations, 
exercises substantial authority over international maritime boundary law. These tribunals take 
account of the jurisprudence on the subject and the state practice found in agreements settling 
maritime boundaries. The judgement and awards articulate and shape states’ obligations in this 
regard. Even though there is no doctrine of stare decisis in international adjudication, it is not 
inaccurate to consider the impressive line of maritime boundary decisions as forming a common 




Similarly, Weil argued that ‘the legal conquest of maritime delimitation is not the 
work of either treaty or custom but of the courts which, far from being subsidiary 
source of international law, here play the role of a primary and direct source of law, 
even if they chosen modestly to ascribe the credit to customary law’.
628
 Wolfrum 
argued from the same perspective, noting in his declaration in the Bay of Bengal 
Case that ‘[c]ase law of international courts and tribunals is more than a means to 
identify the customary or treaty law relevant for the delimitation of continental 
shelves and [EEZs] as stated by the Tribunal’.
629
 In his ‘view international courts and 
tribunals in respect of maritime delimitation exercise a “law-making function”, a 
function which is anticipated and legitimized by articles 74 and 83 of the 
Convention’.
630
 Moreover, Wolfrum stated:  
The ensuing international case law constitutes an acquis judiciare, a source of international law to 
be read into articles 74 and 83 of the Convention. It is the feature of this law not to be static but to 
be open for a progressive development by the international courts and tribunals concerned. It is the 
responsibility of these international courts and tribunals not only to decide delimitation cases while 
remaining within the framework of such acquis judiciare but also to provide for the progressive 
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Bearing this in mind, it appears safe to assert that the jurisprudence in maritime 
boundary delimitations supports the view ‘that adjudication is never simply a 




4.2.4. The Optional Exception Clause 
4.2.4.1. Introduction 
Some disputes have traditionally been categorised as ‘too closely tied to the vital 
interests, independence or honour of the State to be left to the decision of a third 
party’.
633
 It should therefore not come as a surprise that some types of disputes are 
not included in the compulsory dispute settlement procedure of UNCLOS and that 
States can by declaration exclude certain sensitive issues therefrom. Because of this 
sensitivity and the general reluctance to allow reservations
634
 to the Convention, ‘an 
agreement was reached early in the Conference on the need for a list of well-defined 
classes of disputes which may be exempted from such adjudication by a declaration 
filed in advance’.
635
 This can be seen as ‘an attempt to balance the desire to be a 
judge in one’s own cause against the principle of binding third-party settlement’.
636
 
Among the exempted disputes are disputes concerning maritime boundaries between 
adjacent and opposite States, including continental shelf boundaries. Since more than 
a dozen States have claimed, or are going to claim, areas of continental shelf beyond 
200 nm, and have made a declaration exempting maritime boundary disputes from 
the compulsory dispute settlement procedure, the optional exception clause and the 
non-binding compulsory conciliation procedure merit attention.  
4.2.4.2. The Maritime Boundary Exception 
Article 298(1) of UNCLOS provides that when a State signs, ratifies or accedes to 
UNCLOS ‘or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations 
arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of 
the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of’ the three 
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following categories of disputes. One of these categories includes ‘disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea 
boundary delimitations’.
637
 The reference to article 83 clearly provides that 
delimitation disputes regarding the continental shelf within or beyond 200 nm can be 
excluded by declaration. Sixteen States,
638
 which have either made a submission to 
the CLCS or submitted to the Secretary-General preliminary information indicative 
of the outer limits of the continental shelf, and Canada (which is expected to make a 
submission to the CLCS in the near future)
639
 have made a declaration under article 
298(1) of UNCLOS which excludes maritime boundary disputes from the 
compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the Convention. Most of these 
declarations exclude all maritime zones mentioned in the provision. Iceland is the 
only State merely excluding continental shelf boundary disputes from the 
compulsory procedure.
640
 In addition, four States which have claimed areas of 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm have declared that they only accept particular fora 
for cases falling under article 298(1). Norway and Denmark have declared that they 
do not accept arbitral tribunals for any of the disputes mentioned in article 298(1).
641
 
Nicaragua only accepts the jurisdiction of the ICJ in disputes regarding issues falling 
under article 298(1), whilst Guinea-Bissau ‘does not accept the jurisdiction of the 
[ICJ] [for the purposes of article 287] and consequently will not accept that 
jurisdiction with respect to articles 297 and 298’.
642
 It must be noted that although a 
State has opted to exclude disputes concerning maritime boundaries the parties in 
dispute can by agreement submit their dispute to section 2 procedures.
643
 This applies 
both to the forum and the type of dispute. 
The exceptions in article 298 ‘are not self-judging, and their applicability in a 
particular case cannot be determined by their invocation by the State party against 
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which a complaint is brought’.
644
 Article 288(4) clearly provides: ‘In the event of a 
dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled 
by decision of that court or tribunal.’ A court or tribunal obviously has the 
compétence de la compétence.
645
 It must be emphasised that a declaration made 
under article 298 is subject to reciprocity. A State making such a declaration is not 
‘entitled to submit any dispute falling within the excepted category of disputes to any 
procedure in [UNCLOS] as against another State Party, without the consent of that 
party’.
646
 It must also be noted that a State which has made a declaration under 
article 298 is not forever bound thereby. It ‘may at any time withdraw it, or agree to 
submit a dispute excluded by such declaration to any procedure specified’ in 
UNCLOS.
647
 The withdrawal of a declaration, or the making of a new one, does not 
however ‘in any way affect proceedings pending before a court or tribunal ... unless 
the parties otherwise agree’.
648
 Therefore, a State cannot block proceedings in cases 
that fall under article 298(1) which already has begun by making a declaration which 
exempts such matters.  
Some might argue that the exceptions and limitations are a weakness for the 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures. Such criticism is answered by Klein in 
the following manner: 
Part XV had to be constructed to reflect the political dynamic of the Third Conference and while 
the result cannot be described as perfect, it is evident that the dispute settlement regime is carefully 
tailored to specific issue areas to ensure the greatest workability possible. Although resort to 
mandatory arbitration or adjudication has been excluded for some questions when this avenue 
could have served a valuable purpose, States rejected this approach because it did not accord with 
political realities or because binding dispute settlement was not necessary. Such a selective 
approach does not undermine the viability of the Convention for those issues. International 
regimes have been able to function quite successfully regardless of the availability of a system of 
mandatory jurisdiction. Instead, external regulating factors, mutual interests, and diplomatic 
avenues facilitate dispute settlement.
649
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4.2.4.3. Are Disputes Concerning the Interpretation or Application of Article 76 
excluded from the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Procedure? 
Although almost all UNCLOS disputes are in principle subject to compulsory third 
party dispute settlement, and whilst article 76 is not among the provisions mentioned 
in the optional exceptions clause in section 3 of Part XV, some scholars have argued 
that challenges to the outer limits of the continental shelf are excluded from Part XV 
of UNCLOS. Smith and Taft are among them. They state that the Third Conference 
‘negotiators opted to create a Commission with recommendatory powers, and to 
exclude establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf from compulsory 
and binding third-party dispute settlement procedures’ on the basis of the 
‘complexity of Article 76, the need for consistency in applying its provisions, and the 
sensitivity of coastal States related to sovereign rights’.
650
 A similar position is taken 
in an UN publication which notes that UNCLOS does not ‘under Part XV, Section 2, 
provide for compulsory dispute settlement for article 76 issues’.
651
 Other authors 
have a different view. Clingan stated:  
Whether the final adoption [by a coastal state of its outer limit] is perceived to be ‘on the basis’ of 
the Commission recommendations may itself be a question that could be resolved by traditional 
juridical dispute settlement procedures provided for in the Convention, a question of treaty 
interpretation being involved. This view of the Commission is in accord with the wishes of the 




In line with Clingan, Eiriksson states that he ‘finds nothing that precludes a State 
Party to the Convention from bringing a case before the appropriate Convention 
body if it should feel that a coastal State, not having acted “on the basis of” the 
Commission’s recommendations, establishes boundaries which it disputes’.
653
 In 
addition, he points out that ‘[t]he question of seaward demarcation of the continental 
shelf is not one of optional exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms 
allowed under article 298’.
654
 Brown makes a similar argument and points out that 
there is ‘no exception provided for outer limit disputes, but only for disputes over 
delimitation between opposite or adjacent States under Article 298(1)(a)(i)’.
655
 In 
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Anderson’s opinion. the provisions in Part XV ‘also apply in principle to disputes 
over the outer limits of the continental shelf in article 76’.
656
 McDorman points out: 
It would have been possible in the LOS Convention phraseology excluding or precluding 
contesting an outer limit claim through the dispute settlement procedures. Alternative phraseology 
could have been included which would have provided that accord between a submitting state and 
the Commission precluded the use of third-party adjudication or created a strong presumption in 




Wolfrum addresses the issue from a different angle. He notes that ‘[t]he procedure 
applied by the Commission does not give States with adjacent or opposite coasts 
sufficient procedural guarantees to defend their position which could possibly justify 
any exemption of such disputes from the compulsory settlement mechanisms under 
Part XV of the Convention’.
658
 In a similar tone the ILA Committee noted: ‘If article 
76 were to be completely excluded from the procedures of Part XV, the absence of 
legal expertise in the Commission would seem to be problematic, as there then would 




The position taken in this thesis is in line with that of Anderson, Brown, 
Clingan, Eiriksson, McDorman and Wolfrum. Disputes regarding the outer limits of 
the continental shelf ‒ that is disputes about article 76 ‒ are in general not excluded 
from the dispute settlement procedure of Part XV of UNCLOS, because the 
Convention’s provisions on the limitations and exceptions to the applicability of the 
compulsory binding procedures entailing binding decisions are an exception from the 
basic norm of Part XV. Section 3 of Part XV does not mention any of the 
Convention’s provisions on the breadth of maritime zones, including article 76. It 
must therefore be assumed that disputes regarding the outer limits of the outer 
continental shelf are not in general excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism 
of UNCLOS. It must be noted, however, that if a dispute concerns the interplay 
between article 76 and 83 ‒ such as in the Bay of Bengal Case ‒ the optional 
exception clause would apply since such a dispute would not only involve article 76, 
but also article 83. 
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4.2.4.4. Compulsory Conciliation 
A State which has used the optional exception clause shall ‘when such a dispute 
arises ... and where no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in 
negotiations between the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, accept 
submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V, section 2’.
660
 In these 
circumstances conciliation is compulsory. So far, no maritime boundary dispute has 
been subject to compulsory conciliation.
661
 Notwithstanding, Merrills points out that 
‘if the prospect of obligatory conciliation discourages unreasonableness, it will have 
done its job’.
662
 Conciliation is the only compulsory procedural path which can be 
unilaterally taken by a State which has an outer continental shelf boundary 
delimitation dispute with a State that has made a declaration in accordance with 
article 298(1)(a)(i).  
It must be emphasised that four categories of disputes are excluded from the 
compulsory conciliation of UNCLOS and which are therefore absolutely excluded 
from section 2 procedures. These disputes are: (1) Disputes that arose before the 
entry into force of UNCLOS (16 November 1994).
663
 It has been pointed out that 
‘[t]his condition is grounded in the presumption against retroactivity in the law of 
treaties and prevents any longstanding disputes being made subject to Part XV of 
UNCLOS’.
664
 (2) Mixed disputes, that is ‘any dispute that necessarily involves the 
concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other 
rights over continental or insular land territory’.
665
 (3) ‘[S]ea boundary dispute[s] 
finally settled by an arrangement between the parties’.
666
 (4) Disputes that are ‘to be 
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The purpose of a Conciliation Commission is to ‘hear the parties, examine 
their claims and objections, and make proposals to the parties with a view to reaching 
an amicable settlement’.
668
 The commission shall report within 12 months of its 
constitution.
669
 The report ‘shall record any agreements reached and, failing 
agreement, its conclusions on all questions of fact or law relevant to the matter in 
dispute and such recommendations as the commission may deem appropriate for an 
amicable settlement’.
670
 It must be strongly emphasised that ‘[t]he report of the 




Article 298(1)(a)(ii) provides that ‘after the conciliation commission has 
presented its report, which shall state the reasons on which it is based, the parties 
shall negotiate an agreement on the basis of that report’. Although it is clear that the 
Conciliation Commission’s report does not have the binding force of a judgement or 
an arbitral award, the parties are ‘obliged to pay proper attention to the report and to 
negotiate in good faith ... an agreement on the basis of that report’.
672
 Klein notes that 
‘[t]he utility of conciliation reports lies in the elaboration of principles that could be 
applied by the parties in future negotiations’.
673
 She importantly points out that 
‘[s]uch a method is not without precedent – the ICJ was charged with this 
responsibility in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, rather than being asked to 
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define the actual location of the boundary’.
674
 This implies that the outcome of the 
compulsory conciliation procedure can in some instances be very similar to that of a 
binding judgement. 
Article 298(1)(a)(ii) states that if negotiations conducted on the basis of the 
Conciliation Commission’s report do ‘not result in an agreement, the parties shall, by 
mutual consent, submit the question to one of the procedures provided for in section 
2, unless the parties otherwise agree’.
675
 This agreement must ‘be negotiated in good 
faith, but it can come into effect only by mutual consent’.
676
 If it is impossible to 
reach such agreement, ‘the only obligation that remains is the one under Part XV, 
section 1, to proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding the settlement 
of the dispute by further negotiations or’ other peaceful means.
677 
This outcome 
returns the disputing parties to square one.  
To summarise what has been stated above, it is clear that States can exclude 
disputes regarding the delimitation of the outer continental shelf from the 
compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of Part XV of UNCLOS. States that have 
done so can be expected to be brought before a conciliation commission which issues 
non-binding reports. Disputes regarding article 76 not involving article 83 issues 
cannot, however, be excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement procedure on 
the basis of the optional exception clause.  
4.2.5. Standing 
4.2.5.1. CLCS and the Authority 
Until the twentieth century, the traditional view was that States alone enjoyed 
standing (locus standi) before international courts and tribunals. In line with more 
modern ideas, article 291(2) opens the door to non-State entities to the dispute 
settlement mechanism of UNCLOS. It provides that the dispute settlement 
procedures of Part XV ‘shall be open to entities other than States Parties’, however 
‘only as specifically provided for in’ UNCLOS. As will be explained below, the 
dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS is not open to the CLCS under any 
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circumstances, and nor is it open for the Authority in disputes concerning the 
establishment of the outer continental shelf. It therefore came as a surprise when the 
arbitral tribunal, in the Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas between 
Canada and the French Republic,
678
 used as one of the arguments for the refusal to 
address the delimitation of the outer continental shelf that the case concerned not 
only the parties to the dispute but also the international community. The tribunal 
held: 
Any decision by this Court recognizing or rejecting any rights of the Parties over the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, would constitute a pronouncement involving a delimitation, not 
‘between the Parties’ but between each one of them and the international community, represented 
by organs entrusted with the administration and protection of the international sea-bed Area ... that 
has been declared to be the common heritage of mankind ... This Court is not competent to carry 
out a delimitation which affects the rights of a Party which is not before it. In this connection the 
Court notes that in accordance with Article 76, para. 8 and Annex II of the 1982 Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, a Commission is to be set up, under the title of ‘Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf’, to consider the claims and data submitted by coastal States and issue 
recommendations to them. In conformity with this provision, only ‘the limits of the shelf 




In his dissenting opinion, Weil rejected the majority view. He stated:  
Nor am I convinced of the idea on which the Court bases its Decision, namely that the broad 
continental shelf ought to give rise to a delimitation between Canada and France on one side, and 
on the other the international community, a Party which is not present in these proceedings and 
which should be represented by the ‘Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’ – a body 




As aforementioned, the standing of entities other than States must be specifically 
provided for in the Convention. Nothing in UNCLOS indicates that the CLCS enjoys 
standing. In addition, ‘[t]here is no explicit reference to the CLCS in any provision of 
the Convention addressing the access to’ the dispute settlement mechanisms of Part 
XV.
681
 It must, however, be noted that in the Reparation Case the ICJ accepted that 
the UN was ‘capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has 
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims’
682
 even although the 
UN Charter was silent on this issue. The Court based this conclusion on functional 
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arguments, i.e. that UN could not operate effectively without this function.
683
 In this 
context the question arises as to whether the CLCS could be given standing before 
international courts and tribunals based on similar reasons. Since the mandate of the 
CLCS is very narrow compared to that of UN and because the CLCS issues only 
recommendations, it is doubtful whether the CLCS needs standing to execute its 
mandate. Suarez has pointed out that the legal personality of the CLCS ‘under 
international law is limited and does not include becoming a party to a judicial 
forum’.
684
 Moreover, it must be questioned ‘whether the participation of the CLCS as 
a party in proceedings before a court or tribunal would be either desirable or 
practically feasible in the light of its nature and function’.
685
 Consequently, it seems 
safe to support Nelson’s assertions that ‘[i]t is certain ... that the Commission has not 
been granted the power to submit any dispute concerning the outer limit of a coastal 
State’s continental shelf to any court or tribunal’.
686
  
With regard to the Authority, articles 134(4) and 84(2) of UNCLOS read in 
conjunction with para. 1 of section 1 of the Annex to the Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982,
687
 indicate that the Authority has no role in the establishment 
of the outer continental shelf, except for the limited task of depositing charts and co-
ordinates which States have submitted that show the outer limit line of the 
continental shelf. Wolfrum has noted that the St. Pierre and Miquelon Case ‘is open 
for criticism since it does not take into consideration that the International Seabed 
Authority does not have a mandate concerning the delimitation of the Area and for 
                                                          
683
 Ibid 177-84. 
684
 Suarez (n 23) 232. Suarez is of the view that the CLCS has a limited legal personality since it is 
permitted to enter into cooperation arrangements with the IOC and IHO and other competent 
international organisations under article 3(2) of Annex II to UNCLOS. Ibid 80.  
685
 2004 ILA Report (n 71) 784 fn. 50. The ILA Committee discusses whether it is possible to use 
article 20(2) of Annex VI to establish standing for the CLCS ‒ it rejects that possibility. Ibid 784.  
686
 Nelson, ‘Claims to the Continental Shelf Beyond 200-mile limit’ (n 291) 579; See also Nelson, 
‘The Continental Shelf’ (n 254) 1239; See also David Anderson, ‘Developments in Maritime 
Boundary Law and Practice’ (n 184) 3215. 
687
 Adopted 28 July 1994, provisionally entered into force 16 November 1994 and definitively 28 July 
1996, 1836 UNTS 3. Paragraph 1 of section 1 of the Annex to the Agreement provides: ‘[The 
Authority] is the organization through which States Parties to the Convention shall ... organize and 
control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area’ 




that reason is not represented at the deliberations of the Commission’.
688
 Although 
the Authority does not enjoy standing under Part XV, it may be asked whether it 
enjoys standing before ITLOS’ Sea-bed Disputes Chamber. Section 5 of Part XI of 
UNCLOS gives the Authority limited standing before the Chamber; however, the 
jurisdiction of the chamber is limited to activities in the Area.
689
 Consequently, a 
dispute regarding the delineation of the outer continental shelf lies outside its 
competence.  
Nevertheless, there exists a possibility that the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
could indirectly consider the delineation of the outer continental shelf if a coastal 
state purported to exercise its continental shelf rights in an area which the Authority 
considered to be part of the Area. If a coastal State attempted to explore or exploit 
minerals in an area that is in fact part of the Area, this would constitute a violation of 
article 137 and would bring the matter within the jurisdiction of the Chamber under 
article 187 since it concerned ‘activities in the Area’. Consequently, the Authority 
could challenge the coastal State under article 187(b)(i), which states that the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber has jurisdiction in disputes with respect to activities in the Area, 
under Part XI and the Annexes relating thereto, ‘between a State Party and the 
Authority concerning ... acts or omissions ... of a State Party alleged to be in 
violation of this Part or the Annexes relating thereto or of rules, regulations and 
procedures of the Authority adopted in accordance therewith.’ It must be emphasised 
that non-parties to UNCLOS seem to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
Chamber because only acts or omissions of State Parties are mentioned in the 
provision. 
4.2.5.2. Advisory Opinions  
It may be asked whether the Authority or the CLCS can request an advisory opinion 
to clarify legal controversies regarding the establishment of the outer continental 
shelf. Eiriksson has asked whether ‘under article 191 of the Convention, the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber could be approached by the Assembly or Council of the Authority 
                                                          
688
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for an advisory opinion’.
690
 Article 191 provides that ‘[t]he Seabed Disputes 
Chamber shall give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council 
on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. Such opinions shall be 
given as a matter of urgency’.
691
 Eiriksson points out that: 
The key jurisdictional element is that the request must relate to the scope of the activities of the 
Assembly or Council. It should be pointed out that here we would not be at the stage of actual or 
potential ‘activities in the Area’, a term with a specific and defined meaning, but rather at a more 
general stage, and what could be more relevant to activities of the organs of the Authority than 
disputes pertaining to their potential geographical scope? Practically speaking however, it cannot 
be envisaged that this would happen as an academic issue alone; that is, there would have to be 




Nelson has expressed a different opinion:  
‘[A]ctivities’ of the organs of the Authority must necessarily be confined to matter relating to 
‘activities in the Area’, i.e. the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the international 
seabed area. If this line of reasoning is correct, the Seabed Disputes Chamber will not be able to 




He notes however that ‘it is for the Seabed Disputes Chamber to make such a 
determination’.
694
 Nelson’s view is supported by the Area Case.
695
  
Eiriksson suggests that ‘there could be recourse to an option introduced by 
the Law of the Sea Tribunal in article 138 of its Rules to allow for advisory opinions 
if an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically 
provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion’.
696
 
Eiriksson observes that ‘[t]he request would have to be transmitted to the Tribunal by 
whatever body is authorized by or in accordance with the agreement to make the 
request’.
697
 Nelson discusses another possibility. He states that ‘[w]hen certain 
specific requirements are met, the Assembly [of the Authority] shall request an 
advisory opinion from the Seabed Disputes Chamber as to whether “a proposal 
before the Assembly on any matters” conforms with the terms of the Convention 
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(article 159, para. 10)’.
698
 He is however not of the opinion that this applies to the 
Authority ‘[a]s the jurisdiction of the Chamber itself is restricted to matters relating 
to activities in the Area under Part XI and Annexes III and IV’.
699
 Consequently ‘the 
Chamber does not possess the competence to give an advisory opinion on matters 
concerning the delimitation between the outer continental shelves of coastal States 
and the international seabed area’.
700
 
The answer to the question of whether the CLCS can ask for an advisory 
opinion is not straightforward. UNCLOS does not provide for the Commission to ask 
for an advisory opinion by any of the judicial fora mentioned in the Convention. It is 
possible, however, that another route is open to the CLCS. Before explaining this 
path, it must first be noted that the CLCS is not one of the organs of the UN or 
specialized agencies which have been authorised by the UNGA under article 96(2) of 
the UN Charter to request advisory opinions to the ICJ on legal questions arising 
within the scope of their activities. Moreover, there does not exist any direct 
procedural path for the CLCS to ask the UNGA to request an advisory opinion from 
the ICJ. As is well known, the UNGA has competence under the UN Charter to 
request the ICJ ‘to give an advisory opinion on any legal question’.
701
 It can be 
suggested that the Secretary-General could ask the UNGA to request the ICJ for an 
advisory opinion on legal question that was of vital importance to the CLCS. The 
reason why the CLCS should ask the Secretary-General rather than the Meeting of 
States Parties is that the Secretary-General provides the secretariat services for the 
CLCS, including legal services, as discussed in chapter three. The legal problems 
with which the CLCS is faced are likewise the legal problems that the Secretary-
General is faced. Moreover, and more importantly, under the UNGA’s Rules of 
Procedure the provisional agenda of a regular season of the UNGA shall include, 
among others, ‘[a]ll items which the Secretary-General deems it necessary to put 
before the General Assembly’.
702
 UNGA is an important actor in the law of the 
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 Article 96(a) of the UN Charter. 
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 It ‘is the forum for general discussion on the law of the sea, including general 
problems of implementation of the Convention’.
704
 Consequently, it has a direct 
interest in issues pertaining to the interpretation of the Convention and is likely to 
seriously discuss the need for an advisory opinion in this context. Even in the event 
that the UNGA requested the ICJ for an advisory opinion, the Court would have to 
decide whether it accedes to that request. As is well known, ‘the Court has a 
discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions of 
jurisdiction are met’.
705
 However, the Court has decided in its jurisprudence that only 
‘compelling reasons’ lead to refusal in response to a request falling within its 
jurisdiction.
706
 Although this situation may seem far-fetched it is nonetheless a real 
one that could be useful if a legal controversy arises over the CLCS which is difficult 
to solve by other available means. 
4.2.5.3. Specially Affected Injured States 
As noted above, State parties to UNCLOS enjoy standing before the judicial fora of 
Part XV of the Convention. Although all State parties enjoy standing it does not 
follow that all of them can invoke the responsibility of another State, in each case. 
According to article 42(a) of ILC’s Draft Rules on the Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts
707
 ‘[a] State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the 
responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to ... [t]hat State 
individually’. The Commentary to the Draft Rules provides that ‘[f]or a State to be 
considered injured, it must be affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes it 
from the generality of other States to which the obligation is owed’.
708
 Noyes points 
out that ‘[a] specially affected state may invoke the responsibility of a coastal state 
for establishing outer limits in violation of the Convention’s substantive or 
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 He observes that ‘[i]f a coastal state has illegally 
determined the outer limits of its continental shelf, another state could be specially 
affected in a range of situations’.
710
 He further provides that ‘an opposite or adjacent 
state would be specially affected if a coastal state set outer limits that impinged on 
the claimant state’s continental shelf’.
711
 According to Wolfrum, a State in these 
circumstances ‘undoubtedly may initiate legal action against the establishment of the 
outer limits of a continental shelf whether or not the outer limits were based upon a 
recommendation of the Commission or not’.
712
 Another example could be taken of a 
coastal State’s arrest of a vessel flying a foreign flag ‘for violating the coastal state’s 
continental shelf regulations just inside what the coastal state illegally claims as its 
outer limits line; in such a case, the arrest, which would violate rules of flag state 
jurisdiction, could be regarded as proximately resulting from the coastal state’s 
breach of Article 76’.
713
 The following statement of the ILA committee seems to be 
in line with the above considerations:  
[T]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the 
... Authority ... shall act, States individually have an interest in the exploration for and exploitation 
of the resources of the Area ... States can exercise certain high seas freedoms in the sea-bed and 
subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as specified in article 87 of the Convention.
 
The 
existence of these high seas freedoms gives individual States a legal interest in the definition of 
these limits. A State may consider that these limits have not been established in accordance with 
the substantive or procedural requirements of article 76.
 
This would constitute a dispute for the 




A related issue is whether third States enjoy actio popularis standing; i.e. whether 
any State ‘may assert an interest of the international community in the common 
heritage of the Area and its resources and could judicially challenge a coastal state’s 
outer limits’.
715
 UNCLOS is silent on the issue. In the controversial South West 
Africa Case, ICJ rejected this type of standing as a rule of international law:  
[T]he argument amounts to a plea that the Court should allow the equivalent of an ‘actio 
popularis’, or right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a 
public interest. But although a right of this kind may be known to certain municipal systems of 
law, it is not known to international law as it stands at present: nor is the Court able to regard it as 
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Noyes notes that ‘[t]his reluctance perhaps reflects concern that the doctrine could 
disrupt negotiated settlements between a state in breach of its obligations and directly 
injured states’.
717
 It must be questioned whether the South West Africa Case is of 
much relevance in the context of the outer continental shelf. In the case the Court 
was dealing with a treaty dispute in which the applicant states were not parties to the 
relevant treaty. In the context of outer continental shelf disputes the applicant states 
will be parties to the applicable treaty, UNCLOS. The more recent Question relating 
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
718
 case seems to be more relevant. In that 
case the ICJ stated:  
Any State party to the [United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984]
719
 may invoke the responsibility of 
another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations 




Since seabed rights have an erga omnes character, as discussed below, the question 
must be asked whether this dictum is also applicable to state parties to UNCLOS and 
disputes regarding the outer continental shelf that have an effect on the territorial 
scope of the international seabed. It seems likely. 
A closely related question is whether states other than injured states can bring an 
action by referring to draft article 48 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, which concerns invocation of responsibility by a state other than an 
injured state.
721
 Under draft article 48(1): 
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in 
accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including 
that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) The 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.  
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According to article 48(2), the claimant state may claim cessation of the wrongful 
conduct and reparation ‘in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of 
the obligation breached.’ In the Area Case, when discussing subjects entitled to 
claim compensation in matters concerning the Area, ITLOS made references to draft 
article 48 in support of the view that each State-Party to UNCLOS may ‘be entitled 
to claim compensation in light of the erga omnes character of the obligations relating 
to preservation of the environment of the high seas and in the Area.’
722
  
Wolfrum believes that draft article 48 is applicable for states other than injured 
states in a case regarding the delineation of the outer limits of the outer continental 
shelf. He has pointed out that the wording of draft article 48(1)(b) ‘includes the 
initiation of proceedings for a judicial settlement’
723
 and has argued the following:  
Limiting the scope of the Area inevitably means limiting the potential economic use by States. 
Thus, States defending the scope of the Area in the interest of the international community, may 
also act in their own interest. This aspect should ameliorate the concerns of those which hesitate to 





This indicates that ITLOS is of the opinion that draft article 48 is something more 
than de lege ferenda. It seems clear that treaty obligations erga omnes partes fall 
under draft article 48 and can be litigated regardless of whether there is any broader 
rule about an actio popularis. It must though be underlined that the likelihood that a 
state will challenge the outer limits of the outer continental shelf of another state 
without having direct political or economic interests for doing so is little. 
In summary of what has been stated above about standing, references can be 
made to the work of Franckx: 
The determination of the outer edge of the continental margin extending beyond 200 nm, and thus 
indirectly the limits of application of the common heritage principle in the Area, remain basically a 
coastal state competence, which the participants in the UNCLOS III negotiations apparently did 





This outcome ‘leaves the international community ill-equipped to protect the 
common heritage of mankind, even in the location where the principle found its 
fullest exposition, namely the deep seabed’.
726
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4.2.6. Are States obliged to wait for Recommendations from the CLCS before they 
seek to delimit the Outer Continental Shelf with Neighbouring States? 
UNCLOS is silent on the issue of whether a State shall delineate the outer limits of 
its continental shelf beyond 200 nm before engaging in a maritime delimitation with 
a neighbouring State, vice versa, or whether there exists any ‘temporal’ requirement. 
In the Bay of Bengal Case, Myanmar submitted ‘that as long as the outer limit of the 
continental shelf has not been established on the basis of the recommendations of the 
CLCS the Tribunal, as a court of law, cannot determine the line of delimitation on a 
hypothetical basis without knowing what the outer limits are’.
727
 Moreover, 
Myanmar claimed:  
A review of a State’s submission and the making of recommendations by the Commission on this 
submission is a necessary prerequisite for any determination of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf of a coastal State ‘on the basis of these recommendations’ under article 76 (8) of UNCLOS 
and the area of continental shelf beyond 200 [nm] to which a State is potentially entitled; this, in 
turn, is a necessary precondition to any judicial determination of the division of areas of 
overlapping sovereign rights to the natural resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 [nm] … 
To reverse the process ... to adjudicate with respect to rights the extent of which is unknown, 
would not only put this Tribunal at odds with other treaty bodies, but with the entire structure of 
the Convention and the system of international ocean governance.
728 
 
Before rejecting Myanmar’s arguments, ITLOS considered various issues, including 
the relationship between the CLCS and international courts and tribunals, the 
relationship between delineation and delimitation, State practice, decisions of 
international courts and tribunals and the Rules of Procedure. The first step of the 
Tribunal’s analysis was to note: 
[T]he absence of established outer limits of a maritime zone does not preclude delimitation of that 
zone. Lack of agreement on baselines has not been considered an impediment to the delimitation 
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of the territorial sea or the [EEZ] notwithstanding the fact that disputes regarding baselines affect 




Thereafter, ITLOS pointed out that ‘in such cases the question of the entitlement to 
maritime areas of the parties concerned did not arise’
730
 and therefore in the dispute 
before it, it had to ‘consider whether it is appropriate to proceed with the delimitation 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm given the role of the Commission’.
731
  
The second step of the analysis was to discuss the relationship between the 
CLCS and international courts and tribunals. When doing so, ITLOS noted that the 
bodies of the institutional framework of UNCLOS are complementary in nature, as 
aforementioned.
732
 Following that statement, the Tribunal pointed out that ‘[t]he 
right of the coastal State under article 76, paragraph 8, of the Convention to establish 
final and binding limits of its continental shelf is a key element in the structure set 
out in that article’
733
 and that ‘the Commission plays an important role under the 
Convention and has a special expertise which is reflected in its composition’.
734
  
The third step of the analysis began with one of the key declarations of the 
judgement: ‘There is a clear distinction between the delimitation of the continental 
shelf under article 83 and the delineation of its outer limits under article 76.’
735
 The 
Tribunal explained that ‘[u]nder the latter article, the Commission is assigned the 
function of making recommendations to coastal States on matters relating to the 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf, but it does so without 
prejudice to delimitation of maritime boundaries’.
736
 On the other hand, ‘[t]he 
function of settling disputes with respect to delimitation of maritime boundaries is 
entrusted to dispute settlement procedures under article 83 and Part XV of the 
Convention, which include international courts and tribunals’.
737
 Subsequently 
ITLOS stated: ‘There is nothing in the Convention or in the Rules of Procedure of 
the Commission or in its practice to indicate that delimitation of the continental shelf 
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constitutes an impediment to the performance by the Commission of its functions.’
738
 
Thereafter, ITLOS mentioned the ‘non-prejudice provisions’, i.e. article 76(10) and 
article 9 of Annex II, to support its deliberation.
739
  
The fourth step of the analysis was to briefly address the practice of States. 
On State practice the Tribunal stated: ‘Several submissions made to the Commission, 
beginning with the first submission, have included areas in respect of which there 
was agreement between the States concerned effecting the delimitation of their 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm.’
740
 It noted, however, that ‘unlike in the present 
case, in all those situations delimitation has been effected by agreement between 
States, not through international courts and tribunals’.
741
 It can be added to this 
discussion that States have concluded binding bilateral maritime boundary 
agreements in which the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is delimited prior to 
making a submission to the CLCS or receiving any recommendations from the 
Commission. More than a dozen such agreements
742
 have been concluded, after the 
provisions of UNCLOS on the continental shelf beyond 200 nm were finalised. The 
majority thereof have been concluded by States party to UNCLOS. It must be 
emphasised that this practice has not been protested against by any State. Thus it 
appears that States had already tacitly accepted that maritime boundary delimitations 
by agreement and the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf are 
separate functions. This repeated practice by States ‘constitutes objective evidence of 
the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of’
743
 UNCLOS on this issue and 
should be taken into account when interpreting the Convention, according to article 
31(3)(b) of the VCLT.
744
 Since States have concluded agreements in which the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm is delimited, without any involvement of the CLCS 
and without any protest from third States, it would have been illogical to deny States 
the possibility of deciding by agreement to submit a delimitation dispute regarding 
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the outer continental shelf to an international court or tribunal before receiving a 
recommendation from the CLCS. 
The fifth step in the Tribunal’s analysis was to review the relevant 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.
745
 ITLOS mentioned that arbitral 
tribunals have indicated that they have jurisdiction in cases regarding the outer 
continental shelf. The Tribunal made reference
746
 to the award in the 
Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case, which stated that the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
included ‘the delimitation of a maritime boundary in relation to that part of the 
continental shelf extending beyond 200 nm’.
747
 The arbitral tribunal did not, 
however, delimit the outer continental shelf since it decided that ‘between Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago, there is no single maritime boundary beyond 200 nm’.
748
 
ITLOS also made reference to the Nicaragua/Honduras Case in which the ICJ 
provided: 
The Court may accordingly, without specifying a precise endpoint, delimit the maritime boundary 
and state that it extends beyond the 82nd meridian without affecting third-State rights. It should 
also be noted in this regard that in no case may the line be interpreted as extending more than 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; any 
claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with Article 76 of 





It must be emphasised that the parties in the Nicaragua/Honduras Case did not ask 
the Court to delimit the outer continental shelf and it is therefore obvious that the line 
could not extend more than 200 nm from the baselines. It is also obvious from article 
76 that outer continental shelf claims must be reviewed by the CLCS. This statement 
cannot be read as implying that the ICJ decided that delineation must precede 
delimitation. Following its reference to the Nicaragua/Honduras Case, the Tribunal 
observed ‘that the determination of whether an international court or tribunal should 
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In its sixth step of analysis, ITLOS considered paras. 2 and 5 of Annex I to 
the Rules of Procedure
751
 and that CLCS had deferred consideration of the 
submission made by the two States.
752
 The Tribunal pointed out that ‘[t]he 
consequence of these decisions of the Commission is that, if the Tribunal declines to 
delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm under article 83 of the Convention, the 
issue concerning the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf of each 
of the Parties under article 76 of the Convention may remain unresolved’.
753
 If this 
were to be the outcome, the parties would have to wait an indefinite period of time 
for the CLCS, and the CLCS would have to wait for an indefinite period of time for 
ITLOS. Or, in the words of Bangladesh, the outcome would have opened ‘a 
jurisdictional black hole into which all disputes concerning maritime boundaries in 
the outer continental shelf would forever disappear’.
754
  
Finally, ITLOS stated importantly that: ‘A decision by the Tribunal not to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute relating to the continental shelf beyond 200 
nm would not only fail to resolve a long-standing dispute, but also would not be 
conducive to the efficient operation of the Convention.’
755
 Consequently, ITLOS 
concluded: 
392. In the view of the Tribunal, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention 
not to resolve the existing impasse. Inaction in the present case, by the Commission and the 
Tribunal, two organs created by the Convention to ensure the effective implementation of its 
provisions, would leave the Parties in a position where they may be unable to benefit fully from 
their rights over the continental shelf.  
 
393. The Tribunal observes that the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present case cannot be seen as 
an encroachment on the functions of the Commission, inasmuch as the settlement, through 
negotiations, of disputes between States regarding delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 
nm is not seen as precluding examination by the Commission of the submissions made to it or 
hindering it from issuing appropriate recommendations.  
 
394. For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal concludes that, in order to fulfil its responsibilities 
under Part XV, Section 2, of the Convention in the present case, it has an obligation to adjudicate 
the dispute and to delimit the continental shelf between the Parties beyond 200 nm. Such 
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delimitation is without prejudice to the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf in 




It must be highlighted that the Tribunal was not of the opinion that it could 
adjudicate the dispute. It was of the opinion that it had to do so. It must be 
emphasised that later in the judgement the Tribunal stated that it ‘would have been 
hesitant to proceed with the delimitation of the area beyond 200 nm had it concluded 
that there was significant uncertainty as to the existence of a continental margin in 
the area in question’.
757
 What is meant by hesitance is in this context not clear. The 
statement seems to imply that in the event of significant uncertainty the Tribunal will 
not exercise its jurisdiction and will refrain from delimiting the disputed maritime 
area. Whether ITLOS is suggesting that states have to wait for recommendations 
from the CLCS, in such instances, before delimitating the area under consideration is 
neither clear. That interpretation could lead to the black hole situation where the 
parties would have to wait for an indefinite period for the CLCS, and the CLCS 
would have to wait for an indefinite period of time for an international court or 
tribunal. It is therefore more likely that the Tribunal is emphasising the importance 
for States of providing sound scientific and technical evidence to support its 
arguments before the Tribunal.  
To summarise what has been stated above, ITLOS confirmed that delineation 
and delimitation are separate functions. This conclusion is supported by treaty law, 
State practice and the decisions of international courts and tribunals. The view that 
States must first delineate the outer continental shelf before delimiting it is thus 
rejected. States are not obliged to follow a certain path when establishing the outer 
continental shelf; in other words, States are free to choose whether they first follow 
the CLCS path or instead delimit the continental shelf with their neighbouring States.  
It must be pointed out that the Bay of Bengal Case did not involve issues 
regarding the Area. If, however, the Area becomes an issue in a dispute, reference 
could be made to the decision of a Canadian domestic arbitral tribunal in a case 
between the Canadian provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia. 
Regarding the relationship between the act of delimitation and the international 
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community the court noted in a footnote that: ‘[T]here does not seem to be any 
difference in principle between the non-effect of a bilateral delimitation vis-à-vis a 
third state ... and its non-effect vis-à-vis the “international community” of third states 
generally.’
758
 In other words, the international community, as represented by the 
CLCS and the Authority, is not involved in maritime boundary delimitations. In this 
context it can be noted that a court or tribunal could avoid fixing a tri-point with the 
Area by simply indicating a general direction for the final part of the maritime 
boundary and leaving it to the CLCS to indicate the outer limit of the continental 
margin. This has been done in a few negotiated maritime boundary delimitations.
759
 
By doing so, the court or tribunal fully respects the mandate of the CLCS and does 
not involve itself in the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.  
4.3. The Evaluation of Scientific and Technical Evidence by 
International Courts and Tribunals 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The evaluation of complex evidence is nothing new for international courts and 
tribunals. The ICJ, tribunals and other dispute settlement bodies have been faced 
with difficult scientific and technical questions and have not hesitated to rule on the 
issues in dispute. Sometimes the outcome has not been controversial.
760
 In other 
instances, such as in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case, it has.
761
 Since the entitlement 
criteria to the outer continental shelf are founded on geoscience, international courts 
and tribunals responsible for resolving a dispute involving the delineation or 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf will thus be faced with legal issues 
involving the consideration of complex scientific and technical evidence, such as in 
the Bay of Bengal Case. It will be asked below what is the meaning of scientific and 
technical evidence, whether scientific and technical complexities can be seen as a 
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jurisdictional bar, what procedural methods exist to deal with complex scientific and 
technical issues, how deep the judicial assessment of scientific and technical findings 
of the CLCS will be and whether a court or tribunal can cope with complex scientific 
and technical data. 
4.3.2. What is Scientific and Technical Evidence? 
It is both hard to define scientific and technical evidence and to draw distinctions 
between the two because of their close interplay. Riddell and Plant have noted that 
‘[b]oth terms are used in similar contexts in disputes involving elements that require 
explanations from specialized individuals or organizations in the wide-ranging fields 
of modern science and technology’.
762
 Both types of evidence have in common the 
presentation of a problem which is essentially about ‘to what extent specialized 
knowledge associated with such disciplines can be admitted and evaluated in 
international legal proceedings’.
763
 Expert evidence is on the other hand, easier to 
define. By definition such evidence is ‘given by persons with specialized knowledge 
on a subject to aid the Court in deciding the facts of the case. Often this will be on a 
relatively straightforward matter, but one which is simply not within the knowledge 
of the Court’.
764
 That is not always the case. Riddell and Plant point out that:  
[O]ften the matters on which expert guidance is required are extremely complex where a case 
involves issues of science or technology. New developments and research mean these fields are 
constantly expanding and growing in complexity ... Not only are these cases harder ... to consider 




4.3.3. Scientific and Technical Complexity as a Non-Jurisdictional Bar 
The need for consideration of highly complex scientific and technical evidence in a 
case before an international court or tribunal cannot be seen as a bar to jurisdiction. 
The ILA Committee has stated that ‘[a] review of the case law indicates that the ICJ 
and international tribunals do not consider that the complexity of scientific and 
technical data to be taken into account in addressing the legal issues is an 
impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction’.
766
 For instance, in one of the most 
influential maritime boundaries cases ‒ the Libya/Malta Case ‒ the ICJ carefully 
studied the evidence concerning the relevance of certain geophysical and geological 
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features to establish the natural prolongation of the parties even although the Court 




In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case Japan argued that its dispute with 
Australia and New Zealand was concerned with questions of scientific judgement 
and therefore not justiciable.
768
 Although the Tribunal did not rule on the question of 
admissibility it observed that ‘its analysis of provisions of UNCLOS that bring the 
dispute within the substantive reach of UNCLOS suggests that the dispute is not one 
that is confined to matters of scientific judgment only’.
769
 In the St. Pierre and 
Miquelon Case the tribunal implied that it would have looked at scientific and 
technical data, in the context of article 76 of the Convention, had the parties 
presented such data to it; which they did not.
770
 Based on these three decisions it 
appears safe to assert that it must be highly unlikely that an international court or 
tribunal responsible for making a decision in a case regarding the establishment of 
the outer continental shelf will view complex scientific and technical questions as a 
bar that will prevent it from exercising jurisdiction. ITLOS, in the Bay of Bengal 
Case, was at least not afraid to face such complexities. 
4.3.4. Procedural Methods to deal with Scientific and Technical Evidence 
In the joint dissenting opinion of Al-Khasawneh and Bruno Simma in the Case 
Concerning Pulp Mills on the River of Uuguay, it is stated: 
The adjudication of disputes in which the assessment of scientific questions by experts is 
indispensable ... requires an interweaving of legal process with knowledge and expertise that can 
only be drawn from experts properly trained to evaluate the increasingly complex nature of the 




There are principally four different ways scientific and technical knowledge is put 
before a court or tribunal. First, by evidence submitted in writing or orally by the 
parties as part of their pleadings, i.e. ex parte evidence. Although this type of 
evidence is very important in all cases it is often seen as biased simply for the reason 
that it has been introduced by one party and the judges can never be sure about the 
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impartiality of the experts that the parties either have called upon to give an opinion 
or are members of the delegation of a party before a court or tribunal, because they 
have been paid by the parties to support their arguments.
772
 Second, by the 
questionable use of informal expert advice by so called ‘invisible experts’. It can be 
argued that the use of such experts is not in the spirit of transparency and openness.
773
 
Third, by court-appointed experts who sit with the court or tribunal without the right 
to vote.
774
 Fourth, by court-appointed individuals or bodies who have the task of 
carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.
775
 The main legal aspects of 
court-appointed experts will be discussed below.  
4.3.4.1. Scientific and Technical Experts 
Article 289 of UNCLOS was designed to meet situations in which a court or tribunal 
is faced with complex scientific and technical questions. It reads: 
In any dispute involving scientific or technical matters, a court or tribunal exercising jurisdiction 
under this section may, at the request of a party or proprio motu, select in consultation with the 
parties no fewer than two scientific or technical experts chosen preferably from the relevant list 
prepared in accordance with Annex VIII, article 2, to sit with the court or tribunal but without the 
right to vote. 
 
The Virginia Commentary provides the following observation regarding article 289:  
At the ninth and resumed ninth sessions (both 1980) [of the third Conference], it was pointed out 
that the experts to be appointed under article 289 are not ordinary experts acting as witnesses 
before the court or tribunal and presenting to the court or tribunal an expert opinion which may be 
challenged by any party and which may be contradicted by another expert opinion. The experts 
under article 289 are in fact ‘assessors,’ within the meaning of Article 30, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute of the [ICJ], which provides that the ‘Rules of the Court may provide for assessors to sit 
with the Court or with any of its chambers, without the right to vote.’ Such assessors sit with the 
court or tribunal during the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the judgement; their role is 
to ensure that the decision of the court or tribunal does not contain technical errors and conforms 




It must be emphasised that there is no experience of the utilisation of assessors 
because ‘[n]o request or proposal for the appointment of assessors has been made 
before either the PCIJ or the post-war Court’ and ‘it is unclear in what respects they 
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differ from experts appointed by the Court’.
777
 It has been suggested that the key 
difference is that, unlike experts, ‘the assessor may participate in the private 
deliberations of the Court and in this fashion, presumably in the drafting of the 
Judgement’.
778
 Given the technical complexities of most maritime delimitations it is 
a mystery why the Court has never appointed a technical expert to sit with the judges 
in delimitation cases.
779
 If an expert were to be appointed, Schofield and Carleton 
have noted that his role should be to ‘participate fully in preparatory work, the oral 
proceedings, the evaluation of evidence and the drafting of the judgement’.
780
  
A few comments about article 289 must be made. First, article 289 is 
applicable before the ICJ, ITLOS and Annex VI and Annex VII arbitral tribunals. 
Second, there is only a minimum, no maximum, number of experts who can be 
selected. Third, courts or tribunals have discretion as to appointment.
781
 However, 
‘the initiative for such an appointment can come from any party to the dispute or 
from the tribunal itself’.
782
 On the other hand, the formal power to appoint experts 
rests with the court or tribunal. Fourth, prior to appointing the experts the court or 
tribunal shall ‘consult all the parties to the dispute, presumably not only with respect 
to the question whether any appointment should be made, but also with respect to the 
persons to be selected’.
783
 Fifth, it is important to make a clear distinction between 
experts called by the parties and those summoned by a court or tribunal, since the 
relationship between the latter and the judges ‘is more intimate and their advice is 
not subject to analysis by the parties’.
784
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The selection of individuals to sit in the court or tribunal with the judges is 
likely to be a focal point for the parties. It must be emphasised that article 289 states 
that experts should preferably be selected from the same lists from which the 
members of special tribunals are chosen. This means that it is not an obligation to 
select specialists from these lists. They can be selected from elsewhere, which is 
likely in outer continental shelf cases since the lists do not include specialists in 
geoscience or in other subjects relevant to continental shelf disputes.
785
  
The question naturally arises as to whether individual CLCS members can be 
requested to sit with the court or tribunal under article 289 in their personal 
capacity.
786
 In answering this question issues regarding confidentiality and 
impartiality must be discussed. Para. 4.4. of Annex II to the Rules of Procedure 
contains an important provision for confidentiality considerations. It provides that 
‘[t]he members of the Commission shall not disclose, also after they cease to be 
members, any confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their 
duties in relation to the Commission’. Except where the classification of 
confidentiality has been lifted, by a submitting State, it could be difficult for a CLCS 




With regard to the question of impartiality, reference can be made to case law 
from the WTO Appellate Body. In one of the episodes of the so-called ‘beef 
hormone trade disputes’ between the European Communities (EC) and the USA, the 
question of the impartiality of scientific experts arose. The EC challenged before the 
Appellate Body the decision of a panel to appoint experts who had previously been 
involved in conducting risk assessments of the relevant hormones with the Joint 
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA).
788
 The EC argued that 
the experts ‘could not be independent and impartial because they were asked to 
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evaluate risk assessments that were very critical of the JECFA reports’
789
 and ‘as 
co-authors of the JECFA reports, these experts cannot be considered to be 
independent and impartial in these circumstances, because this would amount to 
asking them to review and criticise reports that are their own doing’.
790
  In its appeal, 
the EC argued that ‘the consultation of experts by the Panel for the purposes of 
scientific and technical advice including their selection must respect general 
principles of law, and in particular the principle of due process’.
791
 In addition, the 
EC argued ‘that it is inherent in the principle of due process that the parties to a 
dispute are given a fair hearing including that the experts a court, tribunal or panel 
hears or consults are independent and impartial’.
792
  
In response to these arguments the Appellate Body held that ‘the protection 
of due process is an essential feature of a rules-based system of adjudication’ and 
that ‘[d]ue process protection guarantees that the proceedings are conducted with 
fairness and impartiality, and that one party is not unfairly disadvantaged with 
respect to other parties in a dispute’.
793
 The Appellate Body went on to state that: 
Scientific experts and the manner in which their opinions are solicited and evaluated can have a 
significant bearing on a panel's consideration of the evidence and its review of a domestic 
measure, especially in cases like this one involving highly complex scientific issues. Fairness and 
impartiality in the decision-making process are fundamental guarantees of due process. Those 
guarantees would not be respected where the decision-makers appoint and consult experts who are 
not independent or impartial. Such appointments and consultations compromise a panel's ability to 




The Appellate Body concluded that because the appointment of, and consultations 
with, the specialists compromised the Panel’s ability to act as an independent 
adjudicator and infringed the EC’s due process rights, this ‘could, by itself, lead to 
the invalidation of the Panel’s findings’
795
 on the issues on which they consulted.
796
  
If an international court or tribunal faced with the question of whether it 
should appoint a current CLCS member as a scientific or technical expert adopts a 
similar position to that of the Appellate Body, it should answer it negatively since the 
appointment could lead to all kinds of impartiality questions, especially if the expert 
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had previously commented on the relevant evidence in his work for the CLCS. It 
could however be argued that certain circumstances mitigate the impartiality aspects 
of appointing a CLCS member as an expert. For instance, a newly-elected CLCS 
member who has not taken part in any of the work of the CLCS could possibly be 
seen as eligible under article 289.  
Different considerations apply to former members of the CLCS who have not 
been involved in any aspect of a submission, i.e. in cases when a State submits its 
submission to the CLCS after the former CLCS members left the Commission or 
before any substantive evaluation of the content of a submission took place. Suarez is 
of the opinion that ‘[f]ormer Commission members may be called upon to sit as 




To answer the question of whether CLCS members can be requested to sit 
with a court or tribunal under article 289 of UNCLOS, it may be concluded that it is 
unlikely that, because of concerns about impartiality, a current CLCS member will 
be appointed to sit as an expert, with a court or tribunal. The situation is different in 
the case of a former CLCS member who has not been involved in a substantive 
evaluation of the scientific and technical evidence at issue in the case. It is however 
open for discussion whether it is more appropriate to involve experts from the IHO 
for instance, rather than a former CLCS member, to sit with the bench to minimise 
any suspicion of bias. 
4.3.4.2. Court-appointed Individuals and Bodies 
The principles concerning evidence obtained by the ICJ are found in articles 49 and 
50 of the ICJ Statute. Article 49 provides the general power for the Court to request 
further documents and other information, such as information on questions of law or 
fact, whilst article 50 regulates a special form of obtaining evidence.
798
 
According to article 50 ‘[t]he Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, 
body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of 
carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion’. The purpose of the provision is 
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to ‘enable the Court to establish the facts of a case, and to understand complex 
technical and scientific information’.
799
 In the joint dissenting opinion of Al-
Khasawneh and Bruno Simma in the Pulp Mills Case it is noted that: 
The flexibility in the wording of article 50 of the Statute, for example, allows for recourse 
thereunder at any moment in the proceedings, which is especially noteworthy, as it means that the 
Article 50 procedure can be used from the very start of a dispute, during the written or oral phases, 





Although the ICJ has often been faced with difficult scientific and technical data it 
has in most instances rejected requests for an expert opinion or inquiry.
801
 The Court 
has only twice in its history sought independent advice ‒ in the Corfu Channel Case 
and in the Gulf of Maine Case. In the latter case the Chamber accepted on the basis 
of article 50 the request of the parties ‘to appoint a technical expert nominated jointly 
by the Parties to assist it in respect of technical matters and, in particular in preparing 
the description of the maritime boundary and the charts’.
802
 It has been noted that 
article 50 ‘does not prescribe the evidentiary value attaching to expert opinions or 
inquiries. Just as with respect to all other pieces of evidence placed before it, the 
Court is free ... to evaluate the information in legal terms.’
803
 However, ‘experience, 
notably in the Corfu Channel case, suggests that detailed and well-prepared expert 
advice will not lightly be discarded’.
804
 In this context, reference can be made to the 
Franco-Italian Commission in Héritiers de S.A.R. Mgr. le Duc de Guise award which 
provided that there was no reason to refrain from endorsing the conclusions of an 
appointed expert unless the expert’s argument was inconsistent with the facts or rules 
of logic.
805
 Riddell and Plant have suggested that the reason for the ICJ’s reluctance 
to appoint experts is ‘[t]he risk of the Court feeling “bound” by an expert opinion 
given publicly’.
806
 This ‘has perhaps encouraged the private use of experts by the 
Court in its deliberations and in preparing judgements’.
807
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Since article 50 states that the Court can entrust not only individuals but also 
bodies, bureaus, commissions, or other organisations to carry out an enquiry or to 
give an expert opinion, the question can be asked of whether the Court can ask the 
CLCS to carry out an enquiry or to give an expert opinion. In answering this question 
it must be borne in mind that it is not part of the function of the CLCS, as described 
in article 3 of Annex II of UNCLOS, to give courts and tribunals scientific and 
technical advice. The only scientific and technical advice the CLCS is supposed to 
provide is to coastal States during their preparation of the data needed for their 
submission to the CLCS following a request from that State. Second, the same 
considerations regarding confidentiality, mentioned in the context of the involvement 
of individual CLCS members under article 289, apply. 
ITLOS’ Rules contain a provision which is very similar to article 50 of the 
ICJ Statute. It provides that the Tribunal can arrange for an inquiry or an expert 
opinion if it considers this necessary.
808
 With regard to Arbitral Tribunals it is up to 
each tribunal to determine its own procedure.
809
 Consequently, the treatment of 
complex scientific and technical evidence is decided by the parties. Arbitral 
Tribunals have come up with various ways to handle scientific and technical data. 
For instance, in the Iron Rhine Railway Case, the Tribunal recommended that the 
parties establish a committee of independent experts to determine certain facts.
810
 
The experts were asked to ‘investigate questions of considerable scientific 
complexity as to which measures will be sufficient to achieve compliance with the 
required levels of environmental protection’.
811
 Another example can be taken from 
the Guyana/Suriname Case, in which the Tribunal appointed an independent 
hydrographic expert to serve the Tribunal and directed him as to the specific points 
of fact he was required to examine.
812
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4.3.5. The Depth of Judicial Assessment of Scientific and Technical Findings of the 
CLCS 
The question must be asked as to the depth to which international courts and 
tribunals will go in assessing the CLCS’ scientific and technical findings in cases 
concerning the outer continental shelf. In principle, an international court or tribunal 
is ‘not excluded from exercising its jurisdiction in contentious case between two 
States in which the validity of a decision of an international body is being 
impugned’.
813
 On the other hand, UNCLOS ‘charges the Commission specifically 
with evaluating the scientific and technical data submitted to it by a coastal State’.
814
 
Presumably, this to some extent limits the exercise of jurisdiction by international 
courts and tribunals concerning article 76, since the CLCS must under article 76 have 
discretionary powers to carry out its task.
815
 ITLOS touched upon this issue in the 
Bay of Bengal Case: 
[A]s ... article [76] contains elements of law and science, its proper interpretation and application 
requires both legal and scientific expertise. While the Commission is a scientific and technical 
body with recommendatory functions entrusted by the Convention to consider scientific and 
technical issues arising in the implementation of article 76 on the basis of submissions by coastal 
States, the Tribunal can interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention, including article 76. 




The Tribunal’s dictum seems to indicate that it will not be shy to assess scientific and 
technical issues that are of importance for the interpretation and application of article 
76. How far it is prepared to go is not clear. The final sentence of the dictum seems, 
however, to imply that ITLOS is not keen to evaluate contested scientific material. It 
is, on the other hand, questionable whether it is possible for ITLOS to avoid making 
such evaluations.   
A related question is in which circumstances a court or tribunal can decide 
that the CLCS has misinterpreted the scientific and technical aspects of article 76. 
Noyes, Oude Elferink and the ILA Committee are of the opinion ‒ in the words of 
the ILA Committee ‒ that:  
A court or tribunal is competent to establish if the Commission has overstepped the bounds of its 
competence as defined in the Convention,
 
applying a test of reasonableness. This test may lead to 
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the conclusion that the Commission has acted within the limits of its competence or ultra vires, or 




The other reasons leading to the nullification of an act of an international entity can 
be:  
[P]rocedural irregularities and procedural impropriety in terms of a breach of principles of natural 
justice, of which nemo judex in sua causa [no-one should be a judge in their own cause] and audi 
alteram partem [hear the other side] are particularly noteworthy. Included in this general list is 
illegality in the sense of a breach of a rule of international law, including jus cogens, coercion, 
duress and corruption in the decision making process, abuse of power, lack of good faith, bias, 




All these factors are in principle relevant in this context and can lead to the invalidity 
of CLCS recommendations. Regarding the consequences of the invalidity of a CLCS 
recommendation, the same considerations apply as will be discussed below. 
4.3.6. Can an International Court or Tribunal cope with Complex Scientific and 
Technical Data? 
As described above, courts and tribunals can make use of scientific and technical 
expertise in various ways. Although scientific and technical experts can be important 
for evaluating complex evidence, it is not they who take the decisions for the courts 
or tribunals, as clearly stated in the Pulp Mills Case: 
[D]espite the volume and complexity of the factual information submitted to it, it is the 
responsibility of the Court, after having given careful considerations to all the evidence placed 
before it by the Parties, to determine which facts must be considered relevant, to assess their 
probative value, and to draw conclusions from them as appropriate. Thus, in keeping with its 
practice, the Court will make its own determination of the facts, on the basis of the evidence 
presented to it, and then it will apply the relevant rules of international law to those facts which it 




Notwithstanding this optimistic view of the ICJ’s competence to solve complex 
scientific issues, pessimistic views have been expressed about the capability of 
international courts and tribunals to cope with complex scientific and technical data 
in the context of article 76 of UNCLOS. John E. Noyes has stated the following: 
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[E]ven if a court or tribunal could learn the data necessary to assess whether an outer limits line 
complied with the requirements of Article 76, it could be difficult for judges, even with the 
assistance of experts, to fairly evaluate and apply complex scientific data. When faced with the 
need to consider scientific and technical data, international courts and tribunals disclaim the 
existence of any formal bar to such consideration if necessary for a legal determination. However, 
if tribunals have to rule on such difficult technical issues as the sedimentary thickness test of 
Article 76(4)(a)(i) or the meaning of the ‘foot of the continental slope’ in Article 76(4)(b), they 
may have to, in the words of the [ICJ] [in the Libya/Malta Case], ‘make a determination upon a 
disagreement between scientists of distinction as to the more plausibly correct interpretation of 
apparently incomplete scientific data.’ If a court is to assess the legality of a particular outer limits 
line, it may not be able to escape the need to interpret scientific data, however, given the 
traditional judicial function of applying law to facts. In practice, the difficulties of addressing 
scientific and technical data may limit formal judicial challenges to coastal states’ outer limits. 
States that contemplate judicial proceedings under the Convention’s third-party compulsory 
dispute settlement provisions will be aware of the aforementioned difficulties, which may retard 




With regard, to maritime delimitations, Schofield and Carleton note that ‘[i]n third 
party dispute resolution it appears that technical evidence is less well integrated into 
the process of determining the course of maritime boundaries than is the case in 
bilateral negotiations’.
821
 They point out that ‘[t]his lack of recourse to technical 
expertise and/or the absence, misunderstanding or mistreatment of technical evidence 
can lead to unfortunate results’.
822
 Moreover they note that: 
When States submit a maritime boundary dispute to third party dispute resolution one of the key 
advantages of this step is, or should be, that they will, at the end of the process, be provided with 
certainty, clarity and finality as to the location of the boundary. The court or tribunal should 
ideally resolve the dispute in such a way that there is no scope for disagreement over technical 





The parties should in this effort rely not only on the court or tribunal to solve various 
scientific and technical problems. Schofield and Carleton point out that ‘it is up to 
the parties to a dispute to address the issues of supplying the court or tribunal with 
the technical evidence it requires to make a technically sound ruling’.
824
 
Although an international court or tribunal will be faced with complex 
evidence in outer continental shelf litigation, the position taken here is that they are 
well equipped to respond to such issues by seeking the assistance of experts. That is 
not the problem. The real problem is not about capability. It is about whether 
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international courts and tribunals will use the ammunition with which they are 
provided and whether they will do so in a transparent manner. 
4.4. The Consequences of a Judgement for the CLCS  
The consequences of a judgement, regarding the outer continental shelf obviously 
depends for the CLCS on whether it addresses issues of relevance for that body. 
There are a number of issues as to the interpretation or application of article 76 
which have no bearing on the CLCS. The ILA Committee mentions the following 
examples: 
[T]he CLCS has no role in respect of the process of establishing the outer limits of the continental 
shelf once it has issued its recommendations and the coastal State has not made a new or revised 
submission. The Commission is not competent to indicate whether a coastal State has established 
the outer limits of the continental shelf on the basis of its recommendations. Similarly, the CLCS 
has no role in establishing what is meant by the phrase ‘final and binding’ in article 76(8) or the 




On the other hand, other issues which a court or tribunal rules on will have 
consequences for the CLCS. The following examples are given by the ILA 
Committee:  
A judgment may find that an outer limit line is not final and binding on another State because it 
has not been established in accordance with article 76 of the Convention. Depending on the 
reasons for this finding, the coastal State may either have to redefine its outer limits or have to 
make a new or revised submission to the CLCS. A court or tribunal may also find that a 
recommendation of the CLCS is invalid. The consequences of such a finding are not altogether 
clear. The CLCS will not have been a party to the proceedings before the court or tribunal and will 
not be bound by its judgment.
 
The Commission cannot revise its recommendations proprio motu in 
such a case. On the other hand, the outer limits of the continental shelf established by the coastal 
State on the basis of such invalid recommendations will not be opposable to other States. One way 
to deal with this issue would be for the coastal State to make a new or revised submission to the 
CLCS. A tribunal that has ruled on an issue will have indicated the reasons for its decision. In 
making its recommendations on the new or revised submission the Commission should take into 




Nevertheless ‒ and this is the key point ‒ since a judgement only binds the parties 
before a court or tribunal, and the CLCS does not enjoy standing before international 
courts or tribunals, it cannot be formally bound by a judgement. From a narrow, 
formal perspective the consequences for the CLCS of a judgement, which addresses 
issues regarding article 76 and Annex II to UNCLOS, are nil. However, as has been 
noted: ‘[I]t would seem to be appropriate for the Commission to take it into account 
in the consideration of future submissions. Otherwise, the outer limits established on 
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the basis of the recommendations of the Commission are open to challenge on the 
same grounds as those indicated in an earlier judgment.’
827
  
Finally, the question must be asked as to what the role of the CLCS will be in 
the verification of the submissions made by Bangladesh and Myanmar after the 
judgement in the Bay of Bengal Case. The Area was not an issue in the case, the 
outer limits of the States continental shelf; are defined by maritime boundaries and, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, ITLOS accepted the parties’ entitlement to 
the outer continental shelf without any CLCS involvement. Even if this was the 
outcome, it must be kept in mind that the Tribunal stated that ‘the exercise by 
international courts and tribunals of their jurisdiction regarding the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries … is without prejudice to the exercise by the Commission of its 
functions on matters related to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf’.
828
 This indicates that the CLCS will have to carry out its work as mandated. 
The CLCS will have to independently examine the data submitted by the two States 
in accordance with Article 76. Although the Tribunal accepted that the parties enjoy 
entitlement beyond 200 nm, it remains solely for the Commission to verify this on a 
technical basis. The Rules of Procedure should be followed without any exception, 
notwithstanding the Judgement. In principle, the end result will follow the same 
process that all states go through. 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
Two questions were posed at the beginning of this chapter: ‘What is the role of 
international courts and tribunals in disputes regarding the establishment of the outer 
continental shelf?’ and ‘are there any special factors regarding the outer continental 
shelf that limits the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal?’  
To answer the first question, the role of international courts and tribunals in 
outer continental shelf delimitations is mainly threefold; (1) to settle disputes 
between disputing parties regarding the delineation and delimitation of the outer 
continental shelf in accordance with the law; (2) to safeguard the holistic 
interpretation and application of international law and to save it from fragmentation; 
and (3) to contribute to substantive law-making. Another important task, with which 
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international courts and tribunals are faced, in this context, is the evaluation of 
complex scientific and technical evidence. The position taken in this chapter was that 
courts and tribunals are fully capable of evaluating this type of evidence by using 
various procedural methods that are available to acquire the necessary scientific and 
technical expertise.  
The answer to the second question is that the only factor that limits the 
jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals in disputes regarding the outer 
continental shelf, more than in other types of disputes in general, is the optional 
exception clause which excludes disputes regarding maritime boundaries from the 
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. This provision is only applicable, 
however, in maritime boundary delimitations ‒ not delineations (unless the 
delineation is linked to a delimitation dispute). It must be strongly emphasised that 
the CLCS procedure does not affect the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal in a 
delimitation case and there certainly does not exist an obligation for States to first 
determine the outer limits of their continental shelf before they can proceed to 
delimitation with neighbouring States. Neither does the evaluation of complex 
scientific and technical evidence by international courts and tribunals have any effect 
on their jurisdiction. 
This chapter supports the assertion that States are the masters of their own 
destiny in disputes regarding the establishment of the outer continental shelf. The 
Authority and the CLCS seem to play a very limited supporting role whilst the role 
of international courts and tribunals is in principle the same as in every other 





5. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nm – The 
Method 
5.1. Introduction 
The delimitation of maritime boundaries is one of the more heavily litigated subjects 
of international law. Nevertheless, in only one case thus far has the outer continental 
shelf been delimited. As a result, many questions remain unanswered concerning 
maritime boundary delimitations beyond 200 nm. The main objective of this chapter 
is to shed light on the method that is applicable in boundary delimitations between 
neighbouring States involving the outer continental shelf. An attempt will be made to 
answer the question of whether the principles of the delimitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nm are the same as those within 200 nm. The chapter will also try 
to answer the question of whether a rule of customary international law has emerged 
that is especially applicable in outer continental shelf delimitations.  
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first deals with the question 
of whether the equidistance/relevant circumstances method is applicable in outer 
continental shelf boundary delimitations before international courts and tribunals. 
This part analyses the different stages of the delimitation method established by 
international courts and tribunals. Furthermore, an attempt is made to fit various 
different aspects of the outer continental shelf into the method. The second part 
analyses negotiated agreements involving the outer continental shelf with the aim of 
identifying trends and differences in State practice. Prior to these two main parts, the 
question of whether there is an inner and outer continental shelf, in the context of 
boundary delimitations, will be addressed and subsequently an attempt is made to 
explain the main difference between negotiated and litigated maritime boundaries. 
The reason why the chapter addresses the rules applied by international courts and 
tribunals, in the absence of an agreement between States, before the treaty practice of 
States is because it is easier to clarify many complex concepts by first explaining 
their origin and how international courts and tribunals have developed them.  
5.2. Is there an Inner and Outer Continental Shelf in Maritime Boundary 
Delimitations? 
There is a clear distinction between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nm 




whilst the entitlement beyond 200 nm is based on natural prolongation and has to be 
verified by the CLCS. Different opinions have been expressed as to whether this 
distinction applies also to the delimitation of the outer continental shelf. Two 
different schools of thought exist on how the delimitation of the continental shelf 
should be viewed.
829
 One school finds ‘that areas of outer shelf form an integral part 
of the (legal) continental shelf in all respects’.
830
 The other school favours ‘the view 
that such areas, forced by circumstances, constitute a sort of surplus of shelf, 
something extra, calling for special legal treatment, in particular in relation to 
delimitation’.
831
 The latter opinion has been rejected.  
In the Bay of Bengal Case ITLOS stated that ‘Article 76 of the Convention 
embodies the concept of a single continental shelf’
832
 and noted that ‘[i]n accordance 
with article 77, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Convention, the coastal State exercises 
exclusive sovereign rights over the continental shelf in its entirety without any 
distinction being made between the shelf within 200 nm and the shelf beyond that 
limit’.
833
 The Tribunal also pointed out that ‘Article 83 of the Convention, 
concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts … does not make any such distinction’.
834
 Finally, the Tribunal made 
reference
835
 to the award in the Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case which held that 
‘in any event there is in law only a single “continental shelf” rather than an inner 
continental shelf and a separate extended or outer continental shelf’.
836
 The award 
did not elaborate on the single continental shelf argument, because ‘between 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, there is no single boundary beyond 200 nm’.
837
  
In this context, ‘[i]t may be useful to recall that the outer continental shelf has 
been with us all along’.
838
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 Ibid. Various reasons are given in support of this opinion, including the revenue sharing system of 
article 82, lack of generally accepted rules and different entitlement criteria. 
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It did not just appear with Article 76. Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention makes no 
distinction between broad continental shelves and narrow continental shelves, nor does the 
customary international law of maritime delimitation. Consequently, to think that the delimitation 




Although the continental shelf is a single unit it must be kept in mind that the 
revenue sharing arrangement of article 82 only applies to the outer continental shelf. 
It is also apparent that the entitlement criteria to the continental shelf within and 
beyond 200 nm are different, as explained in chapter two. Consequently, there are in 
law some differences between the continental shelf within and that beyond 200 nm.  
5.3. The Difference between Negotiation and Adjudication in Maritime 
Boundary Delimitations 
Most maritime boundary delimitations have been concluded by negotiations through 
political channels without the involvement of third parties.
840
 This applies both to 
delimitations within and beyond 200 nm. The main reason for preferring negotiation 
over adjudication is that States engaged in negotiations are ‘able to take into account 
human and resource conditions that have been ignored in boundaries settled through 
adjudication or arbitration’.
841
 This flexibility ‒ that of being able to take into 
account more variables ‒ is the main difference between negotiation and adjudication 
in this field. International courts and tribunals cannot decide on the basis of the facts 
of a case without any reference to international law (unless empowered to act ex 
aequo et bono
842
). For courts and tribunals, the method is the essential link between 
the underlying facts and the eventual delimitation.
843
 Oxman has noted that ‘[w]hen a 
tribunal is asked to decide a dispute regarding a maritime boundary under 
international law, the tribunal will limit itself to examining factors it regards as 
legally relevant to the resolution of the issues in dispute’.
844
 For the judge, ‘justice is 
not abstract justice but justice according to the rule of law’.
845
 For States however, it 
is the end, not the means, which matters the most. The making of maritime 
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boundaries is a ‘fragmented practice that responds to the needs of states rather than 
conforming to any established format’.
846
 Another factor which makes States favour 
negotiation more than litigation is that negotiations are in general less expensive.  
In this context it must be noted that the judicial settlement of disputes is not 
incompatible with ongoing diplomatic negotiations. The ICJ has made clear that ‘the 
fact that negotiations are being actively pursued during … proceedings is not, 
legally, any obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function’.
847
 This 
means that negotiations and litigation, regarding the same subject matter can take 
place at the same time. 
Even although it is true that governments enjoy a large degree of contractual 
freedom in maritime boundary delimitations, there exist limitations. As discussed in 
chapter two, the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in 
order to achieve an equitable solution. The reference to international law means that 
the boundary agreements can be based on whatever source of international law the 
negotiating parties choose to use. One source ‒ the jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals ‒ has had an especially strong impact on the law of maritime 
boundaries. Charney has noted: 
Developments in the jurisprudence strongly influence the course of interstate negotiations and the 
resulting delimitation agreements. Diplomats know that – more than for any other area of 
international law – resort to third-party dispute settlement is a real possibility for maritime 
boundary disputes. This awareness limits the positions they may credibly take during negotiations 
by devaluing those that would be untenable if presented for third-party dispute settlement. Based 




Weil similarly stated that ‘it is useful for [States] to have guidelines, so as to put the 
brake on excessive claims, discourage extreme positions and keep the discussion 
within reasonable limits’
849
 and that ‘States negotiating a delimitation agreement 
almost always try to base their claims on legal precedent and rarely fail to take the 
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As discussed in chapter two, it is clear that under the law of international 
maritime boundary delimitations States are supposed to enter into negotiations. It is 
not as clear, however, which methods should be used to locate the boundaries. 
According to Oxman:  
The law of maritime delimitation may require the parties to negotiate in good faith. But it places 
few if any limitations on the location of an agreed boundary or related arrangements. Provided 
they agree, the parties are largely free to divide as they wish control over areas and activities 
subject to their jurisdiction under international law. They may be guided principally, in some 
measure, or not at all by legal principles and legally relevant factors a court might examine, and by 
a host of other factors a tribunal might well ignore such as relative power and wealth, the state of 
their relations, security and foreign policy objectives, convenience, and concessions unrelated to 
the boundary or even to maritime jurisdiction as such.
851
   
 
Furthermore, it can be pointed out that ‘[a] government may accept a less favourable 
delimitation on one of its coasts in exchange for a more favourable delimitation on 
another coast, or for economic or political advantages in other fields’.
852
 The 
possibilities for horse trade are many.  
Interestingly, the practice of States in this field is to some extent similar to the 
practice of international courts and tribunals. Negotiations begin, in general, by 
considering an equidistance line as a starting point between the relevant States. The 
line is then modified if, for whatever reason, the States agree to do so.
853
  
It must be emphasised that the validity of an agreement is not affected if the 
parties to it would for some reason reject equitable principles.
854
 The consensual 
basis of the negotiation process leading to a binding agreement cannot by definition 
lead to the infringement of the goal of achieving an equitable solution. It must also 
be emphasised that ‘the parties must consider the [boundary] line adopted to be 
equitable, otherwise they would not have subscribed to it’.
855
 
One of the conclusions of the major research work carried out by the 
American Society of International Law on Maritime Boundaries is as follows:  
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[I]t appears from the [state] practice that the equidistant line has played a major role in boundary 
delimitation agreements, regardless of whether they concern boundaries between opposite or 
adjacent states. In the vast preponderance of the boundary agreements studied, equidistance has 




For these reasons one could believe that this State practice would be seen as 
customary law that international courts and tribunals would use as an argument in 
support for the primacy of the equidistance line. This is not the case, however. It has 
been noted that ‘this practice does not seem to be very instructive and, thus, is less 
influential than the adjudications’.
857
 It has also been noted that:  
The collection of rules thus built by the courts has, however, only a limited field of application: it 
governs delimitation which States have submitted to judicial or arbitral settlement, but not those 
decided by governments themselves by agreement. The rules which make up the law of maritime 
delimitation do not have the character of jus cogens, binding on States, and allowing them no 
scope for derogation. In a word, although it binds the international judge or arbitrator, the law of 




The reason for the reluctance of international courts and tribunals to accept State 
practice as authoritive in this context may lie in the flexibility inherent in 
negotiations.
859
 Another reason could be how difficult it can be to prove opinio juris 
from negotiated maritime boundary agreements since the parties thereto are not 
required to give any explanation as to why a certain boundary line was chosen. To 
summarise the above discussion, States enjoy more flexibility in negotiations 
deciding the method they wish to use to delimit their maritime boundaries than is 
enjoyed by international courts and tribunals. The aim in negotiation and 
adjudication is nevertheless the same: To reach an equitable solution on the basis of 
international law. From a general perspective this flexibility to choose different 
procedural paths to solve disputes regarding maritime boundaries, can be seen as 
evidence for ‘[t]he fact that international law rarely leaves the state with only one 
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5.4. Is the Equidistance/Relevant Circumstances Method Applicable in 
Delimitation Cases regarding the Outer Continental Shelf? 
5.4.1. The Method 
As explained above, international courts and tribunals do not have a ‘carte blanche to 
employ any method that it chooses in order to effect an equitable delimitation of the 
continental shelf’.
861
 When a court or tribunal is asked to ‘delimit the continental 
shelf or [EEZs], or to draw a single delimitation line, the Court proceeds in defined 
stages’.
862
 The method consists of three separate stages with two preliminary issues 
that must be sorted out.
863
 This process ‘entails neither an unyielding insistence on 
mathematical certainty nor an unbounded quest for an equitable solution’.
864
 
The first underlying issue is entitlement. It must be strongly emphasised that 
‘the starting point of any delimitation is the entitlement of a State to a given maritime 
area’.
865
 If a State does not have the entitlement to the relevant area there will be no 
delimitation. The second issue, which relates to ‘the very source of entitlement to 
maritime areas’,
866
 is to decide which coastal segments are to be taken into account 
for delimitation purposes.  
The first step a court or tribunal takes in a maritime delimitation case is to 
‘establish a provisional delimitation line, using methods that are geometrically 
objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area in which the delimitation 
is to take place’.
867
 The provisional line is one of equidistance
868
 ‘unless there are 
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compelling reasons that make this unfeasible in the particular case’.
869
 It must be 
emphasised that ‘[e]quidistance and median lines are to be constructed from the most 
appropriate points on the coasts of the two States concerned, with particular attention 




It is important to note that the base points used for the purpose of delineation 
are not necessarily the same as those used for delimitation purposes. The ICJ has 
stated:  
[T]he issue of determining the baseline for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the continental 
shelf and the [EEZ] and the issue of identifying base points for drawing an equidistance/median 
line for the purpose of delimiting the continental shelf and the [EEZ] between adjacent/opposite 




When a delimitation of maritime areas involves ‘two or more States, the Court 
should not base itself solely on the choice of base points made by one of those 
parties’.
872
 In these circumstances ‘the Court must, when delimiting the continental 
shelf and [EEZs], select base points by reference to the physical geography of the 
relevant coasts’.
873
 Moreover, these points need to represent the ‘physical reality at 
the time of the delimitation’.
874
 It must however be noted that ‘[m]ost maritime 
delimitations, both domestic and international, take as their starting point the baseline 
of the territorial sea’.
875
   
At the first stage of the delimitation exercise ‘the Court is not yet concerned 
with any relevant circumstances that may obtain and the line is plotted on strictly 
geometrical criteria on the basis of objective data’.
876
 At the second stage, courts and 
tribunals must ‘consider whether there are factors calling for the adjustment or 
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shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result’
877
 
since ‘equidistance alone will in many circumstances not ensure an equitable result 
in the light of the peculiarities of each specific case’.
878
 These factors have, in 
delimitations within 200 nm, ‘increasingly been attached to geographical 
considerations, with particular reference to the length and the configuration of the 




The aforementioned factors have been labelled ‘special circumstances’ or 
‘relevant circumstances’. Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention refers 
to special circumstances while in customary law the term used is relevant 
circumstances. In theory, the two concepts are different. The travaux préparatoires 
of the Geneva Convention indicate that special circumstances were to be understood 
in a narrow, restricted sense while relevant circumstances ‘have always been 
understood as having a more broadly textured connotation, and of being potentially 
broader in scope’.
880
 International courts and tribunals have casted doubts on the 
truth of this difference. The Tribunal noted in the Anglo-French Case that ‘the 
different ways in which the requirements of “equitable principles” or the effects of 
“special circumstances” are put reflect differences of approach and terminology 
rather than of substance’.
881
 Moreover, the ICJ noted in the Jan Mayen Case that:  
Although it is a matter of categories which are different in origin and in name, there is inevitability 
a tendency towards assimilation between the special circumstances of Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention and the relevant circumstances under customary law, and this if only because they 




Maybe it is, after all, just a question of ‘feel’ as Evans has noted,
883
 and not 
something that is of importance.  
At the third and final stage of the delimitation process a court or tribunal will 
have to:  
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[V]erify that the line (a provisional equidistance line which may or may not have been adjusted by 
taking into account the relevant circumstances) does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result 
by reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the 




ITLOS, in the Bay of Bengal Case, applied the three-stage method to the outer 
continental shelf.
885
 It will be discussed below how the three-stage method is applied 
in the outer continental shelf and it will be argued that it could be applied differently 
beyond 200 nm from within 200 nm.  
5.4.1.1. Entitlement 
As stated above ‘the starting point of any delimitation is the entitlement of a State to 
a given maritime area’.
886
 It is clear that ‘[d]elimitation cannot be understood without 
title, which lies at its very heart ... [I]nternational law has turned to considerations 
relating to the legal basis of title, and has decided the criteria and methods for 
delimitation by reference to the legal concepts governing maritime jurisdictions.’
887
  
This theory is perhaps in some ways regrettable: it restricts the benefit of maritime jurisdictions to 
States enjoying access to the sea; it means the outer contours of their jurisdictions depend on the 
shape of their coastline; and, as a result, it causes the inequalities due to the combined hazards of 
political history and nature to be extended to maritime spaces ... So, although all States are equal in 




Nonetheless, the point of departure in all maritime delimitations is the entitlement of 
a State to a given maritime area.
889
 The ICJ has provided that ‘“legal title” to certain 
maritime or submarine areas is always and exclusively the effect of legal operation. 
The same is true of the boundary of the extent of the title. That boundary results from 
a rule of law, and not from any intrinsic merit in the purely physical fact.’
890
 The ICJ 
has also stated that ‘[i]t is only the legal basis of the title to continental shelf rights ... 
which can be taken into account as possibly having consequences for the claims of 
the Parties’.
891
 When discussing the delimitation of the continental shelf, ‘the 
definition given in paragraph 1 [of Article 76 of UNCLOS] cannot be ignored’.
892
 
According to this provision, the entitlement criteria to the continental shelf beyond 
                                                          
884
 Black Sea Case (n 56) 103, para. 122; See also Bay of Bengal Case (n 4) 76, para. 240. 
885
 Bay of Bengal Case (n 4) 132, para. 455. 
886
 Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago (n 4) 837, para. 224. 
887
 Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation (n 158) 49. 
888
 Ibid 279. 
889
 See Bay of Bengal Case (n 4) 117, para. 397. 
890
 Gulf of Maine Case (n 172) 296, para. 103.  
891
 Tunisia/Libya Case (n 40) 48, para. 48. 
892




and within 200 nm differ. Distance is the entitlement criterion within 200 nm whilst 
geoscience is completely immaterial.
893
  
The ILA Committee has pointed out that ‘the fact that the basis for 
entitlement to continental shelf and its delimitation are linked suggests that the 
process of delimitation may be different’ within and beyond 200 nm.
894
 Moreover, 
‘[e]ntitlement to the EEZ and a continental shelf extending up to the 200 nautical 
mile limit is based on distance from the coast. This makes the distance criterion also 
an important consideration in the delimitation of these areas.’
895
 However, 
‘[d]istance does not play the same role in the establishment of entitlement over and 
the outer limit of the outer continental shelf. This may have an impact on the rules 
applicable to the delimitation of this part of the continental shelf.’
896
 In this context it 
must be noted that the ICJ ‘expressly held open ... the possibility that ... scientific 
natural prolongation arguments could be relevant for the delimitation of the outer 
continental shelf between neighboring States beyond the 200-nautical-mile zone’
897
 
in the Libya/Malta Case. 
In the Bay of Bengal Case, ITLOS faced this issue. When discussing 
entitlement beyond 200 nm, ITLOS addressed the question of whether it could ‘and 
should ... determine the entitlements of the Parties to the’ outer continental shelf.
898
  
The Tribunal noted that it is necessary ‘to make a distinction between the notion of 
entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and that of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf’.
899
 ITLOS emphasised that entitlement to the continental shelf does 
not depend on any procedural requirements and made reference to article 77(3).
900
  
Moreover, the Tribunal noted that ‘[a] coastal State’s entitlement to the continental 
shelf exists by the sole fact that the basis of entitlement, namely, sovereignty over the 
land territory, is present. It does not require the establishment of outer limits.’
901
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Consequently, ‘the fact that the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm 
have not been established does not imply that the Tribunal must refrain from 
determining the existence of entitlement to the continental shelf and delimiting the 
continental shelf between the parties concerned’.
902
  
ITLOS pointed out that ‘[a]s the question of the Parties’ entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm raises issues that are predominantly legal in nature, 
the Tribunal can and should determine entitlements of the Parties in this particular 
case’.
903
 Consequently, it rejected Myanmar’s claim that ‘the determination of the 
entitlements of both States to a continental shelf beyond 200 [nm] and their 
respective extent is a prerequisite for any delimitation’.
904
 In this context it must be 
mentioned, as discussed in the previous chapter, that later in the judgement the 
Tribunal stated that it ‘would have been hesitant to proceed with the delimitation of 
the area beyond 200 nm had it concluded that there was significant uncertainty as to 
the existence of a continental margin in the area in question’.
905
 The position taken in 
the previous chapter was that this statement emphasises the importance for States of 
providing sound scientific and technical evidence to support its arguments before the 
Tribunal rather than suggesting that States have to wait for recommendations from 
the CLCS, in such instances, before delimitating the area under consideration. 
5.4.1.2. Relevant Coastal Segments 
It is import to decide which coastal segments are to have their configuration taken 
into account for delimitation purposes. Weil noted that the selection of the relevant 
segments should be simple ‘[s]ince delimitation presupposes an overlapping of 
projections, the relevant segments for delimitation purposes are those whose 
projections intersect projections from the other coast. Coastal segments whose 
projections do not overlap have no effect upon delimitation.’
906
 In the Anglo-French 
Case the Tribunal stated that ‘the method of delimitation ... must be one that has 
relation to the coasts of the Parties actually abutting on the continental shelf of that 
region’.
907
 The ICJ provided in the Tunisia/Libya Case that:  
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[F]or the purpose of shelf delimitation between the Parties, it is not the whole of the coast of each 
Party which can be taken into account; the submarine extension of any part of the coast of one 
Party which, because of its geographic situation, cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of 




Moreover, the Chamber of the Court in the Gulf of Maine Case provided:  
The involvement of coasts other than those directly surrounding the Gulf does not and may not 
have the effect of extending the delimitation area to maritime areas which have in fact nothing to 
do with it. It is ultimately only the concept of the delimitation area which is a legal concept, albeit 




Similarly, ITLOS, in the Bay of Bengal Case, pointed out that ‘for a coast to be 
considered as relevant in maritime delimitation it must generate projections which 
overlap with those of the coast of another party’.
910
  
5.4.1.3. The First Step ― The Establishment of the Provisional Equidistance Line 
As stated above, the first step a court or tribunal takes in an EEZ/inner continental 
shelf delimitation is to ‘establish a provisional delimitation line, using methods that 
are geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area in 
which the delimitation is to take place’.
911
 The reason why the equidistance method 
is tried first is ‘not only because it is easy and objective and can be regarded, prima 
facie, as equitable because it divides the overlapping areas of the projections of the 
two coasts almost equally’.
912
 The main reason is ‘because it reflects the legal ideas 
at the root of the title of States to maritime areas and expresses the modern 
conception of maritime delimitation’.
913
 In the same line of reasoning the Tribunal, 
in the Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case, stated that ‘the need to avoid subjective 
determinations requires that the method used start with a measure of certainty that 
equidistance positively ensures, subject to its subsequent correction if justified’.
914
  
Nevertheless, one author has argued that a judicial body should not embrace 
the provisional equidistance line in outer continental shelf delimitations since the ICJ 
stated in the North Sea Case that the continental shelf may be deemed actually to be 
‘part of the territory over which the coastal State already has dominion’.
915
 This idea 
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must be discarded. It must be emphasised that the Court did not differentiate between 
an inner and outer continental shelf since no distinction between these areas existed 
in law at that time. If this opinion was correct, the jurisprudence of the ICJ should 
show some signs of the rejection of the use of the provisional equidistance line in 
continental shelf delimitations within 200 nm. The ICJ has, however, not rejected it; 
it instead embraces the provisional equidistance line as a central part of the 
delimitation process. 
As noted above the equidistance line is used as the provisional line unless 
there are compelling reasons that make the use of it unfeasible. In some instances, 
international courts and tribunals have deemed the use of the equidistance line to be 
inappropriate as the first step.
916
 In these instances international courts and tribunals 
have turned to the angle-bisector method which focuses on macro-geography instead 
of micro-geographic features, as does the equidistance method. The ICJ first used it 
in the Tunisia/Libya Case,
917
 then in the Gulf of Maine Case
918
 and most recently in 
the Nicaragua/Honduras Case.
919
 The arbitral tribunal in the Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau also used it.
920
 There is no 
reason to believe that this method cannot be employed by international courts and 
tribunals in outer continental shelf delimitations, although ITLOS rejected its 
applicability in the Bay of Bengal Case.
921
  
The bisector method consists of two steps. First, the Parties’ coasts facing the 
delimitation area are transformed into straight lines illustrating their general 
direction. Second, the angle created by these lines is bisected to yield the direction of 
the delimitation line. It must be emphasised that the drawing of an angle-bisector 
line, as the drawing of an equidistance line, is not necessarily the end of the process. 
If the angle-bisector method does not lead to an equitable solution it is subject to 
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 ITLOS has provided: ‘When the angle bisector method is applied, 
the terminus of the land boundary and the generalization of the direction of the 
respective coasts of the Parties from that terminus determine the angle and therefore 
the direction of the bisector.’
923
 The Tribunal also pointed out that ‘[d]ifferent 
hypotheses as to the general direction of the respective coasts of the Parties from the 
terminus of the land boundary will often produce different angles and bisectors’.
924
 
The ICJ has stated: 
The use of a bisector ... has proved to be a viable substitute method in certain circumstances where 
equidistance is not possible or appropriate. The justification for the application of the bisector 
method in maritime delimitation lies in the configuration of and relationship between the relevant 
coastal fronts and the maritime areas to be delimited. In instances where ... any base points that 
could be determined by the Court are inherently unstable, the bisector method may be seen as an 
approximation of the equidistance method. Like equidistance, the bisector method is a geometrical 
approach that can be used to give legal effect to the ‘criterion long held to be as equitable as it is 
simple, namely that in principle, while having regard to the special circumstances of the case, one 
should aim at an equal division of areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of the States 




Coming back to equidistance, Colson argued ‘that positing the equidistant line as a 
starting point in the analysis of a delimitation of the outer continental shelf is a useful 
tool’.
926
 Lilje-Jensen and Thamsborg stated similarly that ‘the principle of 
equidistance ... is supposed to play a prominent part in future bi- and multilateral 
delimitation of enclaves of outer shelf’.
927
 Because the entitlement to the outer 
continental shelf differs from the inner continental shelf, the question arises as to 
whether the location of the provisional equidistance line is affected by this fact.  
It will be discussed below, from where the provisional equidistance line can 
be drawn in an outer continental shelf delimitation. Three possibilities will be 
presented; namely the coastal opening, the 200 nm limit and the foot of the slope. It 
must be emphasised that the discussion below does not cover a situation in which 
there are compelling reasons that make the use of the provisional equidistance line 
unfeasible. 
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a) The Coastal Opening 
With regard to the EEZ/continental shelf it has been noted that ‘the coast of the 
territory of the State is the decisive factor for title to submarine areas adjacent to 
it’
928
 and consequently ‘[t]he coast of each of the Parties ... constitutes the starting 
line from which one has to set out in order to ascertain how far the submarine areas 
appertaining to each of them extend in a seaward direction,
 
as well as in relation to 
neighbouring States situated either in an adjacent or opposite position’.
929
 In other 
words, in EEZ/continental shelf delimitations coastal base points are used as the 
starting point of drawing the provisional equidistance line. 
A preliminary question in this context is whether the coastal opening serves the same 
purpose for the provisional equidistance line beyond 200 nm as within 200 nm in a 
maritime boundary delimitation case before an international court or tribunal. If it is 
kept in mind that the two methods defining the outer edge of the continental margin, 
provided by article 76(4)(a) of UNCLOS, have in common that the outer edge of the 
continental margin is found through measurements from the foot of the slope and not 
from the coastal opening, it could be argued that the equidistance line should be 
measured from the foot of the slope, as discussed below. Nonetheless, in the Bay of 
Bengal Case, ITLOS reached the conclusion that the same method applied within 
and beyond 200 nm;
930
 in other words the provisional equidistance line is to be 
drawn from the coastal base points within and beyond 200 nm. The reason for this is 
because the question of entitlement should, according to ITLOS, ‘be distinguished 
from the question of the object and extent of those rights, be it the nature of the areas 
to which those rights apply or the maximum seaward limits specified in articles 57 
and 76 of the Convention.’
931
 
One might use as a supporting argument for the supremacy of the coastal 
opening ‒ as the starting point for drawing the provisional equidistance line ‒ that the 
constraining limits of article 76(5) of UNCLOS, on the maximum extent of the 
continental shelf, are measured from the territorial sea baselines. This argument must 
be rejected. These constraining limits do not create any rights. Their purpose is to 
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limit the maximum area that can be claimed by a coastal State on the basis of the 
formulae of article 76(4); they have nothing to do with entitlement. 
b) The 200 nm Limit 
Lilje-Jensen and Thamsbourg introduced the idea of using the 200 nm limit as the 
‘coastal opening’ for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Their idea is influenced 
by the fact that ‘natural prolongation over the years has lost its power as governing 
principle of entitlement to shelf areas within 200 nm ... in favour of distance as 
determined on the basis of the coastal opening’.
932
 It is also influenced by the alleged 
analogy that can be made between the 200 nm opening and the coastal opening, 
especially in cases where the continental shelf has been delimited up to 200 nm.
933
 
They predicted correctly that ‘there is every reason to believe that a considerable 
number of States disregarding until further potential areas of outer shelf in front of 
their coasts, will already have delimited their shelf areas vis-à-vis the neighbours at 
the time when the future Commission is established and properly functioning’.
934
 
However, they argued that ‘[c]hoosing this approach the States concerned give 
indirect support to a two-stage solution of delimitation. At the same time they give 
preference to the idea of considering the outer shelf as a surplus of shelf calling for 
separate legal treatment.’
935
 Moreover, they stated that:  
The fact that a given enclave of outer shelf is considered a featureless space being claimed by 
those States which have a 200 nm opening, long or short, to that enclave, suggests that the length 
of the opening should be given status of basic parameter (equitable principles) as to the allocation 




Lilje-Jensen and Thamsburg’s idea is not rooted in the theory of maritime boundary 
delimitation since it is the natural prolongation from a coastal State’s land mass ‒ not 
the natural prolongation from the 200 nm limit ‒ which is the basis for entitlement to 
the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. On the other hand, it must be noted that the 
natural prolongation of the continental shelf is only of relevance where the shelf does 
not extend beyond 200 nm.  
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c) The Foot of the Slope 
As mentioned in chapter two, the CLCS views the foot of the slope as ‘an essential 
feature that serves as the basis for entitlement to the extended continental shelf and 
the delineation of its outer limits’ and that ‘[a]ccording to paragraph 4 (a) (i) and (ii) 
[of article 76 of UNCLOS], it is the reference baseline from which the breadths of 
the limits specified by formulae rules are measured’.
937
 Some authors have argued 
that the base of the slope, or the foot of the slope, is also an essential feature for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The main argument used to 
support this view is that it is the foot of the slope ‒ not the territorial sea baselines ‒ 
which is the main factor with regard to entitlement in the process that leads to the 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  
As stated above, it is clear in continental shelf delimitations within 200 nm 
that ‘the coast of the territory of the State is the decisive factor for title to submarine 
areas adjacent to it’
938
 and therefore ‘the coast of each of the Parties ... constitutes the 
starting line from which one has to set out in order to ascertain how far the 
submarine areas appertaining to each of them extend in a seaward direction,
 
as well 
as in relation to neighbouring States situated either in an adjacent or opposite 
position’.
939
 By analogy, it can be argued that ‘the foot of the continental slope is the 
“decisive factor for title” to the outer continental shelf and consequently the foot of 
the slope “constitutes the starting line from which one has to set out in order to 
ascertain” the extent of the natural prolongation of the territory of one State’.
940
 As a 
result, it could be expected that a provisional equidistance line, in outer continental 
shelf delimitation, reflects the accurate portion of each title to the area subject to 




The first to come up with the idea was Hollis Hedberg. In 1979 he wrote an 
article in Science where he discussed his Base-Slope-Boundary-Zone Formula, 
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[T]he base of the slope (continental or insular) was not only the most prominent geomorphic 
marker worldwide on the ocean floor, but also that, as the outer edge of the continent or island, it 
was the most natural and appropriate line of division between the jurisdictional authority of the 





According to Hedberg, ‘[t]he general guide to the location of national-international 
boundaries on the ocean floor should be the base of the continental (or insular) slope’ 
because it ‘forms the most distinctive and extensive natural division between areas of 




Hedberg was of the opinion that what he called ‘restricted seas’ ‒ which are 
areas where there exist overlapping claims to the continental shelf ‒ should be treated 
in a special manner. Hedberg advocated:  
In restricted seas [small enclosed or semienclosed seas, as contrasted with the major oceans ...], 
areas seaward of the base-of-slope should be divided in their entirety between the bordering 
countries on an equitable – usually median line – basis ... Examples are the Caspian Sea, Black 
Sea, Caribbean Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Labrador Sea, Bay of Bengal, Gulf of Mexico, Sea of 
Okhotsk, Bering Sea, and the Barents Sea. The purpose of the special treatment for small restricted 
seas is principally the practical one of avoiding the complication of having small ‘nuisance’ areas 
of international jurisdiction within them. Restricted seas would be officially designated as such 




His argument with regard to the Gulf of Mexico did not prevail in US political 
circles. Colson has pointed out that ‘[o]ne reason [for this] was that he believed the 
same formula could be used to divide the 200-nautical-mile zone. Another reason 
was that he did not appreciate the need for consistency in boundary practice between 
the United States and Mexico.’
946
 Moreover, Colson asks: 
[W]as he so wrong to suggest that at least in some cases a median line between two lines marking 
the foot of the two continental slopes might be a more equitable solution than a median line 
between two coasts? The fact that the United States and Mexico agreed to apply the traditional 
equidistance method using coastal base points to delimit the Gulf of Mexico, including the western 
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Other authors have followed the footsteps of Hedberg and discussed the use of the 
foot of the slope for delimitation purposes. The shift from the base of the slope to the 
foot of the slope probably reflects the final outcome of article 76 of UNCLOS in 
1982. The 2002 ILA Report suggested that the Committee tried to answer the 
following question in its future work:  
Does the foot of the continental slope provide an alternative baseline to establish an equidistance 
line. The reason for suggesting this option is that under article 76 of the LOS Convention the outer 
limit of the outer continental shelf is not linked directly to the baseline of the territorial sea, as is 
the case for the territorial sea and 200 nautical mile zones, but depends on the location of the foot 




The Committee, however, neither answered the question nor did come up with any 
other criterion for the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in its 
subsequent reports. Based on Hedberg’s theories, Colson stated in 2003 that the 
‘notion of an equidistant line based on the respective foot of each continental slope is 
not so far-fetched’.
949
 In 2010, Kunoy stated the following: 
[I]nstead of drawing a provisional equidistance line, which has the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured as its point of departure, after which it may be altered in 
the presence of special circumstances, a provisional equidistance line in outer continental shelf 
delimitations could be expected to reflect the accurate portion of each title to the area subject to 
dispute. By way of analogy it would seem fair to infer that the drawing of such a provisional line 




In this context, it must be kept in mind that the foot of the slope points can be 
decided by two methods, as discussed in chapter two. According to the general rule, 
the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change 
in the gradient at its base. The other method uses evidence to the contrary of the 
general rule. Theoretically speaking, it should not matter, for the selection of the 
provisional equidistance line, whether the foot of the slope points are decided on the 
basis of the general rule or by evidence to the contrary of the general rule. Practically 
speaking, if the CLCS has not confirmed (or rejected) the foot of the slope points 
which are based on evidence to the contrary to the general rule,
951
 it can be expected 
that it could create more problems for an international court or tribunal to decide if it 
is justifiable to use the evidence to the contrary criterion.  
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The suggestion could be made that the determination of the foot of the slope 
points for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the continental shelf should be 
governed by the same rules as the selection of the base points used for the same 
purpose in delimitations within 200 nm. That is, ‘the Court should not base itself 
solely on the choice of base points made by one of the parties’.
952
 This should apply 
equally to the foot of the slope points decided according to the general rule or the 
evidence to the contrary. 
The question can be asked as to whether it is possible for a coastal State in an 
outer continental shelf delimitation to use foot of the slope points of a third party to 
support its claim to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The answer to that question 
is not clear. Some guidance can be found in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. The Court 
stated in the Libya/Malta Case that ‘[t]he capacity to engender continental shelf 
rights derives not from the landmass, but from sovereignty over the landmass’.
953
 It 
can be asked how a feature ‒ in this case the foot of the slope of a third State ‒ over 
which a coastal State does not have sovereignty, can create title for the same State 
and be used in a delimitation. It seems far-fetched to answer the question in a 
positive manner. It must however be noted that it is possible that a submarine feature 
of a third State could be regarded as a relevant circumstance in outer continental 
shelf delimitations.   
Although the usage of the foot of the slope as the starting point for drawing 
the provisional equidistance line in maritime boundary delimitations beyond 200 nm 
has a certain theoretical charm some significant problems arise from its usage. Its use  
could possibly have the effect of increasing the risk for conflict between decisions of 
courts and tribunals and the recommendations of the CLCS, given that they would 
both have to decide on the foot of the slope. Moreover, it is not clear where along the 
foot of the slope the starting point of the equidistance line should be located. It is also 
unclear, where the foot of the slope is seaward of the terminus of the boundary 
within 200 nm between adjacent states, what principles govern the boundary between 
such terminus and the foot of the slope. It could be suggested that the line within 200 
nm should continue beyond 200 nm until it reaches the foot of the slope. This 
suggestion has however no connection with the roots of entitlement. Another issue 
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which is unclear is what the relationship is between the boundary within and beyond 
200 nm where the foot of the slope is within 200 miles of the baselines? Although 
the answer is not crystal clear the only sensible way is to let the location of the foot 
of the slope have no impact until beyond 200 nm. Furthermore it must be noted that 
it is possible to read the judgement in the Bay of Bengal Case as rejecting the option 
of drawing the provisional equidistance line from the foot of the slope:  
[T]he equidistance/relevant circumstances method continues to apply for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This method is rooted in the recognition that sovereignty over 
the land territory is the basis for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State with 
respect to both the [EEZ] and the continental shelf. This should be distinguished from the question 
of the object and extent of those rights, be it the nature of the areas to which those rights apply or 




In defence of drawing the provisional equidistance line from the foot of the slope it 
must be noted that no state has asked an international court or tribunal to draw a 
provisional equidistance line from the foot of the slope. Consequently, no court or 
tribunal has had the opportunity to deal directly with the issue. On the other hand, the 
complexities and problems that follow the application of this method will probably 
have the effect that states will be reluctant to ask a court or tribunal to use the foot of 
the slope as the reference baseline.  
5.4.1.4. The Second Step ― Relevant Circumstances 
As noted above, at the second stage of the delimitation exercise international courts 
and tribunals have to ‘consider whether there are factors calling for the adjustment or 
shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result’.
955
 
They will ‘have to determine “the relative weight to be accorded to different 
considerations” in each case’.
956
 The function of these considerations ‘is to verify 
that the provisional equidistance line ... is not, in light of the particular circumstances 
of the case, perceived as inequitable. If such would be the case, the Court should 
adjust the line in order to achieve the “equitable solution”’.
957
 In other words, 
considerations of equity come to play in this step of the delimitation process. In the 
North Sea Case the Court provided that:  
In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the 
purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the 
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balancing-up of all such considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to 
the exclusion of all others. The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different 




Since the North Sea Case, international courts and tribunals have considered a 
variety of factors of which account should be taken, including coastal geography; 
seabed geology and geomorphology; seabed resources; living resources and ecology; 
considerations regarding security, navigation and jurisdiction; economic factors; and 
the practice of the parties. As stated above, ‘geographical considerations, with 
particular reference to the length and the configuration of the respective coastlines 
and their characterization as being opposite, adjacent or in some other 
relationship’
959
 have been the primary (almost the only) circumstances that courts 
and tribunals have deemed relevant enough to justify the relocation of the provisional 
equidistance line in delimitations within 200 nm. The reason for this lies in the strong 
relationship between entitlement and delimitation. Because it is the coastal opening 
that creates the entitlement for a coastal State within 200 nm, ‘[t]he delimitation line 
to be drawn in a given area will depend upon the coastal configuration’.
960
 It must be 
emphasised that ‘in some cases it appears necessary to both the courts and 
governments to ignore or to attenuate the effect of certain geographical features in 
order to ensure an equitable result which in their view, if these realities were fully 
taken into account would not be achieved’.
961
 Or, as provided in the North Sea Case:  
[I]n certain geographical circumstances which are quite frequently met with, the equidistance 
method, despite its known advantages, leads unquestionably to inequity, in the following sense: 
(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the equidistance line as 
regards the consequences for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the 
case of concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is employed, then the greater 
the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area to be delimited, the more unreasonable 
are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical 





The primary examples of features that can possibly create inequalities are islands.
963
 
Consequently, some islands are ignored in maritime boundary delimitations; others, 
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meanwhile, are given full or partial effect depending on the circumstances in each 
case.
964
 For instance, in the Libya/Malta Case the ICJ decided that the uninhabited 
Maltese island Filfa should be disregarded altogether,
965
 and in the Tunisia/Libya 
Case it gave only half-effect to the Kerkennah Islands although the main island is 69 
square miles in area and has a population of 15,000 inhabitants.
966
 In outer 
continental shelf delimitations, islands can have an especially distorting effect. In the 
Bay of Bengal Case, ITLOS rejected Bangladesh’s claim to give effect to St. Martin 
in the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf. When doing so ITLOS 
stated:  ‘The distorting effect of an island on an equidistance line may increase 
substantially as the line moves beyond 12 nm from the coast.’
967
 
Since the entitlement to the outer continental shelf is based on natural 
prolongation considerations, it has been argued that geology and geomorphology 
should be of importance for outer continental shelf delimitations. In 1993, Keith 
Highet predicted that in outer continental shelf delimitations ‘it is clear that 
geological and geomorphological factors will not merely be important; they will be 
of the essence’.
968
 Colson predicted in 2003 that ‘geological and geomorphological 
factors will reemerge in the law of maritime delimitation of the outer continental 
shelf ... Presumably, they will work together with the other facts in the case, perhaps 
prominently or perhaps not, depending on the circumstances, to achieve an equitable 
solution.’
969
Anderson stated in 2005 that ‘[g]eophysical and geomorphologic criteria 
retain their relevance beyond 200 n.m. as regards both entitlement to outer 
continental shelf and delimitation of boundaries with neighbors’.
970
  
Although geoscientific factors may be of relevance beyond 200 nm it must be 
emphasised that there is no reason to believe that the majority of the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals about the continental shelf within 200 nm is not 
directly applicable to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This includes 
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 non-refashioning of nature
972
 and the 








The case law of international courts and tribunals between 1969 and 1985 ‒ 
the period when the general rules of delimitation were developed and when natural 
prolongation had not been rejected as a possible factor in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf within 200 nm ‒ will be analysed below;
976
 as also will the Bay of 
Bengal Case from 2012. The aim of this exercise is to identify circumstances that 
could be considered relevant for outer continental shelf delimitations. Furthermore, 




a) The 1969 North Sea Case  
In the first continental shelf case to come before the ICJ, the Court introduced two 
ideas which had great impact on subsequent litigation. These ideas are ‘naturalness’, 
that is the idea ‘that the parties must seek to demonstrate that the area subject to 
overlapping or “competing” claims was “the more natural” extension of its landmass, 
rather than of the landmass of the other state’;
978
 and the impact that the interruption 
of troughs has on the natural prolongation of a coastal States continental shelf. The 
former idea is based on the following statement by the Court:  
[W]henever a given submarine area does not constitute a natural -or the most natural- extension of 
the land territory of a coastal State, even though that area may be closer to it than it is to the 
territory of any other State, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State;- or at least it cannot 
be so regarded in the face of a competing claim by a State of whose land territory the submarine 
area concerned is to be regarded as a natural extension, even if it is less close to it.
979
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One of the consequences of the naturalness criterion was that over the next 15 years 
parties litigating before international courts and tribunals tried to ‘demonstrate that 
the area subject to overlapping or ‘competing’ claims was ‘the more natural’ 
extension of its landmass, rather than of the landmass of the other state’.
980
 A few 
decades later, these considerations were picked up by Bangladesh in the Bay of 
Bengal Case, as will be discussed below. 
In another section of the North Sea Case a reference is made to the 
Norwegian Trough, which is ‘a belt of water 200-650 metres deep, fringing the 
southern and south-western coasts of Norway to a width averaging about 80-100 
kilometres’.
981
 This feature was ignored in a delimitation agreement between the UK 
and Norway. Instead equidistance principles were used although ‘the shelf areas in 
the North Sea separated from the Norwegian Coast by the 80-100 kilometres of the 
Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be adjacent to it, nor to be its natural 
prolongation’.
982
 The reason for the judgement to mentioning this was to ‘illustrate 
that states could choose, in delimiting their shelves, whether or not to take into 
account elements relating to natural prolongation’.
983
 This reference ‘paved the way 
for the passionate searches for troughs and faults and rift zones ... because of the 
implications of the idea that the Court expressed – the suggestion that such a feature 
could, one way or another, have been used as a boundary’.
984
 
b) The 1977 Anglo-French Case 
In the first litigated maritime boundary delimitation after the North Sea Case, the 
argument was made by the UK that there existed in the English Channel a trough or 
trench called the ‘Hurd Deep’ and the ‘Hurd Deep Fault Zone’ along the axis of 
which the Tribunal was asked to find a boundary as an alternative to the equidistant 
line.
985
 The Tribunal answered the argument in the following manner:  
The geological faults which constitute the Hurd Deep and the so-called Hurd Deep Fault Zone, 
even if they be considered as distinct features in the geomorphology of the shelf, are still 
discontinuities in the seabed and subsoil which do not disrupt the essential unity of the continental 
shelf either in the Channel or the Atlantic region. Indeed, in comparison with the deep Norwegian 
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Trough in the North Sea, they can only be regarded as minor faults in the geological structure of 
the shelf ... Moreover, to attach critical significance to a physical feature like the Hurd Deep-Hurd 
Deep Fault Zone in delimiting the continental shelf boundary in the present case would run counter 




The above quoted text shows the impact of the reference to the Norwegian Trough in 
the North Sea Case. The Anglo-French Case was the first case in which a 
comparison between a trough, mentioned in a previous judgement of a court or 
tribunal, was an issue. Such comparison is seen in subsequent delimitations until 
1985. Although geological or geomorphological factors were not used by the tribunal 
in the Anglo-French Case it did not reject them as a factor and kept open the 
possibility that such features could validly be used in more pronounced 
circumstances. 
c) The 1982 Tunisia/Libya Case 
In the Tunisia/Libya Case, the Parties used arguments based on geology, 
geomorphology and bathymetry to show that the disputed area was more naturally 
the prolongation of its landmass. Tunisia grounded its argument on bathymetry 
whilst the Libyan arguments were grounded on geology. Tunisia tried to show ‘the 
steady “reflection” of the Tunisian coastline in the bathymetric patterns in order to 
demonstrate the “naturalness” of the asserted Tunisian prolongation eastward, rather 
than the “unnaturalness” of the asserted Libyan prolongation northward’.
987
 Libya, 
on the other hand, ‘asserted that the sub-marine areas in question were more 
naturally akin, geologically, to the southward-lying Libyan coast than they were to 
the westward-lying Tunisian coast’.
988
 The Court treated these arguments as of 
possible relevance to the delimitation. It was, however, unable to view them as 
decisive in the particular factual circumstances given the characteristics of the 
specific submarine features relied on by the parties. The Court held:  
Those [features] relied on by Libya in support of its principal contention as to the geologically 
determined ‘northward thrust’ do not seem to the Court to add sufficient weight to that contention 
to cause it to prevail over the rival geological contentions of Tunisia; nor do they amount 
independently to a means of identifying distinct natural prolongations, which would in fact be 
contrary to Libya’s assertion of the unity of the Pelagian Block. As for the features relied on by 
Tunisia, the Court, while not accepting that the relative size and importance of these features can 
be reduced to such insubstantial proportions as counsel for Libya suggest, is unable to find that any 
of them involve such a marked disruption or discontinuance of the sea-bed as to constitute an 
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The conclusion that the physical structure of the sea-bed of the Pelagian Block as the natural 
prolongation common to both Parties does not contain any element which interrupts the continuity 
of the continental shelf does not necessarily exclude the possibility that certain geomorphological 
configurations of the sea-bed, which do not amount to such an interruption of the natural 
prolongation of one Party with regard to that of the other, may be taken into account for the 
delimitation, as relevant circumstances characterizing the area ... In such a situation, however, the 
physical factor constituting the natural prolongation is not taken as a legal title, but as one of 




The above quoted text seems to indicate that the geological and geomorphological 
factors relevant for delimitation must be of certain undefined minimum size. It also 
shows how the Court makes a clear difference between factors that are great enough 
to have impact on title and lesser factors which should be seen as relevant 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it did not place any weight on such factors.   
d) The 1984 Gulf of Maine Case 
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the US to a limited extent grounded its arguments on a 
geological/geomorphological natural boundary argument
991
 ‒ without success. The 
arguments were based on the separation between Brown Bank and Georges Bank by 
the Northeast Channel, which is in some places more than 200 metres deep, and was 
said to represent an equitable reflection of geographic reality confirmed by 
geological elements. When dismissing the geoscientific component of the case, the 
Chamber provided that: 
[W]ithin this single, uniform expanse of sea-bed it is possible to pick out features described as 
shelves, banks, basins, channels, and the Parties have given a detailed description of these, 
occasionally – and very cautiously – seeking in the existence of one or other of these 
geomorphological features some support for their respective positions. These are ultimately a 




Even the most accentuated of these features, namely the Northeast Channel, does not have the 
characteristics of a real trough marking the dividing-line between two geomorphologically distinct 
units. It is quite simply a natural feature of the area. It might also be recalled that the presence of 
much more conspicuous accidents, such as the Hurd deep and Hurd Deep Fault Zone in the 
continental shelf which was the subject of the Anglo-French arbitration, did not prevent the Court 
of Arbitration from concluding that those faults did not interrupt the geological continuity of that 
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This case supported previous jurisprudence of the Court which held that geological 
and geomorphological factors have to be of a certain undefined minimum size. It is 
also an example where the sizes of troughs, which have been at issue in previous 
disputes, are compared. As in previous cases before the Court, these features were 
not deemed to be important enough to be seen as a relevant factor.  
e) The 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case 
In the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case, the importance of natural prolongation for 
continental shelf delimitation was at issue. Guinea-Bissau argued that there was a 
separation of natural prolongation between the States. The physical characteristics 
invoked by Guinea-Bissau were not, however, deemed by the Tribunal ‘to be 
sufficiently important to be taken as constituting a separation of the natural 
prolongations of the two States concerned’.
994
 One reason for this conclusion was a 
lack of evidence.
995
 These characteristics consisted of ‘a series of underwater 
troughs, oriented in a north-east/south-west direction, 3 to 10 kilometers wide but 
never more than a few meters deeper than the shelf’
996
 and the more pronounced 
underwater troughs of Konkoure and Soumbouya. Consequently, the continental 
shelf opposite the two States was considered to be one and the same.
997
 The Tribunal 
importantly held that ‘the Rule of natural prolongation can be effectively invoked for 
purposes of delimitation only where there is a separation of continental shelves’.
998
 It 
elaborated upon this statement and noted: 
The characteristics of a continental shelf may serve to demonstrate the existence of a break in the 
continuity of the shelf or in the prolongation of territories of the States which are parties to a 
delimitation. However, if the continental shelf is assumed to be continuous, in the present state of 
international law no characteristic could validly be invoked to support an argument based on the 





This case emphasised the significance of natural prolongation for the delimitation of 
the continental shelf and the importance of clear evidence ‒ for a significant 
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separation of the continental shelf ‒ to prove that it is not the natural prolongation of 
a coastal State.  
f) The 1985 Libya/Malta Case 
The main seabed feature addressed in this case was called the ‘Rift Zone’. 
[The Rift Zone] lies broadly to the south and south-west of the Maltese islands, and much closer to 
them than to the coasts of Libya. In this area is a series of deep troughs, running in a generally 
northwest-southeast direction, and reaching over 1,000 metres in depth, described on the 
International Bathymetric Chart of the Mediterranean as the ‘Malta Trough’, the ‘Pantelleria 
Trough’ and the ‘Linosa Trough’. To the east of these troughs, and running in broadly the same 
direction, are two channels of lesser depth designated the ‘Malta Channel’ and the ‘Medina 




Libya held, whilst Malta rejected, that:  
[T]he rift zone indicate[s] the boundary zone between Libya’s entitlement to areas of continental 
shelf to the north of the Libyan landmass and Malta’s entitlement to areas of continental shelf to 
the south of the Maltese islands, either as constituting geologically a boundary between two 





As noted in chapter two, the Court rejected arguments based on geology and 
geomorphology, mainly because of the development in international law, with the 
introduction of UNCLOS, that distance is the entitlement criterion and ‘geological or 
geomorphological characteristics ... are completely immaterial’.
1002
 Since 1985, the 
impact of geology and geomorphology has in the case law of maritime delimitations 
within 200 nm been a non-issue. That is until 2011 when the Bay of Bengal Case 
litigation took place.  
g) The 2012 Bangladesh/Myanmar Case 
In the Bay of Bengal Case, Bangladesh claimed that the relevant circumstances 
beyond 200 nm ‘include the geology and geomorphology of the seabed and subsoil, 
because entitlement beyond 200 nm depends entirely on natural prolongation while 
within 200 nm it is based on distance from the coast’.
1003
 It noted that ‘its entitlement 
to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm “rests firmly” on the geological and 
geomorphological continuity between its land territory and the entire seabed of the 
Bay of Bengal’.
1004
 Bangladesh claimed that Myanmar ‘at best enjoys only 
geomorphological continuity between its own landmass and the outer continental 
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 Consequently, Bangladesh argued that ‘an equitable delimitation 
consistent with article 83 must necessarily take full account of the fact that 
Bangladesh has the most natural prolongation into the Bay of Bengal, and that 
Myanmar has little or no natural prolongation beyond 200 nm’.
1006
 Myanmar, on the 
other hand, claimed that there were no relevant circumstances for the outer 
continental shelf to be taken into account.
1007
 
The Tribunal held ‘that “the most natural prolongation” argument made by 
Bangladesh’ had no relevance for the case since it had ‘already determined that 
natural prolongation is not an independent basis for entitlement and should be 
interpreted in the context of the subsequent provisions of article 76’,
1008
 especially 
para. 4 which mainly contains references to geomorphology, not geology. It had 
already held that both parties were entitled to the outer continental shelf and 
consequently it could not ‘accept the argument of Bangladesh that, were the Tribunal 
to decide that Myanmar is entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm, Bangladesh 




The conclusion of the Tribunal seems to bring an end to the quest for 
naturalness in maritime boundary jurisprudence. Moreover, it rejects geology as a 
relevant circumstance for the delimitation of the outer continental shelf; in other 
words, geology is completely immaterial beyond 200 nm. This conclusion makes 
perfect sense if one accepts that natural prolongation is not an independent concept. 
It must be emphasised that ITLOS did not reject the possible importance of the 
location and size of troughs or other geomorphological features, since they were not 
an issue in the case.  Consequently, geomorphological factors have not been decided 
completely immaterial, as a possible relevant circumstance, for outer continental 
shelf delimitations.  
h) Other Considerations for Outer Continental Shelf Delimitations 
In the ILA Committee’s 2002 Report the following question is addressed: 
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Can all situations involving the delimitation of the outer continental shelf be treated similarly or is 
it necessary to distinguish between different situations, depending on the location of the outer limit 
line. For instance, there may be a difference between a situation in which both states have a 
continental shelf up to a distance of 350 nautical miles and a situation in which a continental shelf 





As mentioned in chapter two, there may in some areas be a choice between different 
outer limit lines applying article 76(4-5) of UNCLOS. Only the coastal State has 
competence to make such a choice. Since there is no hierarchy involved in the 
selection of the formulae and constraining lines, so long as the relevant seabed fulfils 
the criteria laid down in article 76, and there is no difference with regard to 
entitlement between them, it must be questionable if the use of different formulae in 
an area with overlapping claims can be seen as a relevant circumstance.  
It has however been suggested that a continental shelf claim constrained by 
the limitations of article 76(5) is a stronger claim than one constrained by article 
76(6), especially a claim grounded on the Irish formula. The main difference 
between such claims is that the former involves seafloor features that are natural 
components while the latter involves ‘seafloor features that are not natural 
components but nevertheless an integral part of the continental margin’.
1011
  
To the extent that an overlapping area between two opposite coastal States exist in which coastal 
State A fulfils the test of appurtenance by virtue of national component while opposite coastal 
State B fulfils the same only on the basis of an integral part of the continental margin, the former 
would arguably be stronger than the second with regards to the sovereign rights to the disputed 
area. A natural component of the continental margin being susceptible to generate sovereign rights 
to the continental shelf far beyond 350 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured is undeniably a stronger title to the disputed area than the title whose 
extension terminates at 350 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. It is likely that, to the extent of the two coastal States would have overlapping claims, 




Since ITLOS, in the Bay of Bengal Case, underlined that the natural prolongation 
concept should be interpreted in the light of article 76(4), it could be argued that the 
thickness of sedimentary rocks should be seen as a relevant circumstance when the 
Irish formula is applied by both parties to a delimitation. Following this line of 
reasoning, an international court or tribunal should compare the thickness of the 
sedimentary rocks of the parties to the delimitation and decide that the party with 
thicker sedimentary rocks has a stronger claim to the outer continental shelf. 
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Consequently, it should be seen as more entitled to the disputed area and be given a 
larger slice thereof.   
China has used the origins of sediments covering the continental shelf to 
support its claims ‘to the continental shelf out to silt line in the Yellow Sea. This line 
indicates the limit of sediment brought to the sea by Chinese rivers of which the 
Huang Ho (Yellow River) is best known and carries the largest load of sediment.’
1013
 
Moreover, some of the 1986 negotiated maritime boundary between Burma 
(Myanmar) and India in the Andaman Sea, Coco Channel and Bay of Bengal draws a 
line that is supposed to reflect arguments concerning the deposit of sediments by the 
Irrawaddy River from Myanmar.
1014
 In the Bay of Bengal Case the question arose as 
to the relevance of the origin of sediments. ITLOS rejected Bangladesh assertions 
that the origin of sedimentary rocks had any significance for ‘the interpretation and 
application of article 76 of the Convention’.
1015
 It noted that ‘article 76 of the 
Convention does not support the view that the geographic origin of the sedimentary 
rocks of the continental margin is of relevance to the question of entitlement to the 
continental shelf or constitutes a controlling criterion for determining whether a State 
is entitled to a continental shelf’.
1016
 If the origin of sediments criterion were to have 
been accepted, it could justify absurd claims, such as that a landlocked State which a 
river passes through, that finally ends in the ocean, should be granted a part of the 
outer continental shelf because sediments originate in that State.  
i) Previously Decided Boundary Agreements Within 200 nm 
It may be asked whether any consequences follow from a previous delimitation of an 
inner continental shelf with (most likely) an adjacent State before the continental 
shelf beyond the 200 nm limit is delimited and, if so, what is its effect. It has been 
noted that ‘it is obvious that the 200 nm point of the inner shelf boundary must 
coincide with the point of departure of the corresponding outer shelf boundary 
between the States two by two’.
1017
 However, ‘[t]he direction of the line in the 
transition point between the inner and outer shelf … needs not necessarily be the 
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 One of the consequences of a previous delimitation within 200 nm for a 
delimitation beyond 200 nm could be less flexibility compared to a delimitation of 
the continental shelf as a whole. A previously decided boundary within the 200 nm 
limit can, on the other hand, also ease the delimitation that is left, whereas there is 
less to decide upon in such a case.  
j) Relevant Circumstances for a Provisional Equidistance Line Drawn from the 
Foot of the Slope 
If for some reasons an international court or tribunal accepts to draw the provisional 
equidistance line from the foot of the slope, the question arises as to whether there 
are any specific relevant circumstances that could possibly affect the drawing of the 
line other than those already discussed.  
As mentioned above, some islands are discounted in maritime delimitations, 
whilst others are given full or partial effect depending on the circumstances in each 
case, for the reason that they can create inequalities. It could be argued that foot of 
the slope points creating inequalities should be treated in the same way and should be 
given no effect or partial effect. However, a major difference exists between islands 
and the foot of the slope points. The foot of the slope forms an integral part of the 
natural prolongation of the landmass. In this context it serves the same purpose as the 
coastal front. Islands are, on the other hand, usually separated from the mainland 
(except in the case of sovereign island States) and can therefore generally be seen as 
less important features than the coastal front of the mainland. Consequently, one 
might argue that there is no analogy between ignoring or reducing the effect of a foot 
of the slope point, on the other hand, and ignoring or reducing the effect of an island, 
on the other. One might even argue that ignoring or reducing such an important 
submarine feature would constitute the refashioning of nature and should therefore 
be rejected as a possibility in outer continental shelf delimitations. 
5.4.1.5. The Principle of Non-Encroachment 
A related consideration to relevant circumstances is the problem of encroachment 
which was the core issue in both the North Sea Case and the Bay of Bengal Case. 
The problem was explained in the following manner in the North Sea Case: 
[I]n the present case there are three States whose North Sea coastlines are in fact comparable in 
length and which, therefore, have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the 






configuration of one of the coastlines would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one of 
these States treatment equal or comparable to that given the other two ... What is unacceptable in 
this instance is that a State should enjoy continental shelf rights considerably different from those 
of its neighbours merely because in the one case the coastline is roughly convex in form and in the 




Colson pointed out in 2003 that the principle of non-encroachment will ‘probably 
remain a key feature of outer continental shelf cases’.
1020
 He addressed the problem 
in the following way: 
The principle of non-encroachment concerns how close the boundary line lies to each neighboring 
coast, and whether in the circumstances of the case, that seems to be an equitable result. It has both 
a positive and a negative aspect. Each state is entitled to the projection of its coastal front, but the 
boundary must not ‘cut off’ the projection of the neighbor’s coastal front. Accordingly, the 
principle of nonencroachment works hand in hand with special circumstances. It is really the 
nonencroachment perspective that comes into play in deciding that an equidistantant line will cut 
off the extension of the coastal front of the neighboring country. Identifying the special 
circumstances that causes the equidistant line to do that, and adjusting for it, leads to a satisfactory 





The problem of encroachment is of special relevance for adjacent States as the two 
aforementioned cases demonstrated. Legault and Hankey described this problem: 
[T]he effect on an equidistance line of a protrusion or convexity on the coast of one of the parties, 
or a concavity on the coast of another, is progressively magnified as the boundary extends 
seaward. A relatively minor feature on the coast of one of the parties, particularly when situated in 
the vicinity of the land boundary terminus, thus has a disproportionate effect on the delimitation. 
This phenomenon causes the equidistant line to swing out across the coast of one of the parties to 
the delimitation cutting off that state from the continental shelf lying in front of its coasts. This 
cut-off effect has been recognized in the jurisprudence of the ICJ and other tribunals as creative of 
inequity. In situations involving three or more states, the convergence of equidistant lines in front 
of a state abutting a concave portion of the coast between two states with convex coastlines can 
result in the middle state being ‘shelf locked’ or ‘zone locked’; its maritime zone will be prevented 
from reaching the full extent of its seaward limit by the lateral converging equidistant boundaries 




If a State is prevented from reaching the full extent of its seaward limit it is likely 
that the inner continental shelf will not reach the 200 nm limit. If the continental 
shelf of a State is cut off before it reaches the 200 nm limit, it does not have any right 
to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Charney argued that decisions of 
international courts and tribunals have sought to ‘delimit maritime boundaries so that 
all disputants are allotted some access to areas approaching the maximum distance 
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from the coast permitted for each zone’.
1023
 For instance, in the St. Pierre and 
Miquelon Case the tribunal awarded France a narrow corridor which it constructed 
seaward from the coastline to the 200 nm limit. This is what Charney called ‘the idea 
of maximum reach’. He noted that ‘the interest to be served by the idea of maximum 
reach are not clear’ and that ‘recent cases do not even acknowledge this 
consideration, much less its core values’.
1024
 However, if Charney is correct, his 
ideas can have a considerable effect on outer continental shelf boundary 
delimitations, especially in areas where the inner continental shelf has not already 
been delimited such as in the Bay of Bengal Case, in which ITLOS noted:  
[I]n the delimitation of the [EEZ] and the continental shelf, concavity per se is not necessarily a 
relevant circumstance. However, when an equidistance line drawn between two States produces a 
cut-off effect on the maritime entitlement of one of those States, as a result of the concavity of the 




In this case, ITLOS found ‘that the concavity of the coast of Bangladesh is a relevant 
circumstance in the present case, because the provisional equidistance line as drawn 
produces a cut-off effect on that coast requiring an adjustment of that line’.
1026
 In the 
Bay of Bengal Case, ITLOS quoted the Black Sea Case when discussing the 
adjustment of an equidistance line. ITLOS noted that ‘the objective is a line that 
allows the relevant Parties to produce their effects, in terms of maritime entitlements, 
in a reasonable and mutually defined way’.
1027
 Moreover, ITLOS decided in light of 
the geographic circumstances of the case ‒ the concavity of the Bay of Bengal ‒ that 
the provisional equidistance line was ‘to be deflected at the point where it begins to 
cut off the seaward projection of the Bangladesh coast’.
1028
 Consequently, the 
direction of the adjustment was ‘to be determined in the light of those 
circumstances’
1029
 and was found having a continuing effect beyond 200 nm.
1030 
The principle of non-encroachment and the potentially existing principle of 
maximum reach are of great importance for States in a disadvantaged geographical 
                                                          
1023
 Charney, ‘Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law’ (n 627) 247. In support 
of this view Charney cites the North Sea Case (n 26) 45, para. 81; The Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Case (El Salvador v. Honduras) (Judgement) [1992] ICJ Rep. 351, 606-9, paras. 415-20; St. 
Pierre & Miquelon Case (n 678) 1169-71, paras. 66-74. 
1024
 Charney, ‘Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law’ (n 627) 249. 
1025
 Bay of Bengal Case (n 4) 90-1, para. 292. 
1026
 Ibid 92, para. 297. 
1027
 Ibid 98, para. 326 quoting Black Sea Case (n 56) 127, para. 201.  
1028








position, especially those that are ‘sandwiched’ between adjacent States. These 
considerations envisage how heavily the delimitation of the continental shelf within 
200 nm can influence the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.  
5.4.1.6. The Third Step ― Proportionality 
As noted above, at the third stage1031 of a delimitation a court or tribunal has to 
‘verify that the line … does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of 
any marked disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the 
ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference to the 
delimitation line’.
1032
 If a court or tribunal finds that ‘the proportion of the relevant 
water areas did not roughly coincide with the relative lengths of the coastlines, 
further analyses or adjustments would be considered’.
1033
  
A ‘difference in length is a special circumstance of some weight which ... 
justifies a correction of the equidistance line, or of any other line’.
1034
 Proportionality 
‘serves to check the line of delimitation that might have been arrived at in 
consideration of various other factors, so as to ensure that the end result is equitable 
and thus in accordance with the applicable law under UNCLOS’.
1035
 This final check 
for an equitable outcome of the delimitation ‘entails a confirmation that no great 
disproportionality of maritime areas is evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal 
lengths’.
1036
 It is ‘disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality 
which is the relevant criterion or factor’.
1037
 It must be noted that a minor 
disproportion will not have an impact on the boundary line. It has to be a situation in 
which ‘the relationship between the length of the relevant coasts and the maritime 
areas generated by them by application of the equidistance method, is so 
disproportionate that it has been found necessary to take this circumstance into 
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account in order to ensure an equitable solution’.
1038
 It must also be noted that ‘[t]he 
fact that a third party may claim the same maritime area does not prevent its 
inclusion in the relevant maritime area for purposes of the disproportionality test’ 
since it ‘in no way affects the rights of third parties’.
1039
 
The reason why coastal lengths have a strong influence on delimitations was 
described by the tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case as the following:  
[I]t is the coast that is the basis of entitlement over maritime areas and hence constitutes a relevant 
circumstance that must be considered in the light of equitable criteria. To the extent that a coast is 
abutting on the area of overlapping claims, it is bound to have a strong influence on the 
delimitation, an influence which results not only from the general direction of the coast but also 




It must be emphasised that this is, however, not ‘a question of determining the 
equitable nature of a delimitation as a function of the ratio of the lengths of the coasts 
in comparison with that of the areas generated by the maritime projection of the 
points of the coast’.
1041
 Worded differently: ‘This is not to suggest that these 
respective areas should be proportionate to coastal lengths.’
1042
 Nor is it a question of 
‘rendering the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State 
with a restricted coastline’.
1043
 The ICJ has ‘kept well away from a purely 
mathematical application of the relationship between coastal lengths’.
1044
  
Proportionality ‘has been used as a final check upon the equity of a tentative 





The disproportionality test applies to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm as 
envisaged by ITLOS.
1046
 If the foot of the slope is used as the starting point for the 
drawing of the provisional equidistance line, it could be argued that the ratio of the 
respective lengths of the foot of the slope, instead of coastal lengths, should be 
compared with the ratio of the relevant continental shelf of each State to find out if 
there is any disproportion between them. This would be in line with the 
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interrelationship between entitlement and delimitation described above and would 
merely constitute a difference in the application of the established delimitation 
method.  
5.4.1.7. Defining the Terminus of an Outer Continental Shelf Boundary  
Defining the terminus of an outer continental shelf boundary can be problematic. 
This is not only because of the possible existence of an overlapping claim from a 
third State,
1047
 but also because of the role of the CLCS in the delineation of the outer 
limits. The circumstances of each case are of essence. In some instances it is obvious 
where the terminus should end, for instance because of previously decided maritime 
boundaries. In other instances it is not as clear. A few possibilities have been 
suggested to solve this problem. The easiest solution is where the parties to a case 
have indicated by themselves ‘the area to which the decision is to be limited by 
reference to third party claims or existing maritime boundary agreements’.
1048
 This 
is, however, a rather rare situation.  
Another well-established solution is based on the principle that ‘[t]he Court 
will not rule on an issue when in order to do so the rights of a third party that is not 
before it, have first to be determined’.
1049
 Consequently, ‘it is usual in a judicial 
delimitation for the precise endpoint to be left undefined in order to refrain from 
prejudicing the rights of third States’.
1050
 This was for instance done in the 
Libya/Malta Case, where the interests of Italy were an issue.
1051
  
In this context it must be noted that overlapping claims to a maritime area is 
not a bar to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal.
1052
 In the Anglo-
French Case the tribunal noted that its award ‘will be binding only as between the 
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Parties to the present arbitration and will neither be binding upon nor create any 
rights or obligations for any third State ... for which the Decision will be res inter 
alios acta’.
1053
 The tribunal added: 
In so far as there may be a possibility that the two successive delimitations of continental shelf 
zones in this region, where the three States are neighbours abutting on the same continental shelf, 
may result in some overlapping of the zones, it is manifestly outside the competence of this Court 
to decide in advance and hypothetically the legal problem which may then arise. That problem 





A different solution is ‘to define the boundary as a line running in a specified 
direction without the indication of a final point’.
1055
 The advantages of this solution 
are threefold. First, it fully addresses the request of the parties before the Court or a 
tribunal, at least in most instances. Second, it prevents the infringement of the rights 
of a third State since it does not define the trijunction point where the boundaries 
meet. It must, however, be noted that ‘[t]he fact that the boundary extends in a 
direction after a specified point implies that the same circumstances remain relevant 
for the determination of the boundary up to the point where it will eventually link up 
with other maritime boundaries in the same area’.
1056
 Third, in the case of adjacent 
States that have not received recommendations from the CLCS, or which have not 
even made a submission to the Commission, the method prevents the terminus being 
defined beyond that to which they are entitled. In the Award of the arbitration 
between the Canadian provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, 
the tribunal used this method. When arguing why the Tribunal had jurisdiction to 
delimit the outer continental shelf, it stated that it was only called upon to ‘specify 
the offshore areas of the two parties inter se ... which it can do by providing that the 
line shall not extend beyond the point of intersection with the outer limit of the 
continental margin as determined in accordance with international law’.
1057
 This was 
also the approach taken in the Bay of Bengal Case. In its judgement ITLOS decided 
that the boundary line within 200 nm should continue ‘in the same direction beyond 
the 200 nm limit of Bangladesh until it reaches the area where the rights of third 
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States may be affected’,
1058
 the third state being India. This has also been done in 
State practice as will be discussed later in this chapter.
1059
 
5.4.1.8. The ‘Grey Area’ Problem 
In the Bay of Bengal Case, the delimitation of the outer continental shelf gave ‘rise to 
an area of limited size located beyond 200 nm from the coast of Bangladesh but 
within 200 nm from the coast of Myanmar, yet on the Bangladesh side of the 
delimitation line’.
1060
 What ITLOS is describing is the so called ‘grey area’ problem. 
ITLOS noted that ‘[s]uch an area results when a delimitation line which is not an 
equidistance line reaches the outer limit of one State’s [EEZ] and continues beyond it 
in the same direction, until it reaches the outer limit of the other State’s [EEZ]’.
1061
 
The Tribunal pointed out:  
[I]n the area beyond Bangladesh’s [EEZ] that is within the limits of Myanmar’s [EEZ], the 
maritime boundary delimits the Parties’ rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil of the 




Consequently, it seems safe to assert that there are no bases to accept the view that 
one State’s entitlement within 200 nm trumps another State’s entitlement beyond 200 
nm. 
ITLOS is the first Tribunal not to avoid the grey area problem when 
delimiting maritime boundaries. International courts and tribunals have sought at all 
costs to avoid that issue. States have also avoided the problem, although a few 
maritime boundary agreements exist that have created such zones.
1063
 One reason for 
such avoidance is that these zones create practical inconveniences concerning 
enforcement and management of natural resources that need, to be resolved, for 
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5.4.2. A Theory of Outer Continental Shelf Delimitation 
It has been demonstrated above how the delimitation method established by 
international courts and tribunals for maritime areas within 200 nm applies beyond 
200 nm. As discussed, the application of the three-step delimitation method could be 
different because of the differences of entitlement between the areas within and 
beyond 200 nm. To allow this to be considered as a delimitation criterion, a party 
will have to ask an international court or tribunal to delimit the outer continental 
shelf in this way. A party will probably be unlikely to try to convince a court or 
tribunal to do so unless it can claim a more extensive continental shelf by measuring 
the provisional equidistance line from the foot of the slope than with its traditional 
application.  
As explained above, there is a link between the source for entitlement to the 
continental shelf and its delimitation. It can be argued that this link indicates that the 
process of delimitation might be different within and beyond 200 nm since 
entitlement to the continental shelf within the 200 nm limit is grounded on distance 
from the coast, whereas, arguably, entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 
nm is rooted in the natural prolongation of a coastal State’s landmass. Consequently, 
the application of the three-step delimitation method established by international 
courts and tribunals could be applied differently vis-à-vis the outer shelf as from in 
the inner shelf. In other words, the difference between the delimitation of the inner 
and outer continental shelf does not lie in the delimitation method itself, but in the 
different entitlement criteria. 
In the inner continental shelf, the coast of the territory of the State is the 
decisive factor for title to submarine areas adjacent thereto. In the outer continental 
shelf, the foot of the slope could be seen as the decisive factor for title to submarine 
areas. Arguably the foot of the slope should be seen as the starting point. Hence it 
could be argued that a provisional equidistance line in outer continental shelf 
delimitation should be conceived as departing from the foot of the slope. This could 
however create various technical problems and it is possible to read the decision in 
the Bay of Bengal Case as indirectly rejecting the idea.  
The factors relevant enough to adjust the provisional equidistance line are 




criterion to the continental shelf is first and foremost based on geomorphology 
according to ITLOS. Moreover, factors based on article 76 will probably also be 
deemed relevant. These factors could include the different strength of title, 
previously decided maritime boundaries for the inner continental shelf and if the foot 
of the slope is used as the starting point for drawing the provisional equidistance line 
foot of the slope points that create inequalities could be seen as a relevant factor. 
Related considerations based on non-encroachment will be of importance and 
possibly also Charney’s theory of maximum reach.  
In inner continental shelf delimitations, the final check for an equitable 
outcome of a delimitation entails a confirmation that no great disproportionality of 
maritime areas is evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths. If the foot of 
the slope is used as the starting point for the drawing the provisional equidistance 
line, it could be argued that the ratio of the respective lengths of the foot of the slope, 
instead of coastal lengths, should be compared with the ratio of the relevant 
continental shelf of each State to find out if there is any disproportion between them.  
5.5. Outer Continental Shelf Boundary Agreements 
5.5.1. Introduction 
As noted above, the main difference between negotiated and adjudicated maritime 
boundaries lies in the flexibility States enjoy in deciding how to delimit their 
boundaries. It will be analysed below how States have used this flexibility to 
negotiate boundaries involving the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The main goal 
of this exercise is to find out whether there exist any trends in the practice of States. 
As noted in the introduction, the focus is on the delimitation method, whether States 
have acted on the basis that they have to delineate the limits between the outer 
continental shelf and the Area before they engage in a boundary delimitation with a 
neighbouring State and how the terminus has been defined. These boundary 
agreements are few, compared to the agreements that have been concluded involving 
maritime areas within 200 nm.  
Before discussing the agreements, one issue must be addressed. Non-
members to UNCLOS have engaged in outer continental shelf delimitations without 
any protest from other States. This may show that under customary international law 




however questionable whether they can enjoy title to the outer continental shelf 
without being parties to UNCLOS and follow the CLCS procedure.  
In this context it should be pointed out that the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention is the governing body for non-UNCLOS parties, given that they are 
parties to the 1958 Convention. Furthermore, the governing body with regard to 
oceanic interactions between an UNCLOS party and a non-UNCLOS party, which is, 
however, a party to the 1958 Convention, is the 1958 Convention. The reason for this 
lies in article 311(1) of UNCLOS which states that ‘[t]his Convention shall prevail, 
as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 
April 1958’. It has been pointed out that this provision ‘implies that any dispute over 
the extent of the outer continental shelf between two states, which are both parties to 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, but only one of which is a party to the LOS 
Convention, will be governed by the Convention on the Continental Shelf’.
1065
 As 
explained above, that convention does not differentiate between an inner and outer 
continental shelf and there is no fixed limit on the maximum seaward extent of the 
continental shelf, as explained in chapter two. 
 
5.5.2. State Practice 
Gambia – Senegal 1975 
The 1975 Agreement between The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal
1066
 
establishes the northern and southern maritime boundaries of the two countries. The 
Agreement establishes an all-purpose boundary. The northern boundary line follows 
a parallel of latitude, as does the southern one after a small curve.
1067
 The parties 
decided not to use the equidistance method to avoid a cut-off effect on the Gambian 
maritime area
1068
 with the aim of achieving an equitable delimitation.
1069
 Resource 
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considerations seem not to have affected the choice of delimitation method.
1070
 No 
terminus of the boundary lines is specified in the Agreement. Both parties have, 
however, expressed an understanding, in their preliminary submissions to the CLCS, 
that the boundaries extend to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
1071
 It seems that 
the idea behind this arrangement is that it is for the two States to define the terminus 
of the boundary line after they have made a submission and received 




Australia – Papua New Guinea 1978 
The 1978 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two 
Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters
1073
 is one 
of the more complex maritime boundary agreements that exist. It deals with four 
types of maritime boundaries and addresses various related issues.
1074
 It is a unique 
treaty in a very difficult geographical area. Most of the treaty has little relevance for 
the outer continental shelf. Nevertheless, ‘[i]n the Coral Sea, the seabed jurisdiction 
boundary line extends about 12 n.m. northeastward of the fisheries jurisdiction line 
which ends at 200 n.m. from the basepoints of the parties’.
1075
 The reason for this is 
apparently because of the geomorphological configuration of the area.
1076
 The 
boundary is connected with the 1988 Australia-Solomon Island boundary discussed 
below. 
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Australia – France 1982 
The 1982 Agreement on Marine Delimitation between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of the French Republic
1077
 draws two boundaries between 
Australian and French maritime zones in the southern Indian Ocean and the 
southwest Pacific Ocean. Both boundaries extend beyond 200 nm with regard to the 
continental shelf.  
The boundary in the Indian Ocean is between the Kerguelen Islands which 
belong to France and the Heard and McDonald Islands which belong to Australia. 
The boundary is 430 nm long and defined by eight terminal and turning points which 
are all equidistant from the nearest points of the opposite shores. The northeastern 
segment of the boundary extends beyond 200 nm from the coasts of both countries, 
delimiting part of an outer continental shelf area known as the Kerguelen-Gaussberg 
Ridge.
1078
 The western terminus is 200 nm from the two territories, however the 
eastern terminus 240 nm from the territories, i.e. it extends beyond 200 nm from the 
parties’ coast.
1079
 Prescott has noted that ‘[i]t seems likely that the negotiators 
decided to continue this boundary beyond the 200 n.m. limit in order to secure the 
entire available and clearly defined continental margin’.
1080
 Natural resources seem 
not to have influenced the maritime boundary lines.
1081
 
The boundary in the southwest Pacific Ocean lies in the Coral Sea between 
New Caledonia (France) and Australia. The boundary is 1200 nm long, with 22 
terminal or turning points. Approximately half of the boundary extends beyond 200 
nm. The delimitation method is a partially modified equidistant line. According to 
Choon-ho Park ‘[t]he equidistant line is supposed to have been “straightened” to 
improve the boundary for practical reasons, but it is not clear exactly where and to 
what extent such “straightening” took place’.
1082
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The two parties agreed that the endpoints of the two boundaries may not be 
the outer limit of the continental shelf, and that if a further extension of the 
boundaries is required, it shall be ‘extended by agreement between the two 
Governments in accordance with international law’.
1083
 According to Australia’s 
submission to the CLCS ‘[t]here is a potential outstanding delimitation with France 
involving an extension of the Australia-France Delimitation Treaty boundary’ at its 




Ireland – United Kingdom 1988 
The 1988 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland 
Concerning the Delimitation of Areas of the Continental Shelf between the Two 
Countries
1085
 establishes two continental shelf boundaries that extend well beyond 
the 200 nm limit. The first runs between the opposite coasts of England/Wales and 
Ireland and faces the Irish and Celtic Seas. It is 502 nm long and has 94 defined 
points. The second runs between the opposite coasts of Scotland and Ireland facing 
the northeast Atlantic into the Rockall Trough and Hatton-Rockall Plateau.
1086
 It is 
634 nm with 38 defined points. It is clear that economic factors influenced the 
boundary lines. The Preamble of the Agreement states that the two parties wish ‘to 
open up further opportunities for their respective offshore petroleum and related 
industries by establishing boundaries between their respective parts of the continental 
shelf’.
1087
 Different criteria and methods were used in different sections of the lines. 
According to Anderson ‘[t]he two sides adopted a pragmatic approach in order to 
achieve an equitable solution overall’.
1088
 The boundary lines ‘represent a negotiated 
solution to a dispute which had previously been destined for arbitration’.
1089
 He notes 
that the ‘[m]ethods considered included equidistance, modified equidistance and 
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 The agreed lines are, however, ‘“stepped,” in the sense 
that they follow parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude. The lines also take 
account of the two governments’ compatible block systems as far as possible.’
1091
 
The negotiated lines present a zigzag stairlike pattern. Although not altogether an 
equidistance line, they do not depart far from such a line. Both boundaries stop at 
points that take account of UNCLOS article 76 criteria.
1092
 Moreover, according to 
article 4 of the Agreement, nothing therein ‘affects the position of either Government 
concerning the location of the outer edge of its continental margin’. In other words, 
the Parties reserve their position as to the outer edge of the continental margin.  
 
Australia – Solomon Islands 1988 
The 1988 Australia-Solomon Islands Agreement
1093
 divides the 1979 Fishing Zone 
of Australia and the 1979 EEZ of the Solomon Islands and their continental shelf by 
a single (slightly modified) equidistant line drawn in the Coral Sea of the southwest 
Pacific Ocean. The line is approximately 150 nm long with two terminal points and 
one turning point in between.
1094
 The boundary line is linked with two previously 
concluded boundaries. The east end is linked with the seabed line of the Australia-
Papua New Guinea Torres Strait Agreement and the south end co-terminates with the 
north end of the 1982 Australia-France boundary line.
1095
 
The east end of the boundary line is located beyond 200 nm from the nearest 
basepoints of Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The agreement 
created a grey area problem.
1096
 Economic considerations did not seem to affect the 
location of the boundary line. There are no known natural resources of economic 
value in the area.
1097
 Moreover, geological and geomorphological considerations 
seem not to have affected the location of the boundary line. 
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Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela 1990 
The 1990 Treaty between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Republic of 
Venezuela on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas
1098
 subsumes two 
previously concluded maritime boundary treaties between the two States
1099
 and 
develops the agreed boundaries further. The boundary line extends from ‘the 
potential tri-junction with Grenada in the Caribbean, thence across the Gulf of Paria 
and the Columbus Channel and finally to the outer edge of the continental margin in 
the open Atlantic’.
1100
 The boundary line is approximately 440 nm with 22 fixed 
points. With the 1990 agreement the line is extended by 235 nm from the previous 
agreements with 4 new fixed points (19-22). The final eastern segment of the 
extended line goes beyond the 200 nm limit and proceeds on a constant bearing to a 
point the parties believe to approximate the outer limits of the continental shelf.
1101
  
The line broadly resembles an equidistance line. However, compared to such 
a line, the negotiated line favours Venezuela in its eastern portion.
1102
 Hydrocarbon 
and mineral resources influenced the extension of the maritime boundary beyond 200 
nm.
1103
 Terminal point 22, which is around 6 nm beyond 200 nm was decided on the 
basis of geological and geomorphological data.
1104
 It is clear that ‘the edge of the 
margin was calculated on the basis of the thickness of the sedimentary rocks as equal 
to 1 percent of the shortest distance from the slope, and whereby the potential 
extension of the boundary to a point close to the 350-n.m. limit ... was virtually pre-
empted by the parties’.
1105
 Moreover: 
The extension of the line some 235 n.m. along a given azimuth towards a point approximately on 
the outer edge of the continental margin ‘which delimits the national jurisdiction of the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago and of the Republic of Venezuela and the International Seabed Area ...’ 
may be considered a pioneer attitude on this particular issue as both parties reserved the right, in 
case of determining that the outer edge of the continental margin is located closer to 350 n.m. from 
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their respective baselines, and further than their current position, to establish and negotiate their 




However, Trinidad and Tobago’s submission to the CLCS states that ‘[i]t is now 
known that the current terminus falls appreciably short of the outer limit of the 
continental shelf’.
1107
 Consequently, ‘Trinidad and Tobago … acknowledges its 
obligations to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under the 1990 Treaty and 
recognizes as well that negotiation of the extension of the boundary line beyond the 
current terminus ... awaits action by the CLCS so that further negotiation may 
proceed’.
1108
 It must be noted that this statement is quite interesting since the award 
in the Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case appears to mean that that the outer 
continental shelf part of the 1990 Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela Agreement has 
ceased to have any practical effect because it seems that the tribunal found that 
Trinidad and Tobago has no continental shelf beyond 200 miles.
1109
 This however 
did not stop Trinidad and Tobago subsequently making a submission to the CLCS in 




USA – USSR 1990 
The 1990 Agreement between The United States of America and The Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary
1111
 created the longest 
maritime boundary in the world. It is approximately 1,600 nm in length between the 
opposite States. In general, the boundary line follows one version or another of the 
line under the 1867 Convention by which Russia sold Alaska to the USA.
1112
 The 
negotiations took nine years and were highly political. Considerations of 
hydrocarbon resources and fisheries were prominent in the negotiations.
1113
 The 
agreement delimits the continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the coasts of the 
                                                          
1106
 Ibid 677. See article 2(2) of the 1990 Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela Agreement (n 1103). 
1107
 Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, 
paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Republic of Trinidad  & 




 Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago Case (n 4) 856, para. 368. 
1110
 See Trinidad & Tobago CLCS Executive Summary (n 1112) 14-5. 
1111
 Adopted 1 June 1990; entered provisionally into force 15 June 1990; not in force; 29 ILM 941 
(1990 USA-USSR Agreement).  
1112
 Colson, ‘The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between Neighboring States’ (n 842) 96. 
1113




parties in the Arctic and North Pacific Oceans and Bering and Chukchi Seas.
1114
 
Some areas in the central Bering Sea are more than 300 nm from each coast.
1115
 The 
boundary line ‘extends from the Bering Strait north along a meridian through 
Chukchi Sea’ far into the Arctic Ocean ‘and southwestward from the Bering Strait 
through the Bering Sea to the 167° East meridian of longitude in the North Pacific 
Ocean’.
1116
 Colson has noted that ‘[t]he Russian submission to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf sets forth the Russian view that this meridian 
divides outer continental shelf jurisdiction as far as the North Pole. Whether the 
United States agrees that the outer continental shelf extends so far is not known’.
1117
 
The USA, however, seems to agree on the use of the boundary line beyond 200 nm 
since it is ‘consistent with the mutual interests of Russia and the United States in 




Australia – Indonesia 1997 
The 1997 Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and 
Certain Seabed Boundaries
1119
 completes the maritime boundaries between Australia 
and Indonesia. Natural resources seem not to have influenced the precise location of 
the boundary lines.
1120
 Nevertheless, resource considerations were a driving force 
behind the conclusion of the treaty in general.
1121
 The treaty involves three 
boundaries: The extensions to a seabed boundary and a water column boundary in 
the western Timor Sea and a boundary dividing the water column and the seabed 
between Christmas Island and Java in the Indian Ocean.
1122
 The boundary in the 
western Timor Sea is of importance for the discussion of maritime boundaries 
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beyond 200 nm. This is the only maritime boundary where a maritime zone of only 
one party to the agreement is extended beyond 200 nm where the relevant maritime 
area in the negotiations is narrower than 400 nm wide.  
Prescott has pointed out that ‘[t]he western boundary between the Points A79 
and A82 seems to be unique in seabed boundary delimitation. It coincides with a line 
60 n.m. seaward of the foot of the Australian continental slope and is derived from 
the application of Article 76(4)(a)(ii) of’ UNCLOS.
1123
 It is therefore obvious that 
geoscientific considerations have played a key role in the delimitation of this area. 
Prescott notes that: 
An area of 1,800 sq. n.m. in the western part of this quadrilateral area of seabed lies more than 200 
n.m. from the nearest Australian territory on Scott Reef. The question therefore arises whether 
Australia’s claim to this seabed more than 200 n.m. from its nearest baseline must be submitted to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with Article 76(8) of the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. It appears to be the Australian view that this arrangement 
regarding an area which lies within 200 n.m. of Indonesia’s baselines does not need to be 
submitted to the Commission. This view is possibly based on the opinion that the chief 
responsibility of the Commission is to protect the deep seabed area (The Area) from being 
diminished by unreasonable national claims and that the area under review is not part of The Area 




Australia did not include this area in its submission to the CLCS which implies that 
Prescott could be right. Serdy has stated that ‘the reaction of the Australian Minister 
for Resources and Energy ... suggests that the outer limits submitted by Australia 




Mexico – USA 2000 
The 2000 Treaty on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of 
Mexico beyond 200 Nautical Miles
1126
 is the third maritime boundary treaty between 
Mexico and the USA. It is only devoted to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm in the so-called ‘doughnut hole’ area of the western Gulf of Mexico. 
Natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, were the driving force for concluding the 
treaty. It is the first maritime boundary treaty that focused only on the delimitation of 
the outer continental shelf. The legal status of the waters above the boundary is 
unaffected. The coasts of the two countries are opposite each other where the 
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boundary was delimited. The parties viewed this treaty as the continuation of their 
1978 EEZ treaty
1127
 which created two gaps in the Gulf of Mexico, an eastern gap 
and a western gap, which are beyond 200 nm from the baselines.
1128
 This treaty only 
addresses the western gap. It has been noted that ‘[i]n the early rounds of talks both 
sides presented evidence supporting the fact that the entire “western gap” was 
continental shelf under international law, specifically Article 76 of the LOS 
Convention’.
1129
 The boundary line in this gap is a 135 nm equidistance line which 
takes into account all territory including islands.
1130
 The same methodology as was 
used in the EEZ treaty is used in this treaty, i.e. the boundary is delimited based on 
an equidistance line measured from all points on the normal baseline, including 
islands.
1131
 Some of the same features that were factors in the equidistance line 
calculation in 1978 were also used in this delimitation. Because the negotiating 
parties deemed that no special circumstances existed, the equidistance line was seen 
as an equitable outcome.
1132
 It can be added that in 2007 Mexico made a submission 
to the CLCS regarding the same area as in the Agreement and used the negotiated 
boundary as its outer limit.
1133
 The CLCS accepted the submission and Mexico has 





Australia – New Zealand 2004 
The 2004 Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of New 
Zealand Establishing Certain Exclusive Economic Zone Boundaries and Continental 
Shelf Boundaries
1135
 establishes two boundaries between Australia and New Zealand 
in the Tasman Sea. The boundary delimits overlapping EEZ generated by Norfolk 
Island and Three Kings Islands and by Macquarie Island and Auckland and 
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Campbell Islands. The majority of the boundary delimits however the continental 
shelf in the region extending from Lord Howe Rise to Three Kings Ridge in the north 
and, in the south, in the region between Macquarie, Auckland and Campbell 
Islands.
1136
 The impetus for completing the boundary line was the impending 
submission by the both countries to the CLCS.
1137
 
The EEZ boundaries of the agreement were delimited on the basis of 
equidistance. Equidistance had, however, only a minor role in the delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf.
1138
 Economic considerations did not have a determinant role 
in the location of the boundary line.
1139
 On the other hand, geoscience played a 
crucial role in determining the line. In all the areas where the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm was delimited ‘the boundaries drawn reflect agreement between the 
parties as to the entitlement of each to continental shelf beyond 200 n.m. under 
international law’.
1140
 Geomorphological factors were of high importance in deciding 
some portions of both boundaries. The northern line ‘westwards of the physical 
feature of the Three Kings Ridge reflected the more pronounced natural prolongation 
northward from New Zealand along the Three Kings Ridge when compared with 
Australia’s eastward natural prolongation from Norfolk Island’.
1141
 The other line, 
‘the southern line gives precedence to prolongation from New Zealand’s South 
Island along the Macquarie Ridge over prolongation from Macquarie Island’.
1142
 
The northern and southern terminus of both boundaries ‘are located at points 
that are either agreed by the two countries as being the outer limit of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 n.m. or, where there was no such agreement, at points slightly 
beyond the furthest possible extent of such continental shelf’.
1143
 It must be noted 
that ‘[i]t is understood that the termini could be adjusted at some future point to 
reflect the outcomes of both countries’ submissions to the’ CLCS.
1144
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Agreed Minutes between Denmark (Faroe Islands), Iceland and Norway 2006 
An interesting approach to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is 
found in the trilateral Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
beyond 200 Nautical Miles between Denmark (the Faroe Islands), Iceland and 
Norway (Jan Mayen and mainland Norway) in the Southern Part of the Banana Hole 
of the Northeast Atlantic from 20 September 2006.
1145
 It has been noted that the 
agreement ‘is an outstanding example of foresight, cooperation, and innovation both 
legally and technically’.
1146
 Although the Agreed Minutes are not a treaty their 
content should not be underestimated. They seem to be of a high level of 
significance. One indicator of this is the fact that they were signed by the ministers of 
foreign affairs of the three parties. An important factor in the making of the Agreed 
Minutes ‘was the desire to achieve a tripartitely negotiated solution of issues without 
giving rise to a number of complex legal issues’.
1147
 Consequently, no legal 
reasoning was formulated to justify the provisional boundary lines.
1148
 Another 
important factor was the previously determined maritime boundaries within 200 nm 
between the countries. No extensive knowledge of potential exploitable resources 
existed at the time of the negotiations.
1149
 
The Agreed Minutes set out defined bilateral continental shelf boundaries 
beyond 200 nm between the opposite States and an agreed procedure for determining 
future delimitation lines in the southern part of the Banana Hole. The agreed 
boundary line has six fixed points which divide the area into three parts. Norway gets 
approximately half (55,528 km²) of the negotiated area and Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands share the other half (56,000 km²).
1150
 Particular weight was not given to 
geological and geomorphological considerations with the exception that the parties 
assumed that the relevant area constituted a continuous continental shelf.
1151
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An important factor in the delimitation process seems to have been the fact 
that Norway has a two-sided inner continental shelf/EEZ opening to the area from 
continental Norway and Jan Mayen. It has been pointed out that ‘the resulting 
division of the delimitation area between the Parties played a role in the 
deliberations, in order to draw lines that would not lead to an inequitable result’.
1152
 
However, ‘several of the resulting lines bear considerable resemblance to 
equidistance lines with adjustments, based on negotiations’.
1153
 Moreover, it seems 
as ‘previously concluded delimitation agreements for areas within 200 n.m. were not 
formally considered, but may nevertheless in certain cases have provided inspiration 
for the assessment of what could constitute an equitable solution with regard to the 
delimitation beyond 200 n.m.’
1154
  
According to the Agreed Minutes, the three countries ‘wish to effect the 
delimitations of the continental shelf areas beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines between’ the countries subject to the rights and obligations under 
UNCLOS.
1155
 The Agreed Minutes provide that ‘[t]his will be done taking into 
account, inter alia, the functions of’ the CLCS.
1156
 Moreover, the Agreed Minutes 
state:  
If, after consideration of national data or other material by the Commission, it is ascertained that 
any part thereof belongs to ‘the Area’ ... the coastal State(s) concerned will establish the outer 
limits of the continental shelf in accordance with Article 76(8) of the Convention, without this 




This is an important provision in case the CLCS does not accept the parties’ claims 
to the entitlement of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Banana Hole. 
Furthermore, the Agreed Minutes provide:  
As soon as possible, and no later than three months after the States have concluded the procedure 
set out in Article 76(8) of the Convention, the States will meet with a view to simultaneously 
concluding three parallel bilateral agreements on the final determination of the boundary lines in 
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The Agreed Minutes do not state whether they are based on the assumption that the 
CLCS must give its recommendations before the outer limits of the continental shelf 
is delimited between the adjacent and opposite States, or if this is a procedural 
method the three States agreed upon to delimit the boundary. Nonetheless, the 
Agreed Minutes are a good example of how States can cooperate to conclude outer 
continental shelf boundaries.  
 
Kenya – Tanzania 2009 
The 1976 Agreement between Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania
1159
 
‘establishes a territorial sea boundary between The Pemba Island (Tanzania) and the 
mainland of Kenya which are opposite coasts, and then proceeds seaward to 
constitute an overall boundary line aimed at establishing “other areas of national 
jurisdiction” between the two states’.
1160
 The Agreement was concluded by exchange 
of notes. Natural resources (except fishing by indigenous fisherman) and geological 




The boundary line consists of three turning points: A, B and C. The line 
seaward from point C is of interest for the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. It is a 
‘line of latitude that neither approximates an equidistant line nor runs perpendicular 
to the general direction of the two nations’ coasts’.
1162
 According to the Agreement 
‘[t]he eastward boundary from Point C ... shall be the latitude extending eastwards to 
a point where it intersects the outermost limits of territorial water boundary or areas 
of national jurisdiction of two States’.
1163
 The 2009 Agreement between the United 
Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Kenya on the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
1164
 states that 
‘[t]his Agreement shall define the maritime boundary from the limits of the 
Territorial Waters as defined in the 1976 Maritime Boundary Agreement starting at 
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 According to article 2 of the 2009 Agreement ‘[t]he Parties agree that 
the boundary line extends eastwards to a point where it intersects the outermost 
limits of the continental shelf and such other outermost limits of national jurisdiction 
as may be determined by international law’. As with the 1975 Gambia-Senegal 
Agreement, it seems that the idea behind this arrangement is that it is the task of the 
two States to define the terminus of the boundary line after they have made their 
submissions to the CLCS and received the CLCS recommendations. 
 
Barbados – France 2009 
The 2009 Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the 
Government of Barbados on the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between France and 
Barbados
1166
 is a short and simple agreement. The agreement delimits the maritime 
area between Barbados and Guadeloupe and Martinique (France) in the Caribbean 
Sea. The agreement mainly concerns the delimitation of the EEZ. However, it 
provides that ‘[i]f the continental shelf of Barbados and that of France overlap 
beyond two hundred nautical miles’ the delimitation line is extended to a certain 
geographic coordinate.
1167
 The boundary line is an equidistance line between 
Martinique alone (not Guadeloupe) and Barbados.
1168
 No special circumstances were 
deemed to exist that justified modifications to the line.
1169
 No geological and 
geomorphological considerations influenced the outcome.
1170
 The agreement makes 
no explicit reference to the CLCS or to article 76 of UNCLOS, although it mentions 
in its preamble ‘the rules and principles of international law’ in particular UNCLOS. 
Nevertheless, the CLCS will play an important role in this context since it is left to 
the Commission to verify whether the States are entitled to the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm. Consequently, the terminus remains undefined.   
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Russia – Norway 2010 
The 2010 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean
1171
 marked the end of a 40 year old maritime boundary dispute between the 
parties. The treaty delimits an area that can be divided into three parts. The first 
begins ‘at the mouth of the Varangerfjord and extends to 200 nautical miles from the 
mainlands of Norway and Russia ... The second area is in the middle of the Barents 
Sea beyond 200 miles (the Barents Sea Loophole) ... The third area is in the northern 
Barents Sea’.
1172
 It is only in the second area and in a short section of the third area 
that an outer continental shelf boundary between the opposite coasts of the mainland 
of Norway and Svalbard and of Russia (Novaya Zemlya) was required. 
The eight coordinate delimitation line is a single line within 200 nm. The 
continental shelf boundary extends beyond that limit where the parties’ shelf extends 
beyond 200 nm. It must be emphasised that Norway was in the unusual position that 
CLCS had accepted her claim to the area beyond 200 nm before the treaty was 
concluded
1173
 and the CLCS had indicated in its recommendations to Russia that a 
ratified maritime boundary agreement with Norway in the Barents Sea ‘would 
represent the outer limits of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation extending 
beyond 200 nautical miles in the Barents Sea’.
1174
 
The treaty does not reveal much about the delimitation method except that the 
preamble makes reference to the provisions of UNCLOS. A joint statement made by 
the Russian President and the Norwegian Prime Minister a few months before the 
conclusion of the treaty reveals more.
1175
 According to the statement, delegations 
from the parties recommended ‘a delimitation line on the basis of international law in 
order to achieve an equitable solution’
1176
 and that the line should divide ‘the overall 
disputed area in two parts of approximately same size’.
1177
 The only relevant factor 
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mentioned is ‘the effect of major disparities in respective coastal lengths’.
1178
 The 
statement does not make reference to the median line, equidistance line or a bisector 
line. Neither does it make reference to economic factors although they were an 
important underlying factor. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate whether 
geographical, geological or geomorphological factors were applied.   
 
Uruguay – Argentina 1973 – an outer continental shelf dispute 
There is a disagreement as to whether the 1973 Agreement Between the Government 
of Argentina and the Government of Uruguay Relating to the Delimitation of the 
River Plate and the Maritime Boundary Between Argentina and Uruguay
1179
 delimits 
the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. As its name indicates, the Agreement delimits 
the boundary between the two countries in the river Río de la Plata and establishes 
the maritime boundary between the parties, seaward of the closing line at the mouth 
of the river.
1180
 Article 70 of the Agreement provides that: 
The lateral maritime boundary and the continental shelf boundary between the Oriental Republic 
of Uruguay and the Argentine Republic are defined by an equidistant line, determined by the 
adjacent coasts methods, which begins at the midpoint of the baseline consisting of an imaginary 
straight line that joins Punta del Este (Uruguay) and Punta Rasa del Cabo San Antonio 
(Argentina). 
 
Jimenez de Aréchaga has pointed out that ‘[t]he outer limit of the boundary line, 
seaward of the closing line is not indicated. This is perhaps because the continental 
shelf in this area has a natural prolongation beyond 200 nautical miles ... which 
would eventually be subject to the rules of delimitation with the area provided’ in 
article 76(4-6) and Annex II of UNCLOS.
1181
 Uruguay’s submission to the CLCS is 
silent on this issue. It only states that ‘[t]here exist, at present, no unresolved disputes 
over the maritime border with either of Uruguay’s neighbouring countries, Argentina 
or Brazil’.
1182
 Nevertheless, one of the points that Uruguay uses in its submission (FP 
01), the southernmost point of the submission, is located 350 nm from the territorial 
sea baselines. According to Uruguay’s submission the point ‘is equidistant from 
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Punta Médenos in Argentina ... and Cabo Santa María in Uruguay ... compliant with 
Article 70’ of the Treaty of the River Plate and its Maritime Front.
1183
 Hence it 
appears that Uruguay is of the opinion that the agreed boundary line extends also to 
the outer continental shelf. Argentina however, is clearly of the opinion that there 
exists no maritime boundary between the States beyond 200 nm. Argentina’s 
submission to the CLCS states: 
The boundary between the Argentine and Uruguayan continental shelves beyond the 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines is still to be demarcated ... The abovementioned point FP 01 of the 
Uruguayan submission cannot be taken as a point of the maritime lateral boundary between the 
two countries since such boundary has not yet been demarcated in that sector, an operation which 




Consequently, Argentina requested the Commission to formulate its 
recommendations applying para. 4(a) of Annex I of its Rules of Procedure.
1185
 The 
submissions of the two States are currently pending before the CLCS.  
The question that arises here ‒ and which is of general importance for 
maritime boundary delimitations ‒ is whether a maritime boundary which only 
defines a specific direction for the boundary line without indicating where the 
boundary terminates extends automatically beyond 200 nm, or if the parties to a 
boundary agreement must explicitly state that it does so. In the Black Sea Case, the 
ICJ noted that ‘[s]tate practice indicates that the use of a boundary agreed for the 
delimitation of one maritime zone to delimit another zone is effected by a new 
agreement’.
1186
 In the view of Anderson, ‘[t]he Court’s approach appears to mean 
that pre-existing boundaries only continue to serve for the purposes for which they 
were originally intended, and that they are not automatically transformed into 
boundaries serving other purposes absent the agreement of the Parties’.
1187
 It could 
therefore be argued that in disputes such as that between Argentina and Uruguay it 
will be essential to show whether the boundary agreement was or was not intended to 
delimit the entire continental shelf. On the other hand, the dispute in the Black Sea 
Case was about the establishment of a single maritime boundary delimiting the 
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 Black Sea Case (n 56) 87, para. 69. 
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continental shelf and EEZ within 200 nm.
1188
 The dispute between Argentina and 
Uruguay is different. It is only about the continental shelf. This fact creates a 
complexity as ‘there is in law only a single “continental shelf” rather than an inner 
continental shelf and a separate extended or outer continental shelf’.
1189
 It could 
therefore be argued that the dicta from the Black Sea Case is not applicable in 
disputes regarding the extent of boundary lines that only specify a direction for the 
continental shelf boundary without defining where it terminates. Two arguments 
strengthen this view in the dispute between Uruguay and Argentina. First, article 
83(4) of UNCLOS provides: ‘Where there is an agreement in force between the 
States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall 
be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.’ Second, at the 
time the 1973 Uruguay-Argentina Agreement was concluded the applicable legal 
regime made no distinction between broad and narrow continental shelves.
1190
 
Consequently, the argument can be made that the agreed boundary line between 
Uruguay and Argentina extends beyond 200 nm.  
 
Brazil and Neighbouring States 
In its submission to the CLCS, Brazil noted that ‘it is not involved in any territorial 
dispute concerning maritime areas with another State’.
1191
 Brazil has concluded 
maritime boundaries agreements with its neighbouring States, French Guiana and 
Uruguay. The boundary line with French Guiana, which presumably is a single line, 
does not have a defined terminus.
1192
 The boundary with Uruguay, as agreed in the 
1972 agreement, also does not have a defined terminus. It can however be assumed 
that it was not meant to extend beyond 200 nm since the boundary delimitation 
agreement between the parties stated that the boundary line extended ‘to the outside 
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limit of the territorial sea of both countries’
1193
 which according to their domestic 
legislation; ‘at the time the agreement was signed, was 200 n.m. for both states’.
1194
. 
Brazil seems to assume ‘that the extension of the continental shelf does not pose 
delimitation questions with neighbouring countries … and that it accepts that a 
seaward extension of the existing lateral delimitation will apply’.
1195
 In the case of 
Uruguay, this seems to be accurate since, as mentioned above, Uruguay’s submission 
to the CLCS states that ‘[t]here exist, at present, no unresolved disputes over the 
maritime border with either of Uruguay’s neighbouring countries, Argentina or 
Brazil’.
1196
 The situation is different in the case of French Guiana. French Guiana did 
not make a note verbale commenting on this aspect of Brazil’s submission.
1197
 This 
could be seen as a verification of Brazil’s position. On the other hand it must be kept 
in mind that ‘[t]he establishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of 
grave importance and agreement is not easily to be presumed’.
1198
 Consequently, 
without any input from French Guiana it is difficult to assume that the maritime 
boundary between the two adjacent States should be seen as extending beyond 200 
nm.  
 
5.5.3. Trends in State Practice 
The discussion below aims to analyse whether any trends exist in negotiated outer 
continental shelf boundary delimitations. The discussion is divided into four parts. 
First, the delimitation method used in these agreements is discussed. It is then 
observed whether States have deemed that they must delineate the limits between the 
outer continental shelf and the Area before engaging in a boundary delimitation with 
a neighbouring State. It is then examined how the terminus has been defined. Finally, 
the question is asked as to whether any rule of customary international law has 
emerged in these regards.  
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5.5.3.1. The Delimitation Method 
Five assertions can be made about State practice regarding the method used to locate 
the boundary line in the outer continental shelf. First, States have obviously utilised 
the flexibility inherent in negotiations when the delimitation method used to 
conclude the agreements was adopted. Second, some of the existing boundary 
agreements extend previously concluded boundary lines beyond 200 nm without a 
change in direction (1975 Gambia-Senegal Agreement; 2000 Mexico-USA 
Agreement; and the 2009 Kenya-Tanzania Agreement). Third, a few of the 
agreements which delimit the inner and outer continental shelf extend the inner line 
without a change of direction to the outer line (1982 Australia-France Agreement; 
1988 Australia-Solomon Islands Agreement; 1990 Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela 
Agreement; 1990 USA-USSR Agreement; 2009 Barbados-France Agreement). 
Fourth, it appears that geoscientific factors have played a role in five agreements 
(1978 Australia-Papua New Guinea Agreement; 1988 Ireland-UK Agreement; the 
1990 Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela Agreement; the sui generis 1997 Australia-
Indonesia Agreement; and the 2004 Australia-New Zealand Agreement). Fifth, no 
delimitation method dominates. The equidistance line or a modified equidistance line 
has been used in five agreements (1982 Australia-France Agreement, 1988 Australia-
Solomon Islands Agreement, 1990 Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela Agreement; 2000 
Mexico-USA Agreement, 2009 Barbados-France Agreement) while some have used 
other methods. Some follow lines of longitude or latitude (1975 Gambia-Senegal 
Agreement; 1990 USA-USSR Agreement) whilst a mixture of methods or 
considerations are used in other agreements (1978 Australia-Papua New Guinea 
Agreement; 1988 Ireland-UK Agreement; 1997 Australia-Indonesia Agreement; 
2004 Australia-New Zealand Agreement; 2006 Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway 
Agreed Minutes; 2009 Kenya-Tanzania Agreement; 2010 Russia-Norway 
Agreement).  
5.5.3.2. Have States waited for CLCS Recommendations?  
Of the 14 concluded maritime boundary agreements in which the outer continental 
shelf is delimited, 12 agreements have been concluded before one or both of the 
parties received recommendations from the CLCS. One agreement was concluded 




Agreement) and one set of trilateral agreed minutes has been concluded (the 2006 
Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway Agreed Minutes) that provisionally delimits the outer 
continental shelf and creates a process involving submissions to the CLCS before the 
boundary is finally delimited. One of the agreements is rather unusual. As noted 
above, the 1997 Australia-Indonesia Agreement extends the continental shelf of 
Australia beyond 200 nm where the relevant maritime area in issue is less than 400 
nm in width.  
Eleven agreements that delimit the outer continental shelf, without any 
existing recommendations from the CLCS (or even before the CLCS was 
established), have been concluded after the provisions of UNCLOS on the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm were finalised at the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference, involving 17 states, of which 15 that are parties to UNCLOS. One 
agreement was concluded before UNCLOS itself was concluded (the 1978 Australia-
Papua New Guinea). It must be emphasised that this practice has not been protested 
against by any State. It can thus be argued that States have tacitly accepted that 
delimiting maritime boundaries by agreement and the establishment of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf are separate functions (although obviously interlinked). 
In the words of the ILC, this repeated practice by States ‘constitutes objective 
evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of’
1199
 UNCLOS on 
this issue and should be taken into account when interpreting the Convention.
1200
  
In addition, it must be pointed out that because States have concluded 
agreements in which the outer continental shelf is delimited without first receiving 
recommendations from the CLCS, or even before making a submission to the 
Commission, and without any protest from third States on this issue, it would be 
illogical to deny States to decide by agreement to submit a delimitation dispute 
regarding the outer continental shelf to an international court or tribunal before they 
make a submission to the CLCS or before they receive recommendations from the 
Commission. This view is confirmed in the Bay of Bengal Case: 
The Tribunal observes that the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present case cannot be seen as an 
encroachment on the functions of the Commission, inasmuch as the settlement, through 
negotiations, of disputes between States regarding delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 
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nm is not seen as precluding examination by the Commission of the submissions made to it or 





Four propositions can be made about the location of the terminus in the above 
agreements. First, three agreements leave the terminus of the boundary line 
undefined, i.e. they define a specific direction for the boundary line without defining 
where the boundary terminates. Neither the 1975 Gambia-Senegal Agreement nor the 
2009 Agreement between the Governments define a terminus of the boundary line. 
This implies that the States plan to define the terminus after they have received 
recommendations from the CLCS. The 1990 USA-USSR Agreement extends the 
boundary line far into the Arctic along a meridian. How the two States plan to define 
the terminus is unclear. Difficult questions arise in this instance given that the US is 
not a party to UNCLOS. The 2009 Kenya-Tanzania Agreement states that the 
boundary line extends ‘to a point where it intersects the outermost limits of the 
continental shelf and such other outermost limits of national jurisdiction as may be 
determined by international law’.
1202
 This implies that the terminus will be defined 
after the States receive CLCS recommendations and there is a possible third party 
factor that needs to be addressed. A similar approach, though more cautious, is taken 
in the 2009 Barbados-France Agreement which states that if the continental shelf of 
Barbados and that of France overlap beyond 200 nm, the delimitation line is 
extended to a certain geographical coordinate.
1203
 This implies that the boundary line 
will not be extended beyond 200 nm until positive CLCS recommendations have 
been received.  
Second, four agreements ‒ the 1982 Australia-France Agreement, the 1988 
Ireland-UK Agreement, the 1990 Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela Agreement and 
the 2004 Australia-New Zealand Agreement ‒ define a terminus, but note that it can 
be adjusted in the future. The terminus in the 1990 Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela 
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Third, two agreements, the 2000 Mexico-USA Agreement and the 2006 
Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway Agreed Minutes fill a gap or loophole between the 
parties. The former agreement did so without considerations regarding the CLCS; the 
latter, however, introduces a certain process involving considerations regarding the 
CLCS. 
Fourth, four agreements are not relevant in this context. The 1978 Australia-
Papua New Guinea Agreement was concluded before the provisions on the outer 
continental shelf in UNCLOS were crystallised. The termini of the 1988 Australia-
Solomon Islands Agreement is connected to other boundaries. The outer continental 
shelf part of two boundaries, the 2010 Russia-Norway Agreement and the 1997 
Indonesia-Australia Agreement, is landward of the boundary terminus. 
5.5.3.4. Customary International Law? 
As is well known, ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law’ can be applied by the ICJ when deciding disputes.
1205
 The relevant acts must 
‘amount to a settled practice’ and ‘be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of 
a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it’.
1206
 One of the requirements in establishing State practice is to show that 
it has been applied constantly,
1207
 extensively and in a virtually uniform manner.
1208
 
As discussed above, the delimitation method used in the existing outer continental 
shelf agreements has not been applied constantly and in a virtually uniform manner. 
The same can be said about the location of the terminus. Although the majority of 
States concluding an outer continental shelf boundary agreement have done so before 
making a submission to the CLCS or receiving its recommendations, some States 
have concluded an agreement after receiving the recommendations. This practice 
confirms that the delineation and delimitation procedures are separate processes, as 
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stated in Article 76(10) and Article 9 of Annex II to UNCLOS and by ITLOS in the 
Bay of Bengal Case.
1209
 The practice is perhaps more important for the interpretation 
of the Convention than for the establishment of customary international law. For 
these reasons it seems that the general practice requirement needed to establish 
customary international law has not been fulfilled and consequently no special rules 
of customary international law have emerged that are especially applicable to outer 
continental shelf delimitations. Nevertheless, it is likely that the boundary 
agreements discussed above do not go unnoticed by state officials and will influence 
future maritime boundary negotiations and may provide stability, thereby 
contributing to the peaceful coexistence of states. 
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
The question was asked in the beginning of this chapter as to whether the principles 
of maritime boundary delimitations of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm are the 
same as the principles for the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 nm. It 
has been pointed out that the method of delimitation is the same in inner and outer 
continental shelf delimitations. These arguments were confirmed in the Bay of 
Bengal Case in which ITLOS noted that the delimitation methodology is the same 
for the inner and outer continental shelf. This chapter has nevertheless pointed out  
that the method could, arguably, be applied differently in outer continental shelf 
delimitations. The different entitlement criteria between the areas within and beyond 
200 nm are the fundamental reason for this. This difference affects outer continental 
shelf delimitations, since the bases for entitlement and delimitation are linked. Title 
to the continental shelf within 200 nm is grounded on distance from the coastal 
opening, whilst the title to the outer continental shelf is grounded on the natural 
prolongation of the land mass, as understood in light of Article 76(4). The 
application of this idea however creates various technical problems and it is possible 
to read the decision in the Bay of Bengal Case as indirectly rejecting it.  
It is suggested that the factors that can adjust the provisional equidistance line 
are those based on geomorphology; rather than  geology, as the entitlement criterion 
to the continental shelf is first and foremost based on geomorphology according to 
ITLOS. Factors based on article 76, such as difference in strength of title, previously 
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decided maritime boundaries for the inner continental shelf and if the foot of the 
slope is used as the starting point for drawing the provisional equidistance line foot 
of the slope points that create inequalities could be seen as a relevant factor. Finally, 
it is suggested that the final disproportionality check could be applied differently. It 
can be argued ‒ if the foot of the slope is used as the starting point for the drawing of 
the provisional equidistance line ‒ that the ratio of the respective lengths of the foot 
of the slope, instead of coastal lengths, should be compared with the ratio of the 
relevant continental shelf of each State to find out if there is any disproportion 
between them.   
No special rule of customary international law has evolved that is solely 
applicable to outer continental shelf delimitations. No delimitation method has been 
used in a virtually uniform manner in negotiated boundary agreements involving the 
outer continental shelf. The same applies to the location of the terminus of the 
boundary line. On the other hand, the majority of States that have concluded an outer 
continental shelf boundary agreement have done so before making a submission to 
the CLCS or receiving its recommendations. 
Although the method described above is arguably sound, no State has used 
the foot of the slope as a decisive factor in negotiated maritime boundary 
delimitations and no state has asked an international court or tribunal to use it in a 
boundary delimitation. Nonetheless, the importance of the foot of the slope should 






This thesis has addressed dispute settlement and the establishment of the outer 
continental shelf. It has focused on the relationship between the delineation and 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf, the relationship between the inner and 
outer continental shelf, the relationship between the CLCS and international courts 
and tribunals, the role of science and scientific experts in international law and who 
is responsible for applying and interpreting the law in an area which involves 
complicated scientific and technical considerations. This area of international law is 
vibrant and developing quickly. Although it is a narrow field of international law, all 
major general considerations ‒ such as the sources of international law, the subjects 
of international law, the law of treaties, jurisdiction, international institutions and of 
course the settlement of disputes by peaceful means ‒ have to be considered when 
the topic is discussed.  
The modern continental shelf regime began with a unilateral declaration ‒ the 
Truman declaration. Since then, customary international law, treaty law, and the 
judgements of international courts and tribunals have developed the concept further. 
It is quite symbolic that the first judgement concerning the outer continental shelf 
was given by ITLOS – the tribunal established by the Third Conference ‒ namely 
that which created the modern treaty law on the continental shelf. Perhaps the Bay of 
Bengal Case is the spark that the Tribunal needed to become a more attractive option 
for States seeking to resolve their major law of the sea disputes. Another organ 
created by the Third Conference, the CLCS, will because of its mandate and nature, 
probably be the one in which most controversy will arise in the future. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in five main areas. 
First, by clarifying the difference between delineation and delimitation, substantively 
and procedurally, and by exploring how these actions interweave. Second, by 
clarifying the relationship between the inner and outer continental shelf. Third, by 
analysing the potential relevant circumstances in outer continental shelf 
delimitations. Fourth, by analysing the main aspects of outer continental shelf 
agreements. Fifth, by elaborating upon the foot of the slope/equidistance line 
delimitation method, created by Hollis Hedberg and further advanced by David 




Six questions were asked at the beginning of this thesis. The first question 
asked: ‘What are the similarities and differences between delineation and 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf?’, and can be answered in the following 
manner. If a comparison is made between delineation and delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm at least five observations can be made. First, the act 
of delineation and delimitation consists of drawing a line that defines the jurisdiction 
of a coastal State. Second, both acts have their roots in title. Third, the boundary line 
that is established by delineation is one between a coastal State and the Area. The 
boundary line established by a delimitation is however between two or more coastal 
States. Fourth, if a coastal State is going to delineate the continental shelf it must 
make a submission to the CLCS which has to confirm the reasonableness of the 
submission. If a coastal State wishes to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, 
however, it must communicate directly with its neighbouring State(s). Fifth, only 
coastal States are competent to decide if and when they want to draw these lines. 
The second question asked was: ‘What is the role of the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf in delineation and delimitation disputes?’ The answer 
to that question lies in the different purposes of these acts. In the delineation 
procedure the CLCS plays the role of a scientific and technical administrative buffer 
zone to curtail the territorial temptation of broad margin States and to protect the 
Area. Another role is to assist States in the submission procedure. The Commission 
can be seen as an entity created in the spirit of mixed boundary commissions even if 
it does not share all the characteristics of such commissions. The CLCS has no 
formal ties with the two other bodies established by UNCLOS. It must however be 
noted that the activities of the bodies established by UNCLOS are supposed to be 
complementary. The ties between the CLCS and the Meeting of States Parties have 
been rather strong and the CLCS has sought the advice of the Meeting to legitimise 
important decisions. The Commission is comprised of individuals, not State 
representatives although the State that nominated the CLCS member covers his 
expenses. Some of the Commission’s recommendations have provoked strong 
responses, especially regarding its interpretation of the term natural prolongation. 




of Bengal Case it is unlikely that the responses to this issue will be as strong in the 
future.   
UNCLOS leaves no room for the CLCS when it comes to delimitation. The 
non-prejudice clauses of the Convention are absolutely clear on this issue. The Rules 
of Procedure have expanded the non-prejudice clauses to cases of unresolved land or 
maritime disputes, such as the dispute between Argentina and the UK concerning the 
Falkland Islands. This has been criticised, although this development could be seen 
as an amendment by agreement by the Parties in the meaning of the VCLT. Three 
methods (joint, separate and partial submissions) that are not described in UNCLOS 
have been invented to allow the Commission to carry out its delineation work 
without violating the non-prejudice clauses. Partial submissions are the most 
common submissions, comprising the majority of all submissions yet made.  
The third question asked was the following: ‘What is the role of international 
courts and tribunals in disputes regarding the establishment of the outer continental 
shelf?’ The conclusion was reached that the role of international courts and tribunals 
in outer continental shelf delimitations is threefold; (1) to settle disputes between 
disputing parties regarding the delineation and delimitation of the outer continental 
shelf in accordance with the law; (2) to safeguard an holistic interpretation and 
application of international law and spare it from fragmentation; and (3) to contribute 
to substantive law-making. Another important task with which international courts 
and tribunals are faced is, in this context, the evaluation of complex scientific and 
technical evidence. The position taken in this thesis is that courts and tribunals are 
fully capable of evaluating this type of evidence by using the various available 
procedural methods to acquire the necessary scientific and technical expertise.  
The fourth question asked was ‘whether there are any special factors 
concerning the outer continental shelf that limit the jurisdiction of international 
courts and tribunals?’ The answer to this question is that the only factor limiting the 
jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals in disputes regarding the outer 
continental shelf, any more than in different types of disputes in general, is the 
optional exception clause, which excludes disputes concerning maritime boundaries 
from the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. It must be strongly 




tribunal in a delimitation case and there certainly does not exist an obligation for 
States to first determine the outer limits of their continental shelf before proceeding 
to a delimitation with neighbouring States. Neither does the evaluation of complex 
scientific and technical evidence by international courts and tribunals have any effect 
on their jurisdiction. 
The fifth question asked was as follows: ‘Are the principles of the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm the same as those for within 200 
nm?’ When answering this question, it was maintained that the method of 
delimitation is the same in inner and outer continental shelf delimitations, as 
confirmed by ITLOS. The method could however, arguably, be applied differently in 
outer continental shelf delimitations. The different entitlement criteria between the 
areas within and beyond 200 nm are the fundamental reason for this. This difference 
affects outer continental shelf delimitations, since the bases for entitlement and 
delimitation are linked. Title to the continental shelf within 200 nm is grounded on 
distance from the coastal opening, whilst title to the outer continental shelf is 
grounded on the natural prolongation of the land mass, as understood in the light of 
article 76(4). The application of this idea could however create various technical 
problems and it is possible to read the decision in the Bay of Bengal Case as 
indirectly rejecting it. 
 It is suggested that the factors that can adjust the provisional equidistance line 
are those based on geomorphological factors; rather than geology, as the entitlement 
criterion to the continental shelf is first and foremost based on geomorphology 
according to ITLOS. Factors that may be deemed relevant enough to be able to adjust 
the provisional equidistance line could be based on article 76, such as difference in 
strength of title, previously decided maritime boundaries for the inner continental 
shelf and, if the foot of the slope is used as the starting point for drawing the 
provisional equidistance line, foot of the slope points that create inequalities. Finally, 
it is suggested that the final disproportionality check could be applied differently. It 
can be argued, if the foot of the slope is used as the starting point for the drawing of 
the provisional equidistance line, that the ratio of the respective lengths of the foot of 




relevant continental shelf of each State to find out if there is any disproportion 
between them.   
The sixth and final question asked was whether a rule of customary 
international law has emerged that is especially applicable in outer continental shelf 
delimitations. The analysis of the concluded boundary agreements delimiting the 
outer continental shelf seem to confirm that no special rule of customary 
international law has evolved that is solely applicable to outer continental shelf 
delimitations. No delimitation method has been used in a consistent manner in 
negotiated boundary agreements involving the outer continental shelf. The same 
applies to the allocation of the terminus of the boundary line. Nonetheless, the 
majority of States that have concluded an outer continental shelf boundary agreement 
have done so before making a submission to the CLCS or receiving its 
recommendations. Inner and outer continental shelf boundary agreements are thus 
fairly similar. States have used the inherent flexibility of negotiations to reach a 
conclusion.  
The main contribution of the thesis to debates regarding general international 
law concerns problems of coherency and fragmentation.
1210
 It explains that in the 
first maritime boundary case before ITLOS, the Tribunal gave a coherent and 
consistent reading of the law on boundary delimitation, in line with the case law of 
ICJ and arbitral tribunals. In other words, ITLOS has done its best to ensure 
coherence, as has the ICJ.
1211
 This fact supports Simma’s statement: ‘Rather than 
resulting in fragmentation, the emergence of more international courts, combined 
with an increasing willingness of states to submit their disputes to judicial settlement, 
has revived international legal discourse.’
1212
 The thesis also explains that the ITLOS 
judgement does not upset the relationship between the CLCS and international courts 
and tribunals. Their activities are complementary to each other, as ITLOS stated. 
Although the CLCS has been given a functional authority to interpret and apply 
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UNCLOS in this field of international law the importance of authoritative judicial 
interpretation is not less than in other fields of the law. As discussed in the thesis the 
decision of ITLOS developed various issues regarding the relationship between the 
establishment of the outer continental shelf, the dispute settlement mechanism of 
UNCLOS and delimitations between neighbouring states. This is a clear evidence of 
the law making role of the courts and tribunals under the dispute settlement 
mechanism of UNCLOS. 
This thesis has addressed the interaction of the various mechanisms within 
UNCLOS concerning delineation and delimitation of the continental shelf. It has 
tried to fit together the various pieces of the continental shelf puzzle. The main 
conclusion is that despite the possibility for tension to arise the relationship between 
the various institutions is clear and precise and they together form a coherent system 
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